Glendale Neighborhood v. Greensboro Housing Auth.

• Decision Date: 30 August 1996
• Docket Number: Civil No. 2:95CV00277.
• Citation: 956 F.Supp. 1270
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: GLENDALE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated association; Randall Gore, Dwight Saffer, and Debra W. Martin, individually, Plaintiffs, v. GREENSBORO HOUSING AUTHORITY, and Henry J. Cisneros, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Defendants.

956 F.Supp. 1270

GLENDALE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated association; Randall Gore, Dwight Saffer, and Debra W. Martin, individually, Plaintiffs, v. GREENSBORO HOUSING AUTHORITY, and Henry J. Cisneros, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Defendants.

Civil No. 2:95CV00277.

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina, Greensboro Division.

August 30, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Gary L. Beaver, Patton Boggs, L.L.P., Greensboro, NC, for Plaintiffs.

James R. Turner, Turner Enochs & Lloyd, P.A., and Gill P. Beck, Office of U.S. Attorney, Greensboro, NC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BULLOCK, Chief Judge.

In February 1995, the Greensboro Housing Authority ("GHA") submitted to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") a proposal for a new public housing project on Glendale Drive in Greensboro, North Carolina. HUD approved this proposal. An association of people living near the proposed site brought this suit to block the project. Now before the court are Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, Plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint, Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiffs' motion for final judgment. For the reasons given below in this memorandum opinion, Defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs' motion to amend will be denied. On the merits, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs' motion for final judgment will be granted in part and denied in part. HUD's approval of the site on Glendale Drive will be vacated, and the case will be remanded to HUD.

FACTS

The Greensboro Housing Authority is a housing authority constituted under North Carolina law. See N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 157-1 to -70 (1983 & Supp.1995). Pursuant to a Notice of Funding Availability published in the Federal Register, GHA submitted a proposal for a new housing project to HUD. The proposal was for a joint public-private housing project on a fourteen-acre site on Glendale Drive, in southern Greensboro, just inside the city limits. (Admin.Record at 121 [henceforth AR].) According to the proposal, GHA would build fifty public housing units on the northern eight acres of the site. GHA would sell the remaining six acres to a non-profit corporation, which would subdivide that parcel into eighteen lots. Id. at 122. The corporation would then sell the lots to non-profit sponsors, which would build single-family homes and sell them to low-income families. Id. HUD agreed to fund the project. 59 Fed.Reg. 66,040, 66,041 (1994).

Concerned that a public housing project would change their neighborhood for the worse, many persons living near the proposed site formed the Glendale Neighborhood Association, an unincorporated association that is one of the plaintiffs in this case. The other plaintiffs are individuals who live near the proposed site. (For convenience, the court will refer to all plaintiffs collectively as "the Association.") Alleging that HUD had improperly approved the site for the proposed project, the Association brought this action to enjoin construction of the project. Specifically, the Association claims that HUD approved a site in an area of minority concentration, in violation of federal statutes and regulations. The Association also claims that HUD violated its own regulations concerning the acceptable density of public housing and the proximity of the site to essential services, such as public transportation and medical facilities.

By order dated June 8, 1995, this court granted the Association's motion for a preliminary injunction against building the project. Glendale Neighborhood Ass'n v. Greensboro Hous. Auth., 901 F.Supp. 996 (M.D.N.C.1995). Now before the court are Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, the Association's motion to amend the complaint, Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Association's motion for final judgment. The court will address these motions in order.

DISCUSSION

A. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Defendants seek to dismiss the complaint on two grounds. First, they say that the Association does not have standing to raise its claim. Second, Defendants say that the Association has failed to state a cause of action as to the six acres that are to be sold to private, non-profit developers.¹

1. Standing

Standing refers to a collection of doctrines regarding whether a party is the proper one to bring a suit. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484, 102 S.Ct. 752, 765, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2204-05, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). At its core, the constitutional doctrine of standing arises out of the limitation in Article III of the Constitution of the federal judicial power of "Cases" and "Controversies." E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). This constitutional doctrine has three parts: the plaintiff must show that he has suffered "injury in fact," that the injury has been caused by some act or omission of the defendant, and that the injury can likely be redressed by action of the court. Id. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. at 2136-37.

Because standing is jurisdictional, the burden of establishing it lies on the party seeking to litigate in federal court. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. Moreover, because the elements of standing are "an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case," the burden on the plaintiff at each stage of litigation is the same as for any other substantive element of the claim. Id. To survive this motion to dismiss, then, Plaintiffs need plead only "general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct." Id.

The Association easily satisfies each of the constitutional requirements for standing. It has shown injury in fact by alleging that placement of public housing in their neighborhood, which they allege to be an area of minority concentration, will cause or worsen segregation of that neighborhood. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 111, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1613-14, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). Plaintiffs have also alleged, with supporting affidavits, that they will suffer injury in the form of diminished property values if the project is built, and this injury also suffices. Id. at 115, 99 S.Ct. at 1615-16. As for the other two elements, the Association has alleged that the cause of these injuries will be HUD's decision to fund the project, and this injury will be redressed if the court enjoins construction of the project.

What are more important to this case, however, are the further prudential limits on standing. These are judicially created limits on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. E.g., United Food and Comm'l Workers Union v. Brown Group, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 1533, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996). In the context of a suit under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), the plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury complained of "falls within the `zone of interests' sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint." Air Courier Conf. of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523-24, 111 S.Ct. 913, 917-18, 112 L.Ed.2d 1125 (1991) (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 883, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3186, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)). In keeping with the "presumption in favor of judicial review" under the APA, this test is not very demanding. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399, 107 S.Ct. 750, 757, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987). This test "denies a right of review if the plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.... [T]here need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff." Id. at 399-400, 107 S.Ct. at 757.

Defendants' motion raises prudential objections to the Association's standing to raise its claims. Broadly characterized, the Association makes three claims. First, GHA approved the project for families with children without considering scattered site housing, contrary to the requirements of HUD's Public Housing Development Handbook. 7417.1 REV-1 ¶ 3-75a (1991). (Second Am.Compl. ¶¶ 34, 35.) Second, HUD approved the site even though it was not accessible to "social, recreational, educational, commercial, and health facilities," and was not convenient to public transportation, in violation of HUD's regulations at 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(g) & (h) (1994). (Second Am.Compl. ¶¶ 36-39.) Third, HUD failed to satisfy its affirmative duty to integrate under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3608(e)(5) (West 1994), and the associated regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(c) (1994). (Second Am.Compl. ¶¶ 14, 17, 46.) The heart of HUD's objections is that each of the Association's claims flunks the "zone of interests" test.

A corollary of the "zone of interests" principle is that a plaintiff has no standing to complain of alleged violations of any statute or regulation intended solely to benefit prospective tenants of the project. See Alschuler v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 686 F.2d 472, 480 (7th Cir.1982). HUD argues that the scattered site requirement is just such a regulation. The court agrees.

The Public Housing Development Handbook requires local housing authorities to build projects for families, "to the maximum extent practicable," on "scattered sites." ¶ 3-75. Scattered site housing consists of non-contiguous lots, each bearing only a few units. The requirement does not affect the number of units allowed within an area but only their density.

This handbook provision comes in a paragraph that deals with the density...