Glaze v. State
| Decision Date | 22 October 1907 |
| Docket Number | 729. |
| Parties | GLAZE v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
In a criminal case, where the guilt or innocence of the defendant is wholly dependent upon circumstantial evidence, the jury should be instructed, without request, that the guilt of the accused must be shown to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis.
[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, § 1887.]
The controlling issue in a case must be submitted to the jury with such appropriate instructions as will not only call the attention of the jury to the existence of such issue, but the charge of the court must further contain such clear, apt, and definite exposition of the specific principles of law applicable to the case as will enable the jury to deal with the real issue in the case and to properly decide it; and this is true whether a specific request be made or not.
[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, §§ 1803-1809.]
Where there is only one defense on which a party relies, failure to instruct the jury as to this defense so specifically that the jury will be not only required to pass upon it, but will be able to do so intelligently under pertinent rules of law and evidence, practically withdraws that defense, and is, in effect, tantamount to directing a verdict.
[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, §§ 1806-1807.]
Error from City Court of Americus; Chas. R. Crisp, Judge.
Alexander Glaze was convicted of larceny from the house, and he brings error. Reversed.
Shipp & Sheppard and J. A. Hixon, for plaintiff in error.
Zach Childers, Sol., for the State.
Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted for the offense of larceny from the house. The evidence showed that Glaze went into the store of E. A. Luke, in the presence of a clerk and a customer who was at that time being waited upon by the clerk and that he claimed to want to buy a gun. The clerk was busy waiting on the other customer, and Glaze, while in plain view of the clerk, went to the gun rack and took down the gun alleged to have been stolen, and began to examine it, simultaneously speaking to the clerk, who was also the brother of the prosecutor. The clerk was, at that time, cutting off a piece of meat for his customer, and only 10 or 15 feet from the defendant. The clerk, the customer, and the defendant were the only persons in the store. Before the clerk finished waiting on the other customer, a noise was heard on the outside, and a buggy passed. The defendant started out hurriedly, carrying the gun with him, and the clerk called to him to "put down that gun." The buggy which was passing was the buggy of the defendant, which he had previously refused to lend to one of the parties whom he found in the buggy and who was driving away. When the clerk called out, "Put down that gun," the defendant immediately dropped it, or, as he claims, stood it against the store immediately outside the store door and ran on and took possession of his buggy, which was being rapidly driven off by the parties in it.
There was practically but little difference between the state and the defendant as to any of the material facts. The defendant claimed that he set the gun down and pursued the parties who were attempting to carry off his buggy. The state insists that the defendant ran off with the gun and only dropped it because his theft was discovered. The prosecutor immediately pursued the defendant and overtook him before he had succeeded in overtaking his buggy, and when the prosecutor seized the defendant the latter jerked loose, saying he had done nothing, and continued running until he overtook his buggy. It is not necessary to consider the evidence, however, as to the pursuit of the defendant, because his conduct would be just as consistent with the theory that he was trying to overtake his buggy, if he were innocent, as that he was trying to escape, if he were guilty, for he was well known both to the prosecutor and to his brother, the clerk in the store. The only question in the case, therefore, which the jury had to determine, was whether at the time that the defendant went out of the store he had the intention of stealing the gun, or, having only the intention of getting possession of his buggy, he thoughtlessly took the gun with him without any intention of converting it to his own use. The question of the defendant's intention is the only question in the case. It is the paramount, the only, issue. The accusation alleged that
The accusation is good under either section 178 or section 182 of the Penal Code of 1895. As the offense is denominated "misdemeanor," it was perhaps intended to be brought under section 182; but, whether brought under section 178 or section 182 there is no allegation that the defendant entered the storehouse with intent to steal. "Larceny from the house is the breaking or entering any house with the intent to steal or after breaking or entering said house stealing therefrom anything of value." Section 178, Pen. Code 1895. Under the statute the offense can be committed in four different ways. It may consist in the breaking a house with intent to steal, provided the offense is not burglary; entering any house with intent to steal; breaking a house and stealing therefrom, where it can be accomplished without entry or entering and stealing. The offense can be stated therefore in more than one way in the accusation, but in this accusation only one method is charged, to wit, that the defendant, after entering the house, carried away the gun with intent to steal it. And if the offense be based upon section 182, the same thing is true, for the state's case as set out in the bill of indictment limited the charge to entering the store and stealing therefrom.
Section 182 of the Penal Code of 1895 defines two classes of larceny from the house and distinguishes them. It says: "Any person breaking and entering any house or building (other than a dwelling house or its appurtenances) with intent to steal, but is detected and prevented from carrying such intent into effect." This is the first class. It is directed against those who break and enter a certain class of houses with intent to steal, but are detected before they succeed in stealing any of the articles therein contained. The section then proceeds in the following language: "Any person breaking or entering any such house or building and stealing therefrom any money, goods, chattels, wares or merchandise or any other article of value shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Of course, this second division of the section is itself subdivided into thefts where there is a breaking and entering in order to accomplish the theft, and where there is no breaking, but merely an entrance into the building and a theft is accomplished. But in both cases a theft must actually be committed. Under the first portion of section 182, as in the first clause of section 178, where a house other than a dwelling house and its appurtenances is broken and entered with intent to steal, and the offender is detected, he is guilty of larceny from the house, though nothing be taken.
Whether the accusation, therefore, be construed as based upon section 178 or section 182 of the Penal Code of 1895, the state relied for conviction solely upon proof that the defendant after having entered the store, formed the intent to steal, and upon the sole charge that the gun was carried away with the intent to steal the same. The distance of the asportation would make no difference if the defendant in carrying away the gun intended to steal it. That he dropped the gun, instead of carrying it with him, would afford him no excuse or defense if before he dropped it he had intended to steal it. The intention of the defendant therefore becomes a matter of most paramount importance to be considered by the jury. If the jury should find that he carried the gun out of the store with the intent to steal it, he would be guilty; if, on the contrary, the evidence...
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...interpret contract to determine and instruct on the delivery duties of supplier and liability for product specimen); Glaze v. State, 2 Ga. App. 704, 70809, 58 S.E. 1126, 1128 (1907) (criminal intent was sole issue in case). 159. Pritchett v. Anding, 168 Ga. App. 658, 663, 310 S.E.2d 267, 27......