Girouard's Case

Decision Date17 February 1950
Citation145 Me. 62,71 A.2d 682
PartiesGIROUARD'S CASE. GIROUARD v. BATES MFG. CO.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Lessard & Delahanty, Thomas E. Delahanty, Lewiston, for claimant, Oliver Girouard.

Kneeland & Splane, Boston Mass., Sanford L. Fogg, Augusta, for Bates Mfg. Co., Androscoggin Division, defendant.

Before MURCHIE, C. J., and THAXTER, FELLOWS, MERRILL, NULTY, and WILLIAMSON, JJ.

MERRILL, Justice.

On appeal. This is an appeal from a pro forma decree by a Justice of the Superior Court in accord with a decision of the Industrial Accident Commission awarding compensation to the petitioner, Oliver Girouard. To the petition for compensation, the respondent filed an answer denying each and every allegation thereof. R.S. Chap. 26, Sec. 37 provides as follows: 'If from the petition and answer there appear to be facts in dispute, the commissioner shall then hear such witnesses as may be presented, or by agreement the claims of both parties as to such facts may be presented by affidavits. If the facts are not in dispute, the parties may file with the commission an agreed statement of facts for a ruling upon the law applicable thereto. From the evidence or statements thus furnished the commissioner shall in a summary manner decide the merits of the controversy. His decision, findings of fact and rulings of law, and any other matters pertinent to the questions so raised shall be filed in the office of the commission, and a copy thereof attested by the clerk of the commission mailed forthwith to all parties interested. His decision, in the absence of fraud, upon all questions of fact shall be final.'

This provision of the statute is mandatory. Not only is it mandatory but it is jurisdictional. If an answer to a petition, as here, raises issues of fact the Commission has no authority to hear and determine those issues except in one of the three methods set forth in the statute, (1) upon the testimony of witnesses, (2) by agreement upon affidavits presenting the claims of both parties, or (3) upon an agreed statement of facts filed with the Commission by parties for a ruling upon the law applicable thereto.

As we said in Maguire's Case, 120 Me. 398, 115 A. 176: 'The tribunal known as the Industrial Accident Commission, and all proceedings thereunder, are purely creatures of the statute. No jurisdiction is conferred except as the statute confers it. Therefore the statutory requirements must be strictly complied with.'

The Industrial Accident Commission cannot clothe itself with a jurisdiction it does not possess, nor can the parties confer upon it such jurisdiction either by waiver, consent or express stipulation. Jurisdiction may be conferred only by law, never by act or omission of the tribunal or, except over their persons, of the parties appearing before it.

This case was heard before the Industrial Accident Commission upon the testimony of witnesses. Decree was rendered and the parties notified as required by the foregoing provision of the statute. As before stated, the case is now before this Court on an appeal from the pro forma decree of a Justice of the Superior Court in accordance with the decree of the Industrial Accident Commission. The record presented to us contains no report of the evidence before the Commission, nor does it contain any abstract thereof approved either by the Justice of the Superior Court rendering the pro forma decree, or by the Industrial Accident Commission, or any of its members hearing the case.

The only review of orders and decrees of the Industrial Accident Commission by the courts is that provided for in R.S. Chap. 26, Sec. 41. This section setting forth the procedure to be followed and conferring jurisdiction upon the court to review is as follows:

'Any party in interest may present copies, certified by the clerk of the commission, of any order or decision of the commission or of any commissioner, or of any memorandum of agreement approved by the commissioner of labor and industry, together with all papers in connection therewith, to the clerk of courts for the county in which the accident occurred; or if the accident occurred without the state, to the clerk of courts for the county of Kennebec; whereupon any justice of the superior court shall render a pro forma decree in accordance therewith and cause all interested parties to be notified. Such decree shall have the same effect and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same as though rendered in a suit in equity duly heard and determined by said court, except that there shall be no appeal therefrom upon questions of fact found by said commission or by any commissioner, or where the decree is based upon a memorandum of agreement approved by the commissioner of labor and industry.

'Upon any appeal therefrom the proceedings shall be the same as in appeals in equity procedure, and the law court may, after consideration, reverse or modify any decree so made by a justice based upon an erroneous ruling or finding of law. There shall be no appeal however from a decree based upon any order or decision of the commission or of any commissioner unless said order or decision has been certified and presented to the court within 20 days after notice of the filing thereof by the commission or by any commissioner; and unless appeal has been taken from such pro forma decree within 10 days after such certified order or decision has been so presented. In cases where after appeal aforesaid by an employer the original order or decision rendered by the commission or by any commissioner is affirmed, there shall be added to any amounts payable under said order or decision, the payment of which is delayed by such appeal, interest to the date of payment. In all cases of appeal the law court may order a reasonable allowance to be paid to the employee by the employer for expenses incurred in the proceedings of the appeal including the record, not however to include expenses incurred in other proceedings in the case.'

It is to be noted that the foregoing statute provides with respect to the pro forma decree: 'Such decree shall have the same effect and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same as though rendered in a suit in equity duly heard and determined by said court, except that there shall be no appeal therefrom upon questions of fact found by said commission or by any commissioner, or where the decree is based upon a memorandum of agreement...

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