Glavin v. Boston & M.R.r.
| Decision Date | 29 January 1913 |
| Citation | 213 Mass. 435,100 N.E. 614 |
| Parties | GLAVIN v. BOSTON & M. R. R. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Augustine
J. Daly, of Boston, for plaintiff.
Archibald R. Tisdale, of Boston, for defendant.
The plaintiff was employed to oil the bearings of the shafting on the first and second floors of the defendant's grain elevator while the machinery was in operation. In oiling the bearing of the shaft where he was at work when injured he was obliged to rest one foot on a narrow platform running parallel with the shaft, and the other foot on the handle of a shifting lever used to move the belt to and from the driving pulley. The shaft being at an elevation of 10 feet or more, the lever was worked from the floor below by use of dependent cords switching the power on or off at the will of the operator. While the plaintiff stood in this position bending over in the act of pouring oil into the oil hole of the bearing, one Gleason, who on the evidence the defendant concedes was an acting superintendent directed one McNamara to 'pull the horse,' meaning the lever in question. The order having been obeyed, the plaintiff's footing gave way as the lever moved, and he fell into the machinery.
The third count of the declaration is at common law for failure to warn the plaintiff of the dangerous character of his employment. But from his own testimony he was fully instructed when he began work as to the mode of oiling, and the attendant dangers were pointed out. Indeed he very fully stated the conditions: No additional warning or instructions could have given the plaintiff fuller information of the dangers confronting him, and the defendant is not liable on this count. Mahoney v. Dore, 155 Mass. 513, 30 N.E. 366; Regan v. Lombard, 192 Mass 319, 78 N.E. 476; Ruddy v. Geo. F. Blake Mfg. Co., 205 Mass. 172, 181, 91 N.E. 310; Goulding v. Eastern Bridge & Structural Co., 210 Mass. 52, 96 N.E. 71.
Nor can the action be maintained on the second count charging a defect in the ways, works and machinery. The mechanical equipment is not shown to have been out of repair, or its adjustment subsequently changed, making the conditions of service more dangerous, while the mode of oiling, even if inherently unsafe or abnormally dangerous, was known to and appreciated by the plaintiff at the time of employment. Caron v. Boston & Albany R. R., 164 Mass. 523, 530 531, 42 N.E. 112. The plaintiff, however, contends, that even if obvious risks were assumed he did not assume the chance of injury from the negligence of the...
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