Girard v. St. Louis Car-Wheel Co.

• Decision Date: 19 June 1894
• Citation: 27 S.W. 648
• Parties: GIRARD v. ST. LOUIS CAR-WHEEL CO.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

27 S.W. 648

GIRARD v. ST. LOUIS CAR-WHEEL CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

June 19, 1894.

RELEASE — PLEADING — NECESSITY OF CANCELLATION — RETURN OF BENEFITS RECEIVED.

1. In an action for damages for personal injuries, defendant, by answer, set up an alleged agreement in the nature of a release or discharge of the cause of action. To that plea plaintiff replied that the agreement had been obtained by fraud, while he was unable, because of pain and suffering caused by the injuries, to comprehend his act in signing it, and that he never assented to the agreement. Held, that the reply to the plea of a release was sufficient in an action at law, without resorting to equity to cancel that document. Gantt, Sherwood, and Burgess, JJ., dissenting.

2. Where a reply a fraud is made to a plea of release, and no point is interposed in the trial court of any deficiency in the reply on account of any omission to tender back the benefits received under the agreement for a release, and the record shows that those benefits were accounted for in the judgment, there is no prejudicial error in the omission to allege or prove an offer to return those benefits, even if such offer were otherwise necessary to avoid the release.

(Syllabus by the Judge.)

In banc. Appeal from St. Louis circuit court; Daniel Dillon, Judge.

Action by one Girard against the St. Louis Car-Wheel Company. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals to the St. Louis court of appeals, which transferred the case to the supreme court. Affirmed.

Lee & Ellis and W. E. Fisse, for appellant. A. R. Taylor, for respondent.

BARCLAY, J.

The petition states a case for damages on account of personal injuries suffered by plaintiff while in the employ of the defendant company. It charges as the cause negligence in respect of the operation of certain hoisting machinery, under the direction of defendant's superintendent, in its shops in St. Louis; and alleges that, in consequence of that negligence (the particulars of which are not important at this stage of the proceedings), a heavy timber fell upon plaintiff, disabling him from labor, etc. The answer denies the charge of negligence, and sets up, as a bar to plaintiff's action, a written instrument, signed by plaintiff and by one of defendant's officers, in which, after reciting the fact of plaintiff's injury, the following stipulations appear: "The said Car-Wheel Co., on their part, proposes to furnish and pay for all the medical attendance necessary for his recovery from said injuries sustained by said accident, and to keep his name on its pay roll at the uniform wages per day for all working days which he has been up to this time credited, and in any other way in their power assist in his recovery until he is physically sufficiently recovered from said accident, evidenced by physician's certificate, to resume work. And that on his part, beyond the above obligation of the St. Louis Car-Wheel Co., he relinquishes all other claims whatsoever as to them; and that he agrees to this deliberately, and of his own free will, and without any undue influence from any one. The said parties, in evidence of which, and in good faith, sign this, the date first herein written." Defendant alleged compliance on its part with the above agreement, so far as plaintiff had permitted such compliance, and prayed judgment. Plaintiff, by a reply, charged that the said agreement had been obtained from him by gross fraud and misrepresentations of defendant and its agents; that at the time it was made he was in the deepest distress and mental and bodily pain, and was unable, through his bodily and mental condition, to understand or comprehend the contents of said agreement, and did never assent to the terms thereof. These allegations of fraud and incapacity are repeated in several forms with considerable particularity of detail, but the above outline will be sufficient for present purposes. The cause came to trial before Judge Dillon and a jury. It is not necessary to go into the evidence as to the plaintiff's original right of recovery, since no point is made in this court on that branch of the case. The only questions of any difficulty now submitted concern the rules of law to be applied in view of the so-called "release" or "settlement."

