Gleason v. Smolinski
Decision Date | 08 April 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 34990.,34990. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Madeleine GLEASON et al. v. Janice SMOLINSKI et al. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Steven J. Kelly, pro hac vice, with whom were Anne T. McKenna, pro hac vice, and Christopher DeMarco, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).
John R. Williams, New Haven, for the appellee (named plaintiff).
ALVORD, BEAR and SHELDON, Js.
The defendants Janice Smolinski and Paula Bell 1 appeal from the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff Madeleine Gleason 2 on her claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation arising from the defendants' conduct following the disappearance in 2004 of Bill Smolinski, who is Janice Smolinski's son and Bell's brother. The defendants make six arguments as to why the judgment of the court should be reversed: (1) the court erred in failing to bar the plaintiff's claims under the first amendment to the United States constitution; (2) the trial judge exhibited bias and partiality that constituted plain error; (3) the court erred in relying on hearsay statements to determine that the defendants intended to inflict emotional distress upon the plaintiff; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of defamation; and (6) the court erred in awarding compensatory and punitive damages to the plaintiff. For the following reasons, we disagree with the defendants and affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts and procedural history, as set forth by the trial court in its memorandum of decision filed August 10, 2012, are relevant to our resolution of the foregoing claims. “The plaintiff Madeleine Gleason is and was at the time of the events central to this case a school bus driver. For a time, the young man whose disappearance has never been explained worked at the same company. They met there and [the plaintiff] began dating the young man whom the court will refer to as Bill Smolinski.3 Both of his parents and sister constantly referred to him as ‘Billy,’ which, for the court, at least underlines the affection in which he was held as [the] only son to Mr. William Smolinski and Janice Smolinski, the parents; and the only brother to Paula Bell. Janice Smolinski and Paula Bell are the defendants in the case, which was initiated by [the plaintiff] almost two years after the disappearance of Bill Smolinski....
The court found that the defendants' conduct constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress and that their statements that the plaintiff was a murderer or was involved in murder constituted defamation. The court awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages of $32,000 on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and $7500 on her claim of defamation, for a total compensatory damages award of $39,500. The court also awarded the plaintiff punitive damages on both claims in an amount equal to one-third of the plaintiff's total compensatory damages award (i.e., one third of $39,500, or $13,166.67). This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. We will address each of the defendants' claims separately.
We turn first to the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's claims are barred by the first amendment to the United States constitution, which was not preserved by the defendants at trial. The defendants argue that their unpreserved claim nonetheless is properly before this court because the requirements of State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), have been satisfied. We disagree.
In Golding, our Supreme Court held that (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) Id. at 239–40, 567 A.2d 823. We conclude that the record is adequate for review and that the defendants' claim is of constitutional magnitude because it alleges a violation of the fundamental right to free speech under the first amendment to the United States constitution.5 Thus, we turn our attention to the third prong of Golding, namely, whether the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendants of a fair trial.
In support of their argument that a constitutional violation clearly exists, the defendants claim that their conduct constituted protected speech and that the court should have dismissed the plaintiff's claims against them as barred by the first amendment. The defendants assert that their speech related to a matter of public concern because the missing person posters were designed to uncover information about Bill Smolinski's disappearance, and to assist with the ongoing investigation and potential prosecution of a crime. The defendants cite to Snyder v. Phelps, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172 (2011), in support of this assertion. Such comparison to the public speech described in Snyder, however, is unconvincing.
“The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment ... can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id., at 1215. Whether the first amendment prohibits holding the defendants liable for their speech in this case “turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case. [S]peech on matters of public concern ... is at the heart of the First Amendment's protection.... The First Amendment reflects a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.... That is because speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.... Accordingly, speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection....
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 1215–16.
(Citations omitted; ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Gleason v. Smolinski, SC 19342
...and punitive damages on her claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. Gleason v. Smolinski, 149 Conn. App. 283, 285-86, 88 A.3d 589 (2014). The defendants' first claim on appeal, which relies on, inter alia, Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 179 L......
-
Lynch v. Lynch
...perfect impartiality which is so much to be desired in a judicial proceeding.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gleason v. Smolinski, 149 Conn.App. 283, 296, 88 A.3d 589, cert. granted on other grounds, 312 Conn. 920, 94 A.3d 1201 (2014).The plaintiff makes the broad, sweeping argument t......
-
Nelson v. Tradewind Aviation, LLC.
...decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gleason v. Smolinski, 149 Conn.App. 283, 313, 88 A.3d 589, cert. granted, 312 Conn. 920, 94 A.3d 1201 (2014). “[P]unitive damages are allowable in a libel action where malice is......
-
Gleason v. Smolinski
...and punitive damages on her claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. Gleason v. Smolinski, 149 Conn.App. 283, 285–86, 88 A.3d 589 (2014). The defendants' first claim on appeal, which relies on, inter alia, Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.......
-
Preliminary Sections
...2017); People v. Williams , 1 Cal.5th 1166, 384 P.3d 1162, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 (Supreme Court of California, 2016); Smolinski v. Gleason, 149 Conn.App. 283 (2014); State v. Snead , 783 S.E.2d 733, 368 N.C. 811 (2016); State v. Pierre , 170 So.3d 348 (Court of Appeal of Louisiana, 2015); State......
-
Overview
...2017); People v. Williams , 1 Cal.5th 1166, 384 P.3d 1162, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 (Supreme Court of California, 2016); Smolinski v. Gleason, 149 Conn.App. 283 (2014); State v. Snead , 783 S.E.2d 733, 368 N.C. 811 (2016); State v. Pierre , 170 So.3d 348 (Court of Appeal of Louisiana, 2015); State......
-
Overview
...(2013). A failure to object may raise issues, justified or unjustified, about counsel’s effectiveness. See also Smolinski v. Gleason , 149 Conn.App. 283 (2014), involving a failure to object to newspaper articles. O-33 Overview objection on appeal. 17 On the other side of the coin, if you h......
-
Overview
...(2013). A failure to object may raise issues, justified or unjustified, about counsel’s effectiveness. See also Smolinski v. Gleason , 149 Conn.App. 283 (2014), involving a failure to object to newspaper articles. State v. Snead , 783 S.E.2d 733, 368 N.C. 811 (2016). For an objection to the......