Glade Coal Min. Co. v. Harris
| Decision Date | 09 February 1909 |
| Citation | 63 S.E. 873,65 W.Va. 152 |
| Parties | GLADE COAL MINING CO. v. HARRIS et al. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted June 13, 1908.
Syllabus by the Court.
An answer of a guardian ad litem alleging want of personal knowledge of the matters alleged in the bill against infant defendants, but that he is advised they have material interests therein, admitting nothing alleged against them and calling for full proof of each and every allegation of the bill, in any wise affecting or pertaining to their interest, and committing the same to the protection of the court, is sufficient to put plaintiff on proof of every allegation of the bill affecting said infants, and it is not necessary that such answer should otherwise negative the allegation of the bill.
[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Infants, Cent. Dig. § 281; Dec Dig. § 92. [*] ]
Admissions in the answers of mother and father of infant defendants to a bill of complaint against them and others are not binding on such infant defendants, and cannot be read against them on final hearing of the cause.
[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Infants, Cent. Dig. § 291; Dec Dig. § 95. [*] ]
If such admissions are conclusions of law, and not of facts alleged in the bill, it is bad pleading, and they will be treated as surplusage.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. § 426; Dec. Dig. § 186. [*] ]
An answer to a bill, whether sworn to or not, is not evidence for defendant. Its only effect under section 3856, Code 1906, is to put the plaintiff on proof of the material allegations of the bill denied by the answer.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. § 685; Dec. Dig. § 339. [*] ]
Delivery of a deed conveying land is always a question of intention, to be determined from the deed itself, and from the facts and circumstances attending the execution thereof. Delivery may be actual or constructive. If the parties meet to make it, and read, sign, and acknowledge it without reservation, this, as a general rule, amounts to delivery. Delivery is complete when there is intention manifested on the part of the grantor to make the instrument his deed.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. § 117; Dec. Dig. § 56. [*]
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1958-1970; vol. 8, p. 7632.]
It is the duty of the courts to protect the interests of infant litigants; and this rule is applicable to appellate courts as well as to trial courts, and on appeal an infant will be given the benefit of every defense of which he could have availed himself, or which might have been interposed for him in the trial court, and, where the record shows error as to a minor defendant, the decree will be reversed, though there is no appeal on his part; it being the duty of the chancellor as the guardian of infants to protect their rights.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Infants, Cent. Dig. § 331; Dec. Dig. § 115. [*] ]
Appeal from Circuit Court, Barbour County.
Bill by the Glade Coal Mining Company against Priscilla C. Harris and Margaret B. Stalnaker and Henry Holsberry and others. Decree for complainant, and defendants Margaret B. Stalnaker and Henry Holsberry appeal. Reversed, and bill dismissed.
J. Hop Woods and Harry G. Byrer, for appellants.
F. O. Blue and W. T. George, for appellee.
MILLER, P.