The plaintiff's testimony tended to prove that his injury occurred September 13, 1889, and the agreement (which we will for convenience call a release) was signed the next day, about noon. The timber which struck plaintiff was about 18 feet long and 6 by 9 inches thick. It hit him in the back. He was knocked to the ground, senseless. His arm was broken. Blood oozed from his forehead, and his face was scratched. He could not stand. He had to be carried away from the shop. He was put into an ambulance, and taken to the city hospital. The next day he was removed to his boarding house. He testified that he had no recollection of signing the release. That at that time he was unable to read or comprehend anything. If he attempted to read, he could merely "see a gleam" in front of him. "That for four or five weeks he was not in his proper mind, or able to understand things. That during the first week he did not easily recognize people who called on him." He suffered intense pain, which did not begin to abate for two months. His face and jaws were badly swollen; his eyes discolored, and almost closed. He had a lump on the back of his head for some time after the mishap. Six or eight days later he found a copy of the release on the floor of his room. He gave it to his attorney soon afterwards, and then brought this action in October, 1891. Several of his fellow workmen who called to see him on the day the release was signed and on the following day gave various descriptions of his condition. For instance: "He was excited and bewildered;" "his mind was not clear;" "he was more jovial than was usual with him;" "he did not seem rational;" "he didn't seem to me to act or talk at the time as I saw him do before." The defendant's testimony contradicted that above quoted, and tended to prove that plaintiff understood the release, assented to its terms, executed it freely, and that no fraud was practiced upon him. Under its terms, defendant employed a physician to treat plaintiff, at a cost of $50, up to the time plaintiff discharged him, shortly before bringing this suit. The defendant further paid $10 to another physician who had been called to plaintiff's aid at the shop in the emergency when he was first injured. Defendant also kept plaintiff's name on the pay roll, and was ready and willing to pay him wages according to the terms of the release; but he would not or did not accept such payment. The trial court submitted the issue of release upon instructions, under which the jury found that plaintiff signed that paper at the instance of defendant's agents, without knowing its contents, and never did assent to its terms. They also found that the release was signed when plaintiff was in such a mental condition that he could not comprehend its contents, and that defendant's agents took advantage of that condition to induce him to sign the paper without understanding it, intending thereby to defraud plaintiff of his cause of action set forth in the petition herein. On that issue the court gave the following instructions at the instance of defendant, viz.: "(4) The jury are instructed, even though you should believe from the evidence the release pleaded by defendant to have been unfair to the defendant, and not a sufficient recompense for plaintiff's injuries, still this will not relieve plaintiff from its force and effect as a bar to his recovery in this action. The only way in which plaintiff can effect the conclusiveness of this bar is to satisfy you by a preponderance of evidence that plaintiff, when he signed the release, had not sufficient mental power to know the nature of the instrument he was signing." "(7) The court instructs the jury, that the paper `read in evidence, signed by the plaintiff, and termed a `release,' is on its face a release and discharge of the cause of action sued on in this case. It is a presumption of law that the plaintiff understood and agreed to the terms and contents of said paper when he signed it, and the burden is on the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of evidence that he was not acquainted with the contents of the paper, and that he did not voluntarily agree to release his claim for damages growing out of his injury upon the terms stated in said petition, or that defendant fraudulently procured the execution thereof by him; and, unless the plaintiff has affirmatively so proven these facts to the satisfaction of the jury by a preponderance of proof, they should find for the defendant." "(12) The court instructs the jury that in determining the question whether the paper offered in evidence, and termed a `release,' was freely and voluntarily signed by the plaintiff, they are not at liberty to consider whether the terms of said release were reasonable, nor whether the undertakings of the defendant therein constituted a full and adequate compensation for his injury." The bill of exceptions also shows that, "the cause being submitted to the jury, they found a verdict in favor of plaintiff, such verdict being an award of damages in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $1,562, less the sum of $62, paid by the defendant under the terms of the release given in evidence; leaving the amount of damages $1,500." The jury also found for the plaintiff on the issues of negligence, under appropriate instructions, which need not be examined, as this appeal does not call in question any rulings on that part of the case. After the usual motions and exceptions, defendant appealed to the St. Louis court of appeals, but, as the judges of that court were divided in opinion (Girard v. Wheel Co., 46 Mo. App. 81), the case was transferred to the supreme court, under the provisions of the constitution (Amend...