Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb

Decision Date08 December 1943
Citation52 N.E.2d 27,315 Mass. 176
PartiesLOWELL BAR ASS'N et al. v. LOEB et al. In re LOEB.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Morton, Judge.

Suit in equity by Lowell Bar Association and another against Birdie T. Loeb and another, wherein the Attorney General intervened as an additional petitioner, to restrain defendants from holding themselves out as authorized, qualified and able to practice law, and from engaging in the practice of law. From interlocutory and final decrees enjoining defendants from advertising a tax service and from engaging in the making out of income tax returns as a regular occupation, defendants appeal.

Interlocutory decree permitting Attorney General to intervene affirmed; final decree modified, and as so modified, affirmed. H. W. Cole and C. W. O'Brien, both of Boston, for Louis G. Loeb.

R. B. Walsh, of Lowell, for Lowell Bar Ass'n.

A. Z. LeMoine, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Attorney General.

R. G. Dodge, E. H. Sullivan, and R. B. Heavens, all of Boston, and R. S. Woodbury, of Springfield, amici curiae.

Before FIELD, C. J., and LUMMUS, QUA, COX, and RONAN, JJ.

LUMMUS, Justice.

This is a petition in equity, under G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 221, § 46B, inserted by St.1935, c. 346, § 2, brought by an incorporated association of members of the bar, to restrain the respondents, who are not members of the bar, from holding themselves out as authorized, entitled, competent, qualified and able to practise law, from engaging in the practice of law, and from giving legal advice in respect to liability to pay income taxes and the preparation and execution of income tax returns. See, also, Steinberg v. McKay, 295 Mass. 139, 142, 3 N.E.2d 23;McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 363, 364, 10 N.E.2d 139. The petition was dismissed as to the respondent Koch, who was not served with process. The Attorney General was permitted to intervene as an additional petitioner, under the section of the statute cited. From the decree allowing him to intervene, the remaining respondents Birdie T. Loeb and J. H. Friedman appealed. There is nothing in that appeal, and it is not argued. By interlocutory decree entered on March 4, 1943, those respondents were enjoined until the further order of the court ‘from in any form or manner advertising in the newspapers of this Commonwealth the making of tax returns, from maintaining signs or placards in the windows of the premises at 260 Merrimack Street, Lowell, Massachusetts, and from in any manner practicing law in this Commonwealth.’ By the final decree, entered on March 15, 1943, those respondents were ‘permanently enjoined and restrained from advertising a tax service in any form whatsoever, whether in newspapers, placards or signs displayed in their various offices, and from engaging in the making out of income tax returns as a regular occupation and other than the occasional drafting thereof and from engaging in the practice of the law in any of its aspects,’ and were ordered to pay costs. From each decree these respondents appealed. The case is here on a voluntary report of ‘all the material facts', and a report of all the evidence under G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 214, § 24, and Rule 76 of the Superior Court (1932).

In our consideration of the facts, we are not limited to those recited in the findings of the judge, even though he undertook to find ‘all the material facts.’ All the evidence is before us, and all questions of law, fact and discretion are open for our decision. From the evidence we can find facts not expressly found by the judge. If convinced that he was plainly wrong, we can find facts contrary to his findings. Trade Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Peters, 291 Mass. 79, 83, 84, 195 N.E. 900;Culhane v. Foley, 305 Mass. 542, 543, 26 N.E.2d 331;Marshall v. Landau, 308 Mass. 239, 241, 242, 31 N.E.2d 540;Bernhardt v. Atlantic Finance Corp., 311 Mass. 183, 40 N.E.2d 713;McLaughlin v. Old Colony Trust Co., 313 Mass. 329, 330, 47 N.E.2d 276.

The facts may be summarized as follows: One Louis G. Loeb, an attorney at law practising in Boston, the husband of the respondent Birdie T. Loeb, had an interest in a business of making out income tax returns for wage earners which was carried on in Quincy in 1941, and was then discontinued. In the summer of 1942 he planned to establish a similar business in a number of manufacturing cities. Recent statutes had required income tax returns from many wage earners previously exempt, and the trend was toward a further extension of tax liability. U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, Title 26, § 51, originally enacted as Act of May 28, 1938, c. 289, § 51, 52 U.S.Sts. at Large, 476, and later amended by Act of June 25, 1940, c. 419, Title I, § 7(a), 54 U.S.Sts. at Large, 519, Act of September 20, 1941, c. 412, Title I, § 112(a), 55 U.S.Sts. at Large, 696, and Act of October 21, 1942, c. 619, Title I, §§ 131(c)(1), 136(a), 56 U.S.Sts. at Large, 828, 836. For the Victory Tax, see Act of October 21, 1942, c. 619, Title I, § 172, 56 U.S.Sts. at Large, 884, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Acts.

To carry out his plan, he organized the unincorporated American Tax Service, with headquarters in Boston which soon after establishment were moved to his law office, and with branch offices in Lowell, Lawrence and other manufacturing cities. He is the real owner of the business, although he devotes little time to it. The respondent Birdie T. Loeb devotes all her time to the business, and ostensibly is the proprietor. The respondent Friedman is general manager, and has his office at the Boston headquarters. The respondent Koch was manager of the Lowell branch until succeeded by one Shea. The business has about one hundred employees during the season for income tax returns. None of them is a member of the bar. None of them appears to be an accountant, with the exception of the respondent Friedman.

The American Tax Service does not attempt to make out income tax returns for corporations, partnerships, estates, fiduciaries or business men conducting a business. Its patrons are exclusively persons whose income consists wholly, or almost wholly, of salary or wages. It advertises extensively in newspapers and by signs in its windows. There is little modesty or restraint about its advertising, which is designed to arrest attention and to bring in a large volume of business. Its uniform prices are $2 for a State or Federal return, and $3.75 for both returns. Its ‘maximum charge for all returns to any one person’ is advertised to be the latter sum.

The legal principles underlying this case are now well established. The judicial department of government, and no other, has power to license persons to practise law. Statutes may aid by providing machinery and criminal penalties, but may not extend the privilege of practising law to persons not admitted to practice by the judicial department. Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313;In re Keenan, 310 Mass. 166, 37 N.E.2d 516, 137 A.L.R. 766;Matter of Keenan, 313 Mass. 186, 196, 204, 205, 47 N.E.2d 12; Note, 144 A.L.R. 150. As constituted at present, the Massachusetts bar is a unit. Each member may practise in any State court and in any branch of legal work, without regard to his special qualifications in one branch or his comparative lack of them in another. In England, the legal profession is divided, and lawyers may practise only in the branch of work for which they have been admitted. Formerly a similar division existed in this Commonwealth. Washburn, Judicial History of Massachusetts, 189, 200, 201; S.J.C. Rules, 1806, 2 Mass. 72, 105; S.J.C. Rules, 1810, 6 Mass. 382; St.1782, c. 9, § 4. Rev.Sts.(1836) c. 88, § 23. Pub.Sts.(1882) c. 159, § 37. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 221, § 37. The justification for excluding from the practice of law persons not admitted to the bar is to be found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons, over whom the judicial department could exercise little control. Matter of Shoe Manufacturers Protective Association, Inc., 295 Mass. 369, 372, 3 N.E.2d 746. See, also, McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 363, 366, 10 N.E.2d 139.

A member of the bar is held to a high standard of honor and of ethical conduct. He may not advertise for business or solicit employment. Matter of Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 159 N.E. 495, 55 A.L.R. 1309;Matter of Maclub of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 48, 3 N.E.2d 272, 105 A.L.R. 1360;Matter of Thibodeau, 295 Mass. 374, 376, 3 N.E.2d 749, 106 A.L.R. 542;Commonwealth v. Brown, 302 Mass. 523, 20 N.E.2d 478, appeal dismissed Brown v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 504, 60 S.Ct. 96, 84 L.Ed. 432. But ‘a member of the bar is free to engage in commercial pursuits of an honorable character and to advertise and to extend his purely mercantile business honestly and fairly by ordinary commercial methods.’ Matter of Thibodeau, 295 Mass. 374, 376, 3 N.E.2d 749, 750, 106 A.L.R. 542. See, also, Commonwealth v. Ferris, 305 Mass. 233, 234, 235, 25 N.E.2d 378.

The judicial department is necessarily the sole arbiter of what constitutes the practice of law. Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 614, 194 N.E. 313;Matter of Shoe Manufacturers Protective Association, Inc., 295 Mass. 369, 372, 3 N.E.2d 746;State v. Kirk, 133 Neb. 625, 276 N.W. 380;People v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 349, 8 N.E.2d 941, 111 A.L.R. 1;Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 474, 475, 101 S.W.2d 977;Judd v. City Trust & Savings Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 85, 12 N.E.2d 288. It is not easy to define the practice of law. Since it undertakes to determine all controversies as to rights that may arise among men, the law pervades all human affairs. This has become increasingly evident in recent years. Statutes familiar to everyone have made almost every citizen feel the heavy hand of the law, helping him or hampering him, often adding to his financial burdens, and markedly increasing...

To continue reading

Request your trial
66 cases
  • West Virginia State Bar v. Earley
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • June 9, 1959
    ... ... 462, 176 N.E. 901; Bump v. District Court of Polk County, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N.W.2d 914; Lowell Bar Association v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27; Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N.W ... ...
  • Vincent v. Plecker
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • May 13, 1946
    ... ... See also Nashua & Lowell Railroad v. Boston & Lowell Railroad, 164 Mass. 222, 41 N.E. 268,49 Am.St.Rep. 454;Faulkner v ... Paramount Pictures, Inc., 311 Mass. 580, 42 N.E.2d 524;Lowell Bar Association v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 187, 188, 52 N.E.2d 27. Since no further decree has been entered, unless the decree ... ...
  • Sperry v. State of Florida the Florida Bar
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • May 27, 1963
    ... ... denied, 286 U.S. 559, 52 S.Ct. 641, 76 L.Ed. 1292 (1932) (Customs Court). Compare Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 184—185, 52 N.E.2d 27, 33—34 (1943) (Treasury and Tax Court) ... ...
  • First Escrow, Inc., In re
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • October 27, 1992
    ... ... First Fed. Sav. & L. Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Ky.1961); 22 Loeb, 52 N.E.2d at 35; Pioneer Title, 326 P.2d at 411-2; Opinion No. 26, 130 N.J.L.J. at 26; ... Miller v. Vance, 463 N.E.2d 250 (Ind.1984); Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943); State Bar v. Kupris, 366 Mich. 688, 116 ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Auditor independence, Sarbanes-Oxley, and tax services.
    • United States
    • Tax Executive Vol. 54 No. 5, September 2002
    • September 1, 2002
    ...only members of the bar may engage. When we pass beyond those propositions, we enter debatable ground. Lowell Bar Association v. Loeb, 52 N.E.2d 27, 32-33 (Mass. 1943) (citations and footnotes omitted). In Loeb, the persons were found not to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law wh......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT