Glenwood Post, a div. of Stauffer Communications, Inc. v. City of Glenwood Springs, 85CA0117
| Decision Date | 04 September 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85CA0117,85CA0117 |
| Citation | 731 P.2d 761 |
| Parties | The GLENWOOD POST, a DIVISION OF STAUFFER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., and Ray Sullivan, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF GLENWOOD SPRINGS, a municipal corporation, Carl Schiesser, Dennis Pretti, Mike Deer, Kent Benham, Martha Herzog, Al Maggard and Ross Jeffery, Defendants-Appellees. . III |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Cooper & Kelley, P.C., Thomas B. Kelley, Debra Hodgson, Denver, for plaintiffs-appellants.
David W. Broadwell, Glenwood Springs, for defendants-appellees.
Gerald E. Dahl, Denver, for amicus curiae, Colorado Mun. League.
Plaintiffs, the Glenwood Post and Ray Sullivan (the Post), appeal the judgment entered on a limited permanent injunction issued against defendants, City of Glenwood Springs, Carl Schiesser, Dennis Pretti, Mike Deer, Kent Benham, Martha Herzog, Al Maggard, and Ross Jeffery (city council). We affirm.
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether a home rule city, which has a charter provision requiring "all regular and special meetings of the [city] council" to be "open to the public," may deliberate regarding the appointment of a city attorney in a closed executive session, held during the course of a public meeting, where the executive session is authorized by a duly enacted ordinance. We answer in the affirmative.
Glenwood Springs is a home rule city chartered under Colo. Const. art. XX. Its charter, adopted in 1966, describes regular and special meetings of the city council and states that both shall be open to the public. A duly enacted ordinance restates the requirement that all regular and special meetings of the city council be open to the public, but it also provides for closed executive sessions, provided they are held only during regular and special meetings and only for the purpose of deliberating on a limited number of specified matters. Consideration of the appointment of a city attorney is one of the listed matters permitting a closed executive session. Further, the ordinance provides that "no final policy decision, resolution, rule, regulation, formal action or any action approving a contract or calling for the payment of money, shall be adopted or approved at any executive session." It is undisputed that the city council has held executive sessions since the adoption of the city charter.
In 1984, Glenwood Springs advertised for a new city attorney and scheduled a meeting for the consideration of all applications. The city council intended to consider the applications in a closed executive session in accordance with its authority under the ordinance. The Post sought an injunction preventing the city council from deliberating on the applications in private.
After a hearing, the trial court granted a limited permanent injunction. The injunction provided that: (1) the city council had to receive any applications, and any other information to be considered, in an open meeting with any documents received for consideration opened for public inspection; (2) the city council could deliberate in closed executive session provided that no tentative vote or "straw poll" was taken or any commitment respecting a vote was made by any member; and (3) any vote or official action had to be taken at an open meeting with members expressing the reasons for their vote insofar as a reason was expressed during the executive session.
On appeal, the Post argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the city council could deliberate in executive session. It asserts that closed executive sessions violate the charter's statement that all meetings be open to the public. We disagree.
As a home rule city, Glenwood Springs may enact its own rules regarding meetings of the city council. See Gosliner v. Denver Election Commission, 191...
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