Gleason v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago
| Citation | 792 F.2d 76 |
| Decision Date | 02 June 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-2386,85-2386 |
| Parties | 32 Ed. Law Rep. 928 John F. GLEASON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, Angeline P. Caruso, Ruth Love, Sol Brandzel, George Munoz, Illinois State Board of Education, and Robert W. McAllister, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Michael Wood, Kilberg, Sfasciotti & Wood, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert A. Wolf, Bd. of Ed. Law Dept., Susan Frederick Rhodes, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before CUMMINGS, Chief Judge, and COFFEY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff John F. Gleason filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, the Illinois State Board of Education and Hearing Officer Robert W. McAllister. He challenges his dismissal from his position as a tenured teacher in the Chicago school system and claims that the defendants' actions deprived him of a property interest within the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States and article I, section 2, of the Constitution of the State of Illinois. The district judge granted the defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We affirm.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Mr. Gleason was employed by the Chicago Board of Education (Chicago Board) in September 1960 as a high school English teacher, and he began teaching at Lane Technical High School (Lane Tech) in the fall of 1962. He continued this employment until his suspension in 1980.
In addition to teaching, Mr. Gleason was involved in the travel/tour business. In the fall of 1977, he organized and began to book a tour to Hawaii. The tour was scheduled for the spring school vacation--April 24-28, 1978. The trip, booked through Prestige Travel, cost $438 per person. Mr. Gleason was to receive a ten-percent commission. In advertising the tour, Mr. Gleason identified himself as a Lane Tech teacher with twenty-seven years experience in the travel business. The trip payments were to be made in installments beginning with an initial $100 deposit. A total of 155 individuals--all students, teachers, parents and alumni of Lane Tech--paid $438 to Mr. Gleason for the tour. Thus, Mr. Gleason collected monies in excess of $67,000. This money, less the commission, was to be turned over to Prestige Travel, the tour operator handling the trip.
Some time in early March, Mr. Gleason lent a personal friend, Thomas Quayle, $35,000, which was to be repaid in ten days. On March 20, Mr. Gleason deposited Quayle's $35,000 check. It was not honored by the bank due to insufficient funds. Accordingly, Mr. Gleason was unable to pay Prestige in full.
On April 21, 1978, the day before the tour's departure date, Lane Tech's principal, Norman Silber, was informed by Prestige Travel that Mr. Gleason owed the agency $40,000 on the trip and, consequently, only sixty people would be able to take the trip. That day, Mr. Gleason received a telegram from Daniel Mahru, president of International Leisure Corporation, informing him that only sixty-three persons could take the trip. Later, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Mr. Mahru telephoned Mr. Gleason and told him that he would run the tour after all. Mr. Gleason thanked him and told him that he would repay the money. As of the date of the administrative hearing, Mr. Gleason had not repaid the money. R.1, Ex.A at 17. On April 23, the day after the tour departed, the story was featured in the Chicago Tribune. When school reopened on May 1, Mr. Gleason was absent. He applied for and was granted a leave of absence for the balance of the school year. In September 1978, he resumed his teaching position.
On September 28, 1978, Mr. Gleason was indicted by a Cook County Grand Jury on two counts of theft and one count of conspiracy. After the indictment was handed down, the Director of Teacher Personnel for the Chicago Board informed Mr. Gleason that no disciplinary action would be taken prior to the trial. At his October 27 arraignment, Mr. Gleason pled not guilty. Following a fall 1979 trial, Mr. Gleason was found guilty of theft. On January 11, 1980, he was sentenced to two years imprisonment. Mr. Gleason filed an appeal.
On February 29, 1980, before the criminal appeal was resolved, the Chicago Board suspended Mr. Gleason from his teaching duties and brought an action for his dismissal based on "conduct unbecoming a teacher in the Chicago public schools in that he did make unauthorized use of a sum of money belonging to others, for which conduct he has been convicted of the felony offense of theft...." Complaint, R.1 at 4. Thereafter, a hearing was held pursuant to Section 34-85 of the Illinois School Code (School Code), Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 122, p 34-85 (Smith-Hurd 1962 and Supp.1985). This hearing was presided over by defendant Robert McAllister, a professional arbitrator under contract to the Chicago Board. On November 24, 1981, following a hearing at which both the Chicago Board and Gleason presented evidence, McAllister rendered an award and opinion, R.1 Ex.A, affirming Mr. Gleason's dismissal. Specifically, Mr. McAllister decided that Mr. Gleason's R.1, Ex.A at 21.
On June 30, 1982, an Illinois appellate court reversed Mr. Gleason's conviction, holding that the monies loaned to Quayle were Mr. Gleason's and that, while Prestige Travel could have sought a civil remedy, no theft had occurred. The appellate court's order became final on October 5, 1982. In November 1982, Mr. Gleason contacted the Chicago Board to request a review of his dismissal. On July 24, 1984, the Chicago Board advised Mr. Gleason that he would not be reinstated. On November 14, 1984, Mr. Gleason petitioned the Illinois State Board of Education (State Board) to reopen the administrative hearing so that newly-discovered evidence could be entered into the record. On January 4, 1985, the State Board informed Mr. Gleason's attorney that the decision of the hearing officer was final and that, according to the School Code, review was possible only in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Review Law, Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 122, p 34-85b (Smith-Hurd 1962 and Supp.1985). The State Board informed Mr. Gleason that neither the State Board nor the hearing officer had the statutory authority to entertain post-hearing motions or petitions.
On February 28, 1985, Mr. Gleason brought suit in the district court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Mr. Gleason claimed that he was entitled to both prospective relief (reinstatement) and retrospective relief (back pay) based on the defendants' alleged deprivation of his property interest in his tenured teaching position. Upon receipt of motions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the district court dismissed the case without opinion. This appeal followed.
The State Board claims that it is not subject to suit in federal court. The district court, despite full briefing of the issue by the parties, did not rule on the question and, instead, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. However, it is appropriate to deal first with this threshold matter.
The eleventh amendment "prohibits federal courts from entertaining suits by private parties against States and their agencies." Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978). "This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought." Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). The State Board, an Illinois state agency, is therefore absolutely immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100, 104 S.Ct. at 908; Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1145, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979); Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035 n. 54, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). 1
Mr. Gleason argues that Quern distinguishes between prospective and retrospective relief and concludes that a federal court "may enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal law...." 440 U.S. at 337, 99 S.Ct. at 1143; see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). However, Quern was a suit brought against an official not an agency. Here, the agency alone, not its officials, is named as a party defendant. Such a suit is barred by the eleventh amendment "regardless of the nature of the relief sought." Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100, 104 S.Ct. at 908.
The final issue on this appeal is whether, with respect to the Chicago Board, the complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. 2 We agree with the district court that it did not.
It is undisputed that, prior to his dismissal, Mr. Gleason, as a tenured teacher, had a protectible property interest in continued employment with the Chicago Board. R. 13 at 4; see Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538, 542 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017, 103 S.Ct. 379, 74 L.Ed.2d 512 (1982). It is equally clear that due process principles require that a public employee who has a protectible interest in continued employment must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to rebut dismissal charges brought by the employer. See Schultz v. Baumgart, 738 F.2d 231, 234 (7th Cir.1984); Smith v. Board of Education, 708 F.2d 258, 261 (7th Cir.1983); see generally Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974).
Mr. Gleason does not argue that he was not afforded adequate due process at the time of his dismissal. Indeed, he has recognized that the...
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