Glascock v. State

• Citation: 10 Mo. 508
• Parties: GEORGE GLASCOCK v. THE STATE.
• Decision Date: 31 March 1847
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

10 Mo. 508

GEORGE GLASCOCK

v.THE STATE.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1847.

APPEAL FROM ST. LOUIS CRIMINAL COURT.

MCBRIDE, J.

George Glascock was indicted in the Criminal Court of St. Louis county, at the July term, 1844, for setting up and keeping a gambling device, commonly called rondo. A trial was had at the subsequent term, and the defendant was found guilty and a fine assessed against him. The defendant moved for a new trial and in arrest, which having been overruled, he excepted and brings the case here by appeal.

The bill of exceptions, after detailing the evidence given upon the trial, goes on to state that “the circuit attorney, in his concluding argument having stated to the jury that the object of the Legislature in passing the act under which the defendant was indicted, was to prevent the practice of money-making games, and that the game of rondo was a money-making game” The defendant, by his attorney, moved the following instruction: That the question before the jury was not whether the game of rondo was a money making game, but whether it was a game of chance. But the court overruled the instruction, and refused to grant it because there was no evidence to justify it, and because it was an instruction founded upon the argument of the State's attorney; to which opinion of the court, in refusing the instruction aforesaid, the defendant by his counsel, excepted. The court afterwards, at the instance of the defendant, gave the jury the following instructions: “1. If the jury shall find from the evidence that chance enters into the game of roundea, but that there is more skill than chance in it, so as to characterize it a game of skill, they ought to find the defendant not guilty. 2. If they have reasonable doubt whether rondo is a game of chance or a game of skill, they ought to find the defendant not guilty.” The court also instructed the jury, of its own accord, as follows: “To convict the defendant, you must be satisfied from the evidence that the defendant did set up the device in question; but if you shall believe from the evidence that the defendant was the keeper of the device in question, or had control or management of it, this will be sufficient evidence of the setting up of said device. And also to convict the defendant, you must be satisfied from the evidence that the device is such as was devised, adapted and designed to play a game of chance, and that the game of rondo is a game of chance.”

From a review of instructions...