Gish v. Scott
| Decision Date | 24 March 1961 |
| Citation | 345 S.W.2d 490 |
| Parties | James T. GISH, Appellant, v. Lurtie B. SCOTT, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Raymond C. Stephenson, Louisville, for appellant.
Victor W. Ewen, Jones, Ewen & MacKenzie, Louisville, for appellee.
CULLEN, Commissioner.
About 1:00 a. m. on a clear October night James T. Gish undertook to cross on foot a two-lane street in the suburban area of Louisville, and was struck and injured by an automobile driven by Lurtie B. Scott. The street runs north and south; the Scott car was headed south; Gish was crossing from the west side to the east; and he was struck by the left front fender of the car when he was at a point around two feet west of the center line, he having traversed less than half of the street.
In Gish's action for damages against Mrs. Scott the jury found for the defendant and judgment was entered accordingly. Appealing, Gish complains only of errors in regard to the instructions.
Gish claimed that he was crossing at an intersection in an unmarked crosswalk. The evidence for the defendant was that he was crossing at a point some 75 feet south of the intersection. The court refused to give an instruction requested by Gish as to the duty of the defendant to yield the right of way if Gish was crossing at the intersection in an unmarked crosswalk. However, the court submitted interrogatories to the jury asking for a specific finding as to whether or not Gish was crossing at a regular pedestrian crossing. The jury found that he was crossing at a place other than at the regular crossing for pedestrians. In view of this finding Gish could not have been prejudiced by the refusal of the court to instruct that the defendant was required to yield the right of way if Gish was in an unmarked crosswalk at the intersection.
Gish maintains that the court erred in refusing to instruct on the duty of the defendant to sound her horn. The evidence shows that as soon as she saw Gish the defendant applied her brakes and swerved to the right in an effort to avoid striking him. Had she sounded her horn at the same moment it would have been of no efficacy because it would not have afforded Gish any real opportunity to take proper action to evade being hit. The sounding of a horn can serve no effective purpose to warn a pedestrian unless there is sufficient time available after the warning to enable the pedestrian to take advantage of it. Such was the situation in Halbert v. Lang, 313...
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Hopper v. Reed
...The danger was imminent when the defendant first saw the child and he could do no more than try to avoid the accident. In Gish v. Scott, 345 S.W.2d 490 (Ky.), the court said: "The evidence shows that as soon as she saw Gish the defendant applied her brakes and swerved to the right in an eff......
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Leger v. Watkins
...instruct on a duty to sound his horn, citing Emerine v. Ford, Ky., 254 S.W.2d 938; Pearce v. Rawlings, Ky., 373 S.W.2d 426; and Gish v. Scott, Ky., 345 S.W.2d 490. It may be that those cases would b apposite if the only inference supported by the evidence was that adduced by Dr. Leger. On t......
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Pearce v. Rawlings
...because Beverly already was exerting every effort to reach a place of safety, and had committed herself beyond recall. See Gish v. Scott, Ky., 345 S.W.2d 490. If, on the other hand, as claimed by the plaintiff, Beverly already had reached the safety of the island, the accident was not due t......