Giudicessi v. State

• Decision Date: 14 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–2041.,13–2041.
• Citation: 868 N.W.2d 418
• Parties: Sonni M. GIUDICESSI, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. STATE of Iowa, Defendant–Appellant. and Sergio Paradiso, M.D., Ph.D., Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

868 N.W.2d 418

Sonni M. GIUDICESSI, Plaintiff–Appellee

v. STATE of Iowa, Defendant–Appellant.andSergio Paradiso, M.D., Ph.D., Defendant.

No. 13–2041.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Jan. 14, 2015.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Anne Updegraff, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Michael J. Carroll of Coppola, McConville, Coppola, Carroll, Hockenberg & Scalise, P.C., West Des Moines, and Kodi A. Brotherson of Becker & Brotherson Law Firm, Sac City, and David H. Goldman of Babich Goldman, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

Sergio Paradiso, Coralville, defendant pro se.

Heard by MULLINS, P.J., and BOWER and McDONALD, JJ.

Opinion

BOWER, J.

The State of Iowa appeals the court's denial of its motion for summary judgment finding material issues exist concerning the liability of the State, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the sexual relationship between University of Iowa psychiatrist Dr. Sergio Paradiso and his former patient Sonni Giudicessi. Limiting our inquiry on the intent of Paradiso, we find Paradiso's acts were “so far removed” from the scope of his employment the State cannot be held liable. We find the district court erred in finding the existence of a general issue of material fact. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Sonni Giudicessi was a patient at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC) Eating Disorder Program on three occasions from 2008 through 2009. She received inpatient and out-patient treatment for anorexia nervosa-restricting type

, alcohol abuse, and depression. Dr. Paradiso was a psychiatrist employed by the State of Iowa at UIHC, and was one of several psychiatrists who provided care to Giudicessi during two of her stays at UIHC. Paradiso conducted one-on-one counseling sessions with Giudicessi where she disclosed personal details about her past, including her alcohol abuse and sexual relationships. Paradiso's last session with Giudicessi occurred on December 7, 2009.

Giudicessi was discharged from the program in early December 2009. In February 2010, Giudicessi contacted Paradiso through an internet social network. Paradiso responded by sending Giudicessi an email, through his private email account, congratulating her on her new job and inquiring about her current residence. The two corresponded further, and eventually met in person on March 3, 2010, when Giudicessi told Paradiso to stop at a bar for an event she planned on attending. Paradiso complied and met her at the bar, and spent most of the evening with her. Paradiso arranged the next meeting for March 10 to take place in Grinnell. At that meeting, Paradiso told Giudicessi details about his personal life, including information about his son who was recently diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. At the end of the meeting, Paradiso stated he did not think meeting again was a good idea. He later told Giudicessi they could be friends and talk over the telephone and by email. Paradiso emphasized to Giudicessi they could not be seen together in public or tell anyone about their relationship, including her new psychiatrist in Des Moines.

The two began talking over the telephone every day. Paradiso mentioned moving to Italy where they could live together. The two met in Iowa City on March 19 at Paradiso's house. As they drank a bottle of wine, Paradiso again mentioned he could not do “this,” and he talked about leaving the country. Paradiso and Giudicessi slept together, but did not have sex. The next day, Paradiso attempted to have sex with Giudicessi. Giudicessi refused his advances. Paradiso went on to share personal details concerning the end of his relationship with a former girlfriend and the fact he missed having sex. The two continued to talk and arranged another meeting in Grinnell on March 29.

A sexual relationship began on March 29, 2010, and ended in June.¹ UIHC was not aware of the relationship and only learned about the relationship after Giudicessi's Des Moines-based psychiatrist, who was not associated with UIHC, reported the relationship to UIHC in July.

Paradiso worked in the psychiatry department at UIHC as a staff doctor from 1997 through his departure in July 2010. UIHC psychiatry resident doctors are trained it is inappropriate to have sexual relationships with their patients. Dr. Winokur, the department head of psychiatry, distributes a list of commandments to all residents and fellows in the department. The first commandment is: “Thou shalt not sleep with any UI Psychiatry Hospital patient unless it be thy spouse.” The American Psychiatric Association Code of Ethics prohibits relations between current and former patients. UIHC and University of Iowa policies prohibit sexual harassment.

