Glens Falls Group Insurance Corp. v. Hoium, 43319

Decision Date04 August 1972
Docket NumberNo. 43319,43319
Citation200 N.W.2d 189,294 Minn. 247
PartiesGLENS FALLS GROUP INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellant, v. David HOIUM, Respondent, Bradford's, Inc., d.b.a. Bradford's, et al., Respondents, James Sheehan, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

In adjudicating the question of coverage under a liability policy, the insured's plea of guilty to aggravated assault is admissible in evidence, but does not collaterally estop him from relitigating the issue of whether the injuries sustained by a third party were inflicted intentionally by the insured or simply through his negligence.

Robb, Van Eps & Gilmore, Duane E. Arndt and Don James Chantry, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Oppenheimer, Brown, Wolff, Leach & Foster and Thomas P. Kane, St. Paul, for Hoium.

Mordaunt, Walstad, Cousineau & McGuire and Harold J. W. Sweet, Minneapolis, for Bradford's.

Carroll, Cronan, Roth & Austin, Minneapolis, for Sheehan.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and OTIS, ROGOSHESKE, and PETERSON, JJ.

OTIS, Justice.

This is an action brought by a liability insurer, Glens Falls Group Insurance Corporation, seeking to construe its policy to exclude coverage for injuries inflicted by its insured, James Sheehan, on David Hoium in a barroom altercation on June 10, 1969. The trial court found that Glens Falls was obliged to defend Sheehan but declined to pass on whether Glens Falls was obligated to indemnify Sheehan in the event of Hoium's recovery. Glens Falls appeals.

The policy excludes coverage for torts intentionally inflicted. The issue raised on appeal is whether, as a result of Sheehan's plea of guilty to aggravated assault, he is collaterally estopped from denying he committed an intentional tort against Hoium. We hold that he is not estopped and therefore affirm.

As a result of the injury to Hoium, Sheehan was prosecuted and pled guilty to violation of Minn.St. 609.225, subd. 1, which provides as follows:

'Whoever assaults another and inflicts great bodily harm may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.'

After a presentence investigation, the court stayed imposition of sentence, without supervision, for a period of 1 year, pursuant to § 609.135.

It is the position of Glens Falls that our decision in The Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289 (1968), compels a holding that Sheehan is collaterally estopped from attacking the finality of his conviction and that his tort against Hoium was intentional and thus not covered. In the Thompson case, the defendant had vigorously contested his prosecution for murder and had been found guilty. We subsequently held that the verdict conclusively foreclosed his relitigating the question of whether he killed his wife, when he sought to recover insurance on her life. In that decision, we recognized a conflict in authorities but chose to follow those which held there was collateral estoppel where an insured was found guilty of murder or arson and sought to benefit from his own crime. We said there (281 Minn. 558, 163 N.W.2d 296):

'* * * An examination of the record satisfies us that he (Thompson) had every opportunity and incentive to litigate the issue of his guilt.'

The considerations which govern a plea of guilty as distinguished from a vigorously contested prosecution, where the charge is not as heinous as murder or arson, may be quite different. The trial court held that Glens Falls had failed to satisfy its burden of proving Sheehan committed an intentional tort. There was ample evidence to support that conclusion. The record underscores the difficulty of reconciling a policy of encouraging plea agreements in criminal matters with a policy of refusing to accept the plea unless the court is satisfied there is a factual basis for it. 1 It is the contention of Sheehan that the court, in its effort to comply with the applicable A.B.A. standards relating to pleas of guilty, in effect coaxed an admission of intent out of the defendant. The following colloquy occurred between the court and defendant at the time of accepting the plea:

'Q (by Mr. Posten, assistant county attorney) Mr. Sheehan, calling your attention to June the 10th, 1969, did you on that date assault one David L. Holium (sec)?

'A Only after he spit on me.

'THE DEFENDANT: Well, Your Honor, as I see it, I'm guilty of one thing, and that's punching him, and that's all.

'THE COURT: Yes. But I would like to discuss with you, Mr. Sheehan, just so, in the spirit of what I have just been telling you, that we don't want anybody to plead guilty to any offense unless he is in fact guilty. Now, as I do understand the circumstances, you admit that you did strike this man and you claim that he had provoked you in the sense of spitting upon you?

'THE DEFENDANT: And verbally, Your Honor.

'THE COURT: * * * But the question still remains whether the whole incident amounts to a fact that you intentionally inflicted great bodily harm upon him, because that's what the essence of this offense is.

'THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

'THE COURT: Now, do you feel that you did that:

'THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I don't think this is fair in any respect.

'MR. ROTH: You will have to answer the question, James.

'THE DEFENDANT: Evidently I did, yes, sir.'

Before imposing sentence, the court elicited the following statements from Sheehan:

'Q Is there any doubt now that you are in fact guilty of this matter?

'A I am guilty of striking a man, yes.

'Q Well, I have to ask you if you are--have any doubt that you are guilty of the offense of aggravated assault.

'A No, sir.

'Q There's no doubt about it? Do I understand your answer, 'No, sir,' means that there is no doubt about it?

'A I am guilty as charged, sir.

'Q Fine. Very well. Is there anything you'd like to say, Mr. Sheehan, before disposition is made in this matter?

'A No,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
24 cases
  • James v. Paul
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • May 29, 2001
    ...v. Dominion Ins. Co., 375 P.2d 439 (Cal. 1962); Brohawn v. Trans-America Inc. Co., 347 A.2d 842 (Md. 1975); Glen Falls Group Ins. Corp. v. Hoium, 200 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. 1972); Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kollar, 578 A.2d 1238 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Stidham v. Milvale Sportsm......
  • State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Fullerton, 96-40078
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • July 22, 1997
    ...charge ... may be rebutted or explained in the subsequent civil case in which it is admitted."); Glens Falls Group Ins. Corp. v. Hoium, 294 Minn. 247, 200 N.W.2d 189, 192 (1972) (allowing an insured to enter evidence of his reasons for pleading guilty to criminal assault); Prudential Proper......
  • Beale v. Speck
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • August 11, 1995
    ...speeding precluded by Maine statute; therefore, not admissible as admission by party-opponent); 7 Glens Falls Group Ins. Corp. v. Hoium, 294 Minn. 247, 200 N.W.2d 189, 192 n. 2 (1972) (state statute excludes pleas of guilty in traffic matters from being admitted into evidence in civil litig......
  • Doe v. Liebsch, A14–0275.
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • December 30, 2015
    ...is generally admissible in a subsequent civil trial regarding the same course of conduct. See, e.g., Glens Falls Grp. Ins. Corp. v. Hoium, 294 Minn. 247, 251, 200 N.W.2d 189, 191–92 (1972) ; Jankowski v. Clausen, 167 Minn. 437, 440, 209 N.W. 317, 318 (1926) ; Wischstadt v. Wischstadt, 47 Mi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT