Gleason v. State, 48A02–1106–CR–630.
| Decision Date | 29 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 48A02–1106–CR–630.,48A02–1106–CR–630. |
| Citation | 965 N.E.2d 702 |
| Parties | Buck GLEASON, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
John T. Wilson, Anderson, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Aaron J. Spolarich, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
In this case, while we recognize that brass knuckles may be considered a deadly weapon under our statutes, we revise the defendant's aggregate sentence from eleven years to six years following his several convictions for battery, criminal recklessness, and the failure to stop after an accident that resulted in injury.
Appellant-defendant Buck Gleason appeals his convictions for Battery with a Deadly Weapon,1 a class C felony, Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury,2 a class A misdemeanor, Criminal Recklessness while Armed with a Deadly Weapon,3 a class D felony, and Failure to Stop After an Accident Resulting in Injury,4 a class A misdemeanor, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Gleason maintains that the State failed to prove that he possessed or used a deadly weapon, and that he failed to stop after hitting a victim with his vehicle.
Gleason also challenges the propriety of the aggregate eleven-year sentence that was imposed, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion because the sentencing statement did not adequately identify any aggravating circumstances, that the trial court improperly identified the nature of the offense as an aggravating factor, that consecutive sentences should not have been imposed in light of the improper aggravator, and that the sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.
Although we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Gleason's convictions, we remand this cause to the trial court with instructions that it revise Gleason's sentence to an aggregate term of six years.
On April 8, 2009, Amber–Ball Kilgore was in her home with her fiance, Mark Goodman, and four children. While the children were upstairs watching television, Amber heard a knock on the door. When she opened the door, Gleason, whom she had never met, was standing there. Goodman then walked up to the door and Gleason informed him that he was there to pick up some money that was owed to him by Goodman's former boss, Matt Wallace. Wallace apparently owed Gleason some money for some repair work on a roof. However, Goodman had not seen Wallace for nearly two weeks. Gleason then announced that he was there "for money or blood" and showed Goodman something that "looked like brass knuckles." Tr. p. 62, 63. Gleason then put the item on his hand the way that "a person would wear brass knuckles." Id. Goodman and Amber both remembered that the weapon was metal and "looked like a knife." Id. at 14, 54.
After Gleason put the weapon on his hand, Goodman turned around. Gleason then struck Goodman in the back of the head with the hand that was holding the metal weapon. Goodman fell to the floor, and Amber picked up a frying pan and began swinging it at Gleason. In response, Gleason hit Amber in the left arm with the weapon. Gleason's attack on Amber left her with bruising and pain in her arm, and Goodman had laceration and bleeding from his head that required four stitches.
Goodman got up, grabbed a hammer, and Gleason began to walk outside. However, when Gleason subsequently turned around as if he was going to reenter the residence, Goodman threw the hammer at him but missed. Gleason was walking toward his vehicle and Goodman's parents, who lived across the street, began to approach Amber's house. Goodman's father, Donald, walked up to the scene and heard Gleason yelling at his son. In response, Donald raised a cane above his head and told Gleason to leave. Gleason got into his vehicle and drove it toward Donald. Gleason's passenger side view mirror and door of his vehicle struck Donald, knocking him to the ground. Immediately following this incident, Goodman threw four gallons of spoiled chili onto Gleason's vehicle because he thought it "would be easier for the police to find him with the chili all over it." Tr. p. 66–67.
Gleason was arrested and the State charged him with:
Following a bench trial on April 29, 2011, Gleason was convicted of Counts I, II, and IV, and guilty of the lesser-included offense of criminal recklessness while armed with a deadly weapon, a class D felony, under Count III.
On June 1, 2011, the trial court sentenced Gleason to eight years on Count I, one year on Count II, to run concurrently with the sentence on Count I, three years on Count III, to run consecutively to the sentence for Count I, and six months on Count IV, to run concurrently with the sentence for Count I. As a result, Gleason was sentenced to an aggregate term of eleven years. Gleason now appeals.
Our standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well settled. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Bond v. State, 925 N.E.2d 773, 781 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and affirm if the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the verdict. Id. Reversal is appropriate only when a reasonable trier of fact would not be able to form inferences as to each material element of the offense. Id.
Gleason claims that the State failed to prove that he used a deadly weapon when he committed battery on Goodman. Specifically, Gleason argues that there is no evidence establishing that Gleason displayed any brass knuckles or used a knife in the attack.
To convict Gleason of the charged offense, the State must prove that Gleason (1) knowingly or intentionally; (2) touched Goodman in a rude, insolent, or angry manner; (3) by means of a deadly weapon. See I.C. § 35–42–2–1(a)(3).
Our General Assembly has defined a "deadly weapon" as a weapon "that in the manner it is used; or could ordinarily be used, or is intended to be used, is readily capable of causing serious bodily injury." Ind.Code § 35–41–1–8(2). Serious bodily injury is defined as an injury causing serious permanent disfigurement, unconsciousness, or extreme pain. Ind.Code § 35–41–1–25.
The question of whether a weapon is "deadly" is determined from a description of the weapon, the manner of its use, and the circumstances of the case. Merriweather v. State, 778 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Whether an object is a deadly weapon based on these factors is a question of fact. Miller v. State, 500 N.E.2d 193, 197 (Ind.1986). The original purpose of the object is not considered. Rather, the manner in which the defendant actually used the object is examined. Timm v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (Ind.1994). Also, it does not matter if actual injuries were sustained by the crime victim, provided the defendant had the apparent ability to injure the victim seriously through his use of the object during the crime. Miller, 500 N.E.2d at 196–97.
In this case, both Amber and Goodman described the item that was used to batter them. More specifically, Amber testified that Gleason's weapon "looked like a knifelike a brass knuckle thing." Tr. p. 14. Goodman testified that the object Gleason used Id. at 63. Mark also testified that Gleason placed the object on his hand the same way a person would wear brass knuckles. Id. Both Mark and Amber testified that the object was made of metal. Id. at 14, 56, 63. Although Gleason claims that it is only speculation as to whether Goodman and Amber actually saw brass knuckles, such a contention amounts to an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. That said, the trial court, as the finder of fact, could reasonably conclude from the circumstances, that Gleason used brass knuckles when battering Amber and Goodman.
Finally, we note that the manner in which Gleason used the object and the circumstances of this case also show that the object was a deadly weapon. As discussed above, Gleason put the weapon on his hand after telling Goodman that "he was there for money or blood." Tr. p. 62. Gleason then hit Goodman in the back of the head with the weapon, resulting in significant lacerations causing Goodman to fall to the floor. Id. at 15–16, 64. Defendant also used the weapon to strike Amber in the arm, causing pain and bruising. Id. at 18, 30. Gleason inflicted serious injury on both Goodman and Amber with the weapon. And the use of the weapon demonstrates that the object was a deadly weapon within the meaning of the statute. In short, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Gleason's conviction for battery with a deadly weapon, a class C felony.
Gleason next argues that the criminal recklessness conviction must be set aside because the State failed to show that he acted recklessly. More specifically, Gleason claims that there was no evidence demonstrating that he was driving the vehicle in a reckless manner when he struck Donald with it.
To convict a person of criminal recklessness as a Class D...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ward v. State, 49A02–1401–CR–25.
...ability to injure the victim seriously through his use of the object during the crime. Miller, 500 N.E.2d at 196–97.Gleason v. State, 965 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ind.Ct.App.2012).In Timm, 644 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (Ind.1994), the Indiana Supreme Court determined that under the circumstances presented,......
-
Wallace v. State
... ... "explain why each circumstance has been determined to be ... aggravating or mitigating." Id ... Gleason v. State , 965 N.E.2d 702, 710 (Ind.Ct.App ... 2012) ... [¶20] ... To begin, the trial court had no ... ...
-
Pruitt v. State
...to sixty-five years and ordered his sentences to run consecutively based on a single aggravating factor. See Gleason v. State , 965 N.E.2d 702, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (same, single aggravator may be used both to enhance presumptive sentence and to justify consecutive sentences); McGinity ......
-
Norris v. State
...that it is improper as a matter of law to find that a material element of a crime is an aggravating circumstance. Gleason v. State , 965 N.E.2d 702, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). However, as our supreme court has recently explained, while a defendant's convictions cannot be used to enhance his ......