During their three-month relationship, Paradiso mentioned to Giudicessi on multiple occasions he could get in trouble for seeing her outside the clinical setting. He emphasized the need to keep the relationship a secret. Giudicessi was also aware the relationship was improper. During the affair, Giudicessi continued to refer to Paradiso as “Doctor,” and continued to regard Paradiso as her treating psychiatrist. However, the doctor/patient relationship was not shared by Paradiso. The relations were conducted off University property, usually at Paradiso's residence or in hotels. In mid-June Paradiso sent Giudicessi an email ending the relationship. Giudicessi responded, they have not communicated since.

On July 22, 2011, Giudicessi filed an anonymous petition at law and jury demand against the State of Iowa, UIHC, and Paradiso. The claims against the State and UIHC included: medical negligence under a respondeat superior theory; negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Dr. Paradiso; and breach of contract. On October 28, the court entered an order requiring Giudicessi to file an amended petition including her name and dismissing the UIHC. She complied and filed an amended petition. The State filed an answer to the amended petition, affirmative defenses, and jury demand on December 12, 2011. The State filed a motion for summary judgment on April 23, 2013. The court found issues of material fact in existence and denied the State's motion. The State filed a motion to enlarge and amend the summary judgment ruling, which the court also denied. The State then filed an interlocutory appeal with our supreme court. The interlocutory appeal was granted and assigned to this court.

On appeal, the State claims: there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning the State's liability under the theory of respondeat superior, the court erred in considering Giudicessi's belief of continued treatment by Paradiso after her discharge a fact issue, the court erred in considering the theory of transference a fact issue, and the court erred in considering the foreseeability of a psychiatrist-patient sexual relationship a fact issue.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review rulings on motions for summary judgment for the correction of errors at law. City of Cedar Rapids v. James Props., Inc., 701 N.W.2d 673, 675 (Iowa 2005). “Summary judgment is appropriate only when the entire record demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Stevens v. Iowa Newspapers, Inc., 728 N.W.2d 823, 827 (Iowa 2007). We examine the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all legitimate inferences the evidence bears in order to establish the existence of questions of fact. Mason v. Vision Iowa Bd., 700 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Iowa 2005). “A party resisting a motion for summary judgment cannot rely on the mere assertions in [her] pleadings but must come forward with evidence to demonstrate that a genuine issue of fact is presented.” Stevens, 728 N.W.2d at 827.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Respondeat Superior

Giudicessi claims issues of material fact exist concerning whether or not the State is liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for its psychiatrist-employee's sexual relationship with a former patient.² The State responds the trial court erred in finding issues of fact existed on the State's liability for Paradiso's relations with Giudicessi, because the relations occurred outside the scope of his employment with the hospital.

Our supreme court provided an extensive discussion of the doctrine of respondeat superior:

The well-established rule is that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the negligence of an employee committed while the employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment. Jones v. Blair, 387 N.W.2d 349, 355 (Iowa 1986) ; Sandman v. Hagan , 154 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Iowa 1967). Thus, “[a] claim of vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior rests on two elements: proof of an employer/employee relationship, and proof that the injury occurred within the scope of that employment.” Biddle v. Sartori Mem'l Hosp., 518 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Iowa 1994) ; see also Vlotho v. Hardin County, 509 N.W.2d 350, 354 (Iowa 1993).

We have said that for an act to be within the scope of employment the conduct complained of “must be of the same general nature as that authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized.” Sandman, 154 N.W.2d at 117. Thus, an act is deemed to be within the scope of one's employment “where such act is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the employment and is intended for such purpose.” Id. The question, therefore, is whether the employee's conduct “is so unlike that authorized that it is ‘substantially different.’ ” Id. Said another way, “a deviation from the employer's business or interest to pursue the employee's own business or interest must be substantial in nature to relieve the employer from liability.” Id. at 118.

Section 229(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1957) lists the following factors to be considered in determining whether conduct of an employee may be characterized as occurring within the scope of the employee's employment:

(a) whether or not the act is one

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