Girson v. Carter
| Decision Date | 15 May 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 39799,39799 |
| Citation | 454 P.2d 392,76 Wn.2d 18 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Bernard G. GIRSON and Julia Girson, his wife, Appellants, v. Phyliss CARTER and John Doe Carter, her husband, Respondents. |
Merges, Brain & Hilyer, Gale P. Hilyer, Jr., Seattle, for appellants.
Skeel, McKelvy, Henke, Evenson & Uhlmann, Frederick V. Betts, Seattle, for respondents.
This is an intersection collision case. The defendant concedes that she was not watching the signal light as she entered the intersection and that, as a passenger riding with her testified, it turned from yellow (warning) to red as she entered. She collided with the car driven by the plaintiff, which had entered from the defendant's right and was preparing to make a left turn. The left front of the defendant's vehicle struck the left side of the plaintiff's vehicle, just behind the driver's seat.
According to the plaintiff's testimony, she entered the intersection on the green light, having stopped for the red light. The defendant having conceded that the evidence showed she entered the intersection on a red light, there is no dispute but that the plaintiff had the right of way. However, the jury found in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff, appealing, urges that an erroneous instruction was given and also that the court should have instructed the jury to return a verdict in her favor.
We find merit in both of these contentions. The rule is that a driver proceeding into a controlled intersection with the green light has a right to proceed upon the assumption that disfavored drivers will not attempt to enter the intersection against the traffic signal. Church v. Shaffer, 162 Wash. 126, 297 P. 1097 (1931), cited with approval in Grabos v. Loudin, 60 Wash.2d 634, 374 P.2d 673 (1962).
It is true that the driver entering on the green light does not have an absolute right and must look out for and avoid colliding with other vehicles also rightfully within the intersection. Lanegan v. Crauford, 49 Wash.2d 562, 304 P.2d 953 (1956). He also may be guilty of contributory negligence if he turns directly into the path of a vehicle traveling on the same street in the opposite direction, which he fails to see but which is there to be seen. Owens v. Kuro, 56 Wash.2d 564, 354 P.2d 696 (1960). Also, if an emergency vehicle is approaching on a side street, sounding its siren and flashing its light, he has a duty to be aware of its approach and yield the right of way. Grabos v. Loudin, Supra.
However, the evidence in this case does not present any of these situations. The defendant's vehicle was not in the intersection when the plaintiff entered it but was approaching from the plaintiff's left; and the plaintiff, whether or not she saw it, had the right to assume that traffic approaching from that direction (with the exception of emergency vehicles) would stop and yield the right of way.
If there were any evidence that there was something in the manner in which the defendant's automobile was being driven which should have caught the plaintiff's attention and apprised her that it would not be brought to a halt at the intersection, a different question might be presented. But the defendant's evidence was that she was driving at a rate of about 20 miles per hour, keeping up with the flow of traffic but not doing anything erratic, so there is no evidence on which a jury could base a finding that the plaintiff should have been alerted to the fact that the defendant would not obey the signal. The mere fact that the defendant entered the intersection illegally is not such evidence. If it were, the right of the favored driver at a controlled intersection would be effectively nullified.
As the plaintiff urges, the court erred in giving an instruction which permitted the jury to find that the plaintiff should have observed the defendant's approach and yielded the right of way. There was no evidence to support such a finding.
In support of the verdict, the defendant also...
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Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.
...so as to require a directed verdict for defendant. Contributory negligence must be proved by the party alleging it. Girson v. Carter, 76 Wash.2d 18, 454 P.2d 392 (1969). We do not question the axiom that where facts are undisputed and but one reasonable inference can be drawn from them, the......
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Pancoast v. McLean, 405--II
...sufficient to raise an issue for the jury. While contributory negligence cannot rest on speculation or conjecture (Girson v. Carter, 76 Wash.2d 18, 454 P.2d 392 (1969)) it has been repeatedly stated that only in rare instances is the trial court warranted in withdrawing contributory neglige......