The plaintiff, claiming by right of assignment from E. C. Moore, sues for specific execution of an option contract, made December 16, 1901, between the owner, Martin Holsberry, and said Moore, for the sale and purchase of coal under a tract of 230 acres of land in Barbour county. The bill makes defendants thereto Priscilla C. Harris, a daughter of said Holsberry, Ira Harris, her husband, and Grover Harris, Virgil Harris, Bretz Harris, and Martin Harris, their infant children; also Margaret B. Stalnaker, a sister of said Priscilla C. Harris, said Moore, and others. The contract fixed the price for the coal at $12 per acre, gave the optionee until March 1, 1902, to take the coal upon the terms of purchase, and, among other things, stipulated that in the event he "should fail to pay the purchase price therefor on or before March 1, 1902, or elect not to take the same in a reasonable time thereafter, then such agreement should be void and the parties thereto mutually released therefrom." The bill alleges, on information, which it charges to be true, that the right or option to purchase said coal was within the time provided and contemplated by said contract accepted in writing, and that this right was subsequently, for a valuable consideration, sold and transferred by said Moore to plaintiff, the then owner, with right of enforcement thereof. Another allegation of the bill is that by deed of October 16, 1902, the said Holsberry, in consideration of $1, natural love and affection, and other considerations thereinafter named, granted, sold, and conveyed said tract of land unto the said Priscilla C. Harris during her natural life, and at her death to descend to her children in fee simple; also, granting and conveying unto her all the personal property of every kind and character, including household and kitchen furniture, that he might own at the time of his death, with covenants of general warranty, being subject to the provisions: That, should the said Ira Harris die before his wife, then said property should descend as aforesaid to her children, but not to her children by any subsequent marriage; that in the event she should survive her husband, and should again marry, and bear children, she should pay to her sister, Margaret B. Stalnaker, daughter of said grantor, the sum of $500 in five annual payments of $100 each, a vendor's lien being retained to secure the payment thereof; it being further stipulated that said Martin Holsberry should remain in full possession of the property conveyed, both real and personal, and enjoy the rents, issues, and profits arising therefrom during his life. Another important allegation of the bill is that said deed was signed, sealed, and acknowledged during the last illness of said Holsberry, that it is a testamentary paper in nature and effect, and was so intended at the time, and was in lieu of a will making disposition of his property according to the effect thereof. Another allegation is that upon the death of said Holsberry occurring shortly after making said deed said Priscilla C. Harris entered upon and took possession of the said property, both real and personal; that at the time of making said deed said Holsberry recognized and expressly stated in the presence of said Priscilla C. and Ira Harris that the written agreement between himself and said Moore of December 16, 1901, was in full force and effect; and that the rights of said grantees in said deed were subject and subordinate to the prior and superior rights of said plaintiff under said option contract, and of which said Priscilla C. and Ira Harris, and said infant defendants had full notice, knowledge, and information.
Plaintiff further alleges that it has always been ready and willing to pay the purchase money for said coal, and would have paid for the same but for the default of said Holsberry in his lifetime, to execute a deed of conveyance, free from liens and incumbrances, provided for in said deed, that it has been ready at all times to pay the parties entitled to receive the same; but because of said deed of October 16, 1902, it has never regarded it safe to make payment until said deed had been properly construed and payment thereof directed to the persons entitled thereto. The bill contained a prayer for specific and general relief. The contract exhibited with the bill, though acknowledged at the time, does not appear to have been recorded; but an indorsement thereon by the clerk shows that it was left in his office for record October 19 1905, about the time of the institution of this suit. Defendants Priscilla C. and Ira Harris promptly filed joint answers admitting all material allegations of the bill, notice to them and their infant children of the rights of plaintiff under said option contract, and respecting said deed of October 16, 1902, say: "Respondents admit that said deed of the said Martin Holsberry to the said Priscilla C. Harris was in the nature of a testamentary instrument; that the decedent, Martin Holsberry, made the said deed in writing during his last illness and but a short time before his death, and that by his instructions the same was not to be delivered until his death, and that by the terms of the said deed said property was not to come into the possession of Priscilla C. Harris until the death of the said Martin Holsberry; and respondents further answering, say that they believe that said Martin Holsberry made the said writing in lieu of a will as a method of disposing of his property." It is also alleged in said answer that by virtue of the provisions of said deed of December 16, 1902, respecting the personal property, the said Priscilla is entitled to the proceeds of the sale of said coal to said Moore; and respondents join in the prayer of said bill for a construction of said deed of October 16, 1902, and for a specific execution of said contract. After tendering her demurrer, which was overruled, defendant Margaret B. Stalnaker also filed her answer, in the nature of a cross-bill, asking for affirmative relief, charging, as alleged in the bill and admitted in the answers of Priscilla C. and Ira Harris, that said deed of October 16, 1902, was testamentary in character, and not to be and not in fact delivered until after the death of the said grantor, and did not take effect as a deed or pass any title to said grantees, in consequence of which, it is charged, the said Martin Holsberry died intestate...
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