Glaittli v. State
| Decision Date | 15 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 20130119.,20130119. |
| Citation | 765 Utah Adv. Rep. 16,332 P.3d 953 |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
| Parties | Todd GLAITTLI, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of Utah and John Does I–V, Defendant and Appellee. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Daniel F. Bertch, Kevin K. Robson, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Bridget K. Romano, Solicitor General, Salt Lake City, for appellee.
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 This case requires us to once again define the contours of the “natural condition” exception to the waiver provision of the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah.
¶ 2 Appellant Todd Glaittli sued the State of Utah for injuries he suffered when his boat “heaved” and struck him, shattering his shoulder. Mr. Glaittli claimed his injuries were due to the negligent adjustment of a floating dock at Jordanelle Reservoir, where he kept his boat. The State claimed governmental immunity and moved to dismiss the claim under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Mr. Glaittli's injuries fell within the “natural condition” exception to the waiver of immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. We reverse and hold that a reservoir is not a natural condition on the land under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code section 63G–7–301(5)(k).
¶ 3 Todd Glaittli was the owner of a twenty-five foot cabin cruiser boat that he docked in the marina at Jordanelle Reservoir.1 The marina, docks, boat slips, and reservoir are owned by the State of Utah and operated by the Utah Division of Parks & Recreation and Jordanelle State Park. Mr. Glaittli's boat was tethered to a boat slip on a floating dock, which was connected to the shore by eight cables. Using a hand-operated winch, state employees could lengthen or shorten the dock cables as needed. The length of the cables was important. Because the dock was floating, its position could be altered by the water level of the reservoir, wind, or other forces that disturbed the water surface. Failure to properly adjust the cables risked allowing the boats to “strike the dock or other boats, especially during periods of wave action.” Although the Jordanelle Reservoir master plan recommended the creation of a breakwater to protect the docks from waves, no breakwater was ever built.
¶ 4 In early June 2008, the water levels of Jordanelle Reservoir were rising at a rate of approximately one foot per day, requiring “frequent, if not daily, adjustment of the cable tether length” of the docks. On June 10, 2008, a storm hit the area and “created large waves on the reservoir.” Mr. Glaittli believed the “wave action” created by the storm was “significant enough to warrant personal attention to his boat.” When Mr. Glaittli arrived at the marina,
he saw large waves, causing his large boat to heave to a degree that he feared his boat would strike the dock or other boats. [He] walked out onto the dock, to lengthen the lines on his boat, to allow it to ride the waves more freely .... The lines were so taut that he was unable to loosen them. While [Mr. Glaittli] was standing on the dock, he was struck by the bow of his boat, shattering his upper arm and shoulder, causing him to fall to the dock, [resulting in injuries to] his shoulder, arm and other parts of his body.
¶ 5 Mr. Glaittli attributes his injuries to the State's failure to: “adjust the dock level with the water levels;” “warn [him] of an unsafe condition at the docks;” “properly secure the docks;” and finally, to “construct a breakwater” for the marina.
¶ 6 The State claimed governmental immunity and moved to dismiss Mr. Glaittli's complaint. The parties agreed that the activity was a government function, and the State conceded for the purposes of the motion to dismiss that Mr. Glaittli's injury was “proximatelycaused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment”—meaning that governmental immunity would be generally waived.2 The district court thus evaluated only whether there was an exception to the general waiver rule that would allow the State to retain its immunity. Proceeding under Utah Code section 63G–7–301(5)(k), the district court found that the waves were a “natural condition” that caused Mr. Glaittli's injury, and thus the State retained its immunity. The district court then dismissed Mr. Glaittli's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the water and waves in the reservoir were a natural condition and that Mr. Glaittli's injuries “arose out of, were connected with, or resulted from” that natural condition.3
¶ 7 The single question on certiorari presents two distinct issues: (1) whether a reservoir is a “natural condition” under Utah Code section 63G–7–301(5)(k) and (2) if it is, whether Mr. Glaittli's injuries “ar[ose] out of, in connection with, or result[ed] from” that natural condition.4 Because we hold that the reservoir is not a natural condition, the second issue is irrelevant and we do not address it. We instead remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a determination of negligence under the negligence waiver provision.
¶ 8 “When reviewing a court of appeals decision affirming a grant of a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we review the decisions of the court of appeals rather than that of the trial court ... for correctness.” 5 Moreover, “determining the scope of an exception to the waiver of governmental immunity is a question of statutory interpretation that we also review for correctness.” 6
¶ 9 Whether a reservoir is a “natural condition on [the] land[ ]” under section 63G–7–301(5)(k) of the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah is an issue of first impression in this court. The court of appeals held that the natural condition exception applied because it reasoned that the waves caused Mr. Glaittli's injury, waves are made of water, and the “basic nature” of water is that it is a natural condition.7 The court of appeals held that the presence of a dam did not “change the basic nature of the water itself” because the water had “simply expanded onto a greater area” (i.e., into the reservoir). 8
¶ 10 In interpreting the term “natural condition” we cannot focus our inquiry too “broadly,” for if we were to do so, the statute's natural condition exception would largely “swallow the Act's waiver of immunity for negligence.” 9 This is because, as we noted in Grappendorf, “[c]onsidered broadly, natural conditions include laws of physics, such as gravity, that necessarily contribute to any accident or occurrence.” 10 Moreover, as we noted in Francis v. State, “we must exercise caution when interpreting an inexact term” (like “natural”) because “its meaning could be stretched to include almost anything.” 11 The court of appeals reached its conclusion by focusing on whether the wave and the water it was made of were a “natural condition.” This was error.12
¶ 11 In Blackner v. State, an avalanche fell onto a road, injuring the plaintiff.13 We held that the avalanche was a natural condition.14 The instant case is distinguishable because a road is separate and distinct from an avalanche in a way that waves are not separate and distinct from the body of water on which they occur. The waves and the body of water are “so closely related” that they “cannot be encountered independently.” 15 Thus, the court of appeals focused too broadly 16 when it considered the “basic nature” of water itself.17 The proper question is whether the reservoir was a natural condition upon the land. We hold that it was not.
¶ 12 Our statute reads, in pertinent part,
[i]mmunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee.... [But is] not waived ... if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from ... (k) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands. 18
In other words, the government loses its immunity if a government employee negligently causes injury, but negligence or not, the government retains its immunity if the injury arose out of a natural condition on public lands. 19
¶ 13 A reservoir is topographical in nature and, following our recent decision in Francis, is thus indisputably a “condition on the land.” 20 The question then, is whether a reservoir is “natural.” We hold that it is not. In Grappendorf, we defined “natural” as “[p]resent in or produced by nature.” 21 According to Black's Law Dictionary, something natural is “[b]rought about by nature as opposed to artificial means.” 22 As the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned in 2008, “unlike a natural body of water, which exists because of natural processes, an artificial body of water is the result of someone's labor.” 23 And a reservoir is certainly brought about by human labor.24
¶ 14 Jordanelle Dam and Reservoir was constructed from 1987 through 1992 by the United States Bureau of Reclamation in order to store water for municipal and industrial use.25 After it was built, a highway had to be relocated and two small towns were completely submerged.26 The reservoir was thus imagined, built, and brought about by “human efforts,” not nature.27 Were it not for human efforts in building the Jordanelle Dam, the Jordanelle Reservoir would not exist and in its place would remain the naturally flowing Provo River.28
¶ 15 Because the reservoir was designed and created by human activity, and because it would not exist but for that activity, we hold that the Jordanelle Reservoir is not a natural condition on the land.
¶ 16 We therefore reverse and remand to ...
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