Winchester Coalition v. U.S. Dept. of Hud

• Decision Date: 27 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. C2-98-00144.,No. C2-98-00165.,C2-98-00165.,C2-98-00144.
• Citation: 999 F.Supp. 1058
• Parties: WINCHESTER COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT, and Jeff Bisker, Plaintiffs, v. U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, et al., Defendants. and STATE ex rel. Patrick NEARY, and State ex rel. Patrick A. Haven, Plaintiffs, v. COLUMBUS METROPOLITAN HOUSING AUTHORITY, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

Page 1058

999 F.Supp. 1058

WINCHESTER COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT, and Jeff Bisker, Plaintiffs, v. U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, et al., Defendants. and STATE ex rel. Patrick NEARY, and State ex rel. Patrick A. Haven, Plaintiffs, v. COLUMBUS METROPOLITAN HOUSING AUTHORITY, INC., Defendant.

No. C2-98-00165.

No. C2-98-00144.

United States District Court, S.D.Ohio, Eastern Division.

March 27, 1998.

Joseph Scott Streb, Columbus, OH, for plaintiffs.

O. Charles Hosterman, U.S. Attorney's Office, Columbus, OH, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

MARBLEY, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (docs. 33, 25) and Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (docs. 32, 24).¹ Plaintiffs have filed an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from Defendants' decision to build low-income housing in their neighborhood, the Canal Winchester area. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On September 11, 1996, CMHA requested HUD approval for the purchase of a tract of land located along Gender Road ("Hunter's Ridge Site"), either with HUD funds or with CMHA funds subject to a later reimbursement from HUD. The purpose of the purchase was to begin the building and development of low-income housing in the area called Hunter's Ridge. On September 17, 1996, HUD approved the purchase with CMHA funds and agreed to reimburse CMHA later for the project. On November 1, 1996, CMHA purchased the property through a wholly-owned Ohio corporation called the Gender Road GP Corp.

On May 30, 1997, CMHA submitted a "Development Proposal" for the Hunter's Ridge project. On August 22, 1997, HUD approved the project and authorized CMHA to purchase the property using HUD funds from the HOPE VI program. On August 26, 1997 CMHA purchased the Hunter's Ridge Site from the Gender Road GP Corp.

On December 17, 1997, HUD withdrew its approval for the Hunter's Ridge project because, inter alia, there was an inadequate Environmental Assessment. On January 30, 1998, after a corrected Environmental Assessment was filed, HUD again approved the Hunter's Ridge project. This action followed.

With respect to the procedural history, Plaintiffs first filed a suit in federal court in late December, 1997, seeking to prevent HUD approval of the Hunter's Ridge project and construction of the housing by CMHA. At that time, HUD had withdrawn its approval, so Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case in lieu of a Freedom of Information Act complaint for documents related to the project. When HUD reapproved the project, Plaintiffs filed an action in state court alleging that CMHA had exceeded its authority. CMHA promptly removed the case to federal court, asserting that the case was essentially a claim that CMHA violated federal law. Around the same time, Plaintiffs filed an action against HUD in federal court under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. alleging that HUD's decision to approve the Hunter's Ridge project was "arbitrary and capricious." These cases were then consolidated before this Court.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I. Standard For Summary Judgment

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The movant has the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, which may be accomplished by demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., L.P.A., 12 F.3d 1382, 1388-89 (6th Cir.1993). The nonmoving party must then present "significant probative evidence" to show that "there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339-40 (6th Cir.1993). "[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute is about a material fact that is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (Summary judgment appropriate where the evidence could not lead a trier of fact to find for the non-moving party).

In a Rule 56 motion, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251; Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir.1995).

II. Standing of the Plaintiffs

Defendants challenge whether Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action. The question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the Court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Standing subsumes a blend of constitutional requirements and prudential considerations. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). To meet constitutional standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate an actual or threatened injury as a result of putative illegal conduct of the defendant, and that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court. Id. Additionally, to satisfy prudential considerations, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he is asserting his own legal rights and interests. Id. For actions challenging agency decisions under the APA, prudential considerations require that a plaintiff assert claims which fall within the "zone of interest" of the applicable statutes or regulations. Ass'n of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970).

It is undisputed that Plaintiffs have met the requirements for constitutional standing under Article III. Plaintiffs have demonstrated a threatened injury as a result of the putative "arbitrary and capricious" decision of the Defendants. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471-472. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the Defendants, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court. Id. The only question with respect to standing before the Court is whether Plaintiffs meet the prudential requirement of falling within the "zone of interest" of the applicable regulations and statutes in such a manner as to be considered an "aggrieved party" under the APA.

The Sixth Circuit has adopted the liberal interpretation of prudential "zone of interest" test set forth in Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 107 S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987). In Clarke, the Court stated that

the "zone of interest" test is a guide for deciding whether in view of Congress' evident intent to make agency action presumptively reviewable, a particular plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular agency decision. In cases where the plaintiff is not itself the subject of the contested regulatory action, the test denies a right of review if the plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit. The test is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.

Id. 479 U.S. at 399-400. See also Community First Bank v. National Credit Union Admin., 41 F.3d 1050, 1054 (6th Cir.1994) (containing Sixth Circuit restatement of Clarke).

Post-Clarke,² the Sixth Circuit has applied these general considerations in an arguably broad permissive manner. See, e.g., Michigan Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 115 F.3d 1266, 1271-72 (6th Cir.) (permitting natural gas industry competitor to claim zone of interest under statute aimed at protecting consumers). In the unpublished National Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. Pena, 78 F.3d 585, 1996 WL 102421 (6th Cir.1996), the Sixth Circuit followed Clarke, noting that: (1) an inquiry into standing begins with determining which statutes are relevant, which can be determined from the substance of the complaint; (2) a court is "`not limited to considering the statute under which [plaintiffs sue], but may consider any provision that helps ... understand Congress' overall purposes' behind the relevant statute;" and (3) no explicit statutory provision providing expressly for the plaintiff's interest need be found, as legislative history may be used in determining a statute's zone of interest. Id. at *3-4. Notably, the court stated that the "[p]laintiffs' interest must only be arguably within the zone of interests of the relevant statute." Id. at *2 (citing Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 115 S.Ct. 1278, 1283, 131 L.Ed.2d 160 (1995)) (emphasis added). However, where Congress has manifested an express statement of purpose in legislation, and a party's claim bears no rational relationship to that purpose, the party does not fall within that statute's zone of interest. See, e.g., District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. Burnley, 936 F.2d 284 (6th Cir.1991) (finding clear language of statute pr...