Glass v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 11498.
| Decision Date | 25 February 1943 |
| Docket Number | No. 11498.,11498. |
| Citation | 170 S.W.2d 247 |
| Parties | GLASS et al. v. GREAT SOUTHERN LIFE INS. CO. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Harris County; Kenneth McCalla, Judge.
Action by the Great Southern Life Insurance Company against Jim H. Glass, as assessor and collector of taxes for Harris County, and others, to cancel an assessment for state and county taxes for the year 1941 against personal property of the plaintiff. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal, and plaintiff cross appeals.
Affirmed in part, and reversed and rendered in part.
Dan W. Jackson, Criminal Dist. Atty., and Conrad J. Landram, Asst. Criminal Dist. Atty., both of Houston, for appellants.
Frank G. Dyer, of Houston (Vinson, Elkins, Weems & Francis, of Houston, of counsel), for appellee.
This action was brought by appellee, Great Southern Life Insurance Company, against appellants, Jim H. Glass, as assessor and collector of taxes for Harris County, and against the four commissioners and the County Judge, composing the Board of Equalization of Harris County, to cancel an assessment for State and County taxes for the year 1941 against the personal property of appellee.
The assessment in question was made by the tax assessor and collector and duly referred to the Board of Equalization, and after due notice to appellee and a hearing before the Board, it was duly made and approved by the Board and placed on the tax rolls of the county.
Thereafter, on January 31, 1942, appellee Insurance Company instituted this suit in the district court of Harris County to cancel and set aside said assessment as null and void. It contended that, under Article 4754, Vernon's Ann.Civil Statutes there was no taxable value in its personal property for the year 1941 upon which an assessment could lawfully be made by appellants in favor of either the State of Texas or Harris County.
The case was tried before the court upon an agreed stipulation of the facts, under Rule 169, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. No evidence outside of the agreed stipulation was offered by either party and the trial court adopted the facts so stipulated as its findings of fact. Judgment was rendered by the trial court for appellee, Insurance Company, cancelling and declaring said assessment void in its entirety and perpetually enjoining appellants from collecting taxes based thereon in favor of the State in the sum of $5,944.71, and in favor of the County in the sum of $9,173.30.
This appeal involves a construction of Article 4754, Vernon's Ann.Civil Statutes. The question to be determined is whether appellee, Insurance Company, had any taxable value in its personal property which was subject to assessment and taxation by the State of Texas and Harris County for the year 1941. This question must be determined by the meaning placed on the term "assessed value of all real estate owned by the Company", which said Article 4754 states must be deducted from "the total valuation of its assets", before arriving at the final taxable value of the personal property of Insurance Companies incorporated under the laws of this state.
Article 4754, Vernon's Ann.Civil Statutes, reads:
It is stipulated by the parties that in the year 1941 appellee had real estate situated in Harris County and in other jurisdictions of the full and true value of $5,319,256.98, and that for the purpose of this trial taxes were paid by said appellee on said real estate in each of the jurisdictions in which it was located at a valuation of 40% of its true value. In arriving at the taxable value of appellee's personal property for the year 1941, it, in its rendition, showed the total value of all of its assets, which included an item of $5,319,251.98 as the book value and the full and true value of its real estate. In its rendition appellee deducted from the total valuation of its assets its tax exempt bonds and stocks, and its reserve, and of all its real estate. It deducted its real estate in the following manner: it rendered its real estate at 40% of its true value, or $2,237,563.72, and in deducting its real estate from its total assets it deducted that amount, thus eliminating its real estate from the total valuation of its assets. After eliminating its real estate from the total valuation of its assets there remained nothing to be taxed as personal property...
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...it waives its immunity and may be subjected to costs in the same manner as a private litigant."); Glass v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 170 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. App. 1943) (In assessing costs against the State, the court noted "it has been uniformly held that where the State enters the co......
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State v. Lead Industries Associates
...it waives its immunity and may be subjected to costs in the same manner as a private litigant."); Glass v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 170 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. App. 1943) (In assessing costs against the State, the court noted "it has been uniformly held that where the State enters the co......
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State v. Lead Industries Associates
...it waives its immunity and may be subjected to costs in the same manner as a private litigant."); Glass v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 170 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. App. 1943) (In assessing costs against the State, the court noted "it has been uniformly held that where the State enters the co......