Glen Burchfield v. Candace Whaley

• Decision Date: 10 January 2001
• Docket Number: 00CA02,01-LW-0163
• Citation: 2001 Ohio 2659
• Parties: Glen Burchfield, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Candace Whaley, Defendant-Appellee. Case
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

2001-Ohio-2659

Glen Burchfield, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Candace Whaley, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00CA02

01-LW-0163 (4th)

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District Hocking

January 10, 2001

C David Warren, Athens, Ohio, for appellant.

OPINION

Kline J.:

Glen Burchfield appeals from a Hocking County Court of Common Pleas decision ordering that the proceeds from the partition and sale of two parcels of real estate be first applied to his debt to Candace Whaley. Burchfield asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant the partition on summary judgment. We disagree because genuine issues of material fact were in dispute, and therefore summary judgment was not appropriate. Burchfield next asserts that the trial court should have setoff his debt to Whaley by half of the reasonable rental value of the properties. We disagree because Burchfield failed to present any evidence regarding the reasonable rental value. Finally, Burchfield asserts that the trial court erred by granting Whaley a deficiency judgment in the event that the partition sale does not generate sufficient funds to satisfy Burchfield's debt. We agree, because a party recovering in an action for unjust enrichment cannot recover more than the amount by which the other party was enriched. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

I.

Burchfield and Whaley became romantically involved and began sharing a residence without an expectation of marriage. They used $1,000 from Whaley's personal savings account as a ten percent down payment on a lot in Murray City, Ohio. They made only one payment toward the $10,000 purchase price before they refinanced and obtained a construction loan, leaving them with a mortgage in the amount of $61,000. Whaley paid the $6,100 down payment to obtain that mortgage, but Burchfield and Whaley put the mortgage in both their names. Additionally, Whaley paid the parties' $1,000 down payment for purchase of their mobile home. Whaley also paid $1,000 for landscape materials, $900 for spouting, and $225 for railroad ties necessary to construct a retaining wall in the yard. They placed the deed in Burchfield's name alone.

Whaley and Burchfield later obtained a second mortgage in the amount of $10,000. The mortgage was applied to the parties' individual and joint debts, but $1,295 more was applied to Burchfield's individual debts than to Whaley's individual debts.

Whaley and Burchfield then learned that their mobile home, its foundation, and other fixtures were located partly upon a neighbor's property. They obtained that lot by trading it for a second lot that Burchfield owned. Burchfield originally purchased his second lot with $125 given to him by Whaley.

In October of 1998, Burchfield and Whaley separated. Whaley continued to live in their home. In April of 1999, Burchfield filed an action seeking to partition the real estate by sale. Whaley filed an answer and counterclaim. Whaley agreed to the partition by sale, but also pursued claims against Burchfield grounded in theories of unjust enrichment, fraud, and constructive trusts.

Burchfield filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. At trial, Whaley presented evidence of the amounts she expended for down payments and immediate improvements to the properties in question. Whaley also testified that she spent the bulk of the $30,000 cash that she received from her prior marriage on the home. Whaley claimed that she made the mortgage payments for several months without assistance from Burchfield. Burchfield and Whaley dispute whether he gave Whaley all, or only half, of his paychecks. Burchfield testified that he paid the mortgage without assistance from Whaley for an eleven-month period after he and Whaley separated.

The trial court found that the parties combined their incomes, which were nearly equal, to meet their obligations during the three years that they lived together. The trial court also found that Whaley expended the amounts she alleged for down payments and immediate improvements to the home. However, the trial court determined that Whaley failed to trace the remainder of her $30,000 to home improvements.

The trial court determined that Whaley possessed a one-half interest over the two lots and improvements, despite the fact that the lots were not in her name. Additionally, the court ruled that a partition was necessary, and ordered that the properties be appraised and sold pursuant to the partition statute, R.C. 5307.04. Finally, the court determined that Burchfield was unjustly enriched by Whaley's contributions to the down payments and immediate improvements to the property. It ordered that the net proceeds of the partition sale first be applied to a judgment in favor of Whaley in the amount of $10,715.50.^[1] The court ordered that, in the event that the sale of the property did not generate $10,715.50, a deficiency judgment would issue in favor of Whaley.

Burchfield appeals, asserting the following assignments of error:

The trial court erred when it failed to grant Burchfield's motion for summary judgment when Burchfield was entitled to partition as a matter of law.

The trial court erred when it failed to off set the mortgage payments expended by Burchfield while the premises were in exclusive possession of Whaley.

The trial court erred in ordering that any deficit received from the partition be assessed against Burchfield rather than limiting the recovery to the proceeds of the sale.

II.

In his first assignment of error, Burchfield asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant the partition on his motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only when it has been established: (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Civ.R. 56(A). See Bostic v. Connor (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 144, 146; Morehead v. Conley (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 409, 411. In a partition action, the court must determine the cotenants' equitable interests in the property. See Spector v. Giunta (1978), 62 Ohio App.2d 137, 141; 19 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1980) 379, Cotenancy and Partition, Section 148. A cotenant who makes an improvement or contribution to the property is entitled to recoup the value of that improvement upon partition of the property by sale. Youngs v. Heffner (1880), 36 Ohio St. 232; Green v. Armstrong (July 21, 1997), Madison App. No. CA96-11-049, unreported; 19 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d at 384-385, Section 151. This includes a contribution by a cotenant of the other cotenant's share of the purchase price at the time of their joint acquisition of the property. 19 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d at 380, Section 148, citing Jenkins v. Robinson (1960), 175 N.E.2d 123.

In this case, while the parties agreed upon the remedy of partition by sale, the parties did not agree upon their equitable interests in the property. Therefore, the trial court was required to resolve genuine issues of material fact before it could equitably partition the property. Because genuine issues of material fact remained between the parties prior to trial, the trial court did not err in refusing to enter summary judgment. Accordingly, we overrule Burchfield's first assignment of error.

III.

In his second assignment of error, Burchfield asserts that the trial court erred by failing to setoff Whaley's judgment against him by half of the reasonable rental value of the properties for the eleven months during...