GLICK FINLEY LLC v. Glick

• Decision Date: 06 April 2010
• Docket Number: No. ED 93002.,ED 93002.
• Citation: 310 SW 3d 713
• Parties: GLICK FINLEY LLC et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Thomas G. GLICK, Defendant/Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

310 SW 3d 713

GLICK FINLEY LLC et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
Thomas G. GLICK, Defendant/Respondent.

No. ED 93002.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.

April 6, 2010.

310 SW 3d 714

Terrance J. Good, Saint Louis, MO, for Appellants.

John R. Gunn, Saint Louis, MO, for Respondent.

LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, Judge.

The plaintiffs, Glick Finley LLC (the firm) and Karen Finley, appeal the November 2008 judgment entered by the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. In this judgment, the court accepted the receiver's final report and ordered compensation for the receiver, distribution of cash and property, preparation and filing of articles of dissolution for the firm and corresponding publication of notices, preparation and filing of final tax returns, and payment of the receiver's $1 bond. The court's judgment further provided that upon the receiver's filing of a certificate of completion of the enumerated actions, the receiver shall be discharged. The receiver filed a certificate of completion, which was unverified. When the plaintiffs sought the trial court's review of the actions of the receiver, the trial court disclaimed any jurisdiction to review the receiver's compliance with its various orders.

We conclude that the trial court's judgment is not a final, appealable judgment because it is conditioned on the future completion of numerous actions. We dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The plaintiff Karen Finley and the defendant Thomas Glick are attorneys who joined their solo practices to create Glick Finley LLC. After a few years with the firm, Glick notified Finley of his intended departure for a larger St. Louis-area law firm. The parties' relationship quickly and seriously deteriorated. The firm and Finley sued for injunctive relief against Glick, which the trial court granted. Glick counterclaimed for dissolution of the firm and

310 SW 3d 715

appointment of a receiver. Finding that the parties could not peaceably coexist in a working environment, the trial court judicially dissolved the firm and appointed a receiver. The receiver filed an interim report in September 2007, which the trial court ultimately accepted as an inventory, and the receiver filed his final report in August 2008. The parties filed numerous objections and exceptions to the final report, and the firm and Finley filed a request for findings of fact and an accounting. Without an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied all objections and exceptions and the request for findings of fact and an accounting when it issued the November 2008 judgment

The firm and Finley moved for a new trial and again sought findings of fact and conclusions of law. In early January 2009, the receiver "found some additional funds" that he distributed to the parties and their clients, never obtaining judicial approval or ratification. The receiver filed his report of compliance on January 26, 2009, and sought the court's order discharging him. The court neither accepted the receiver's report of compliance nor discharged the receiver. The firm and Finley filed objections and exceptions to the receiver's report of compliance, again sought an inventory and an accounting, and objected that the latest tax returns were prepared incorrectly. Apparently believing he was still engaged, the receiver moved in March 2009 to quash a subpoena to the firm's bank issued by the plaintiffs. In April 2009, the trial court denied all pending motions¹ "for lack of jurisdiction because more than 90 days has transpired since the filing of plaintiff's motion for new trial." The firm and Finley appeal.

In four points on appeal, the firm and Finley claim the trial court erred in denying their after-trial motions for lack of jurisdiction, in approving the receiver's final report without evidence that it was correct and complete, in approving the receiver's final report because the receiver failed to properly perform his duties, and in denying their requests for findings of fact.

The right to appeal is purely statutory. Oasis Car Wash, Inc. v. First North County Bank, 558 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Mo.App.St. L.1977). An aggrieved party may appeal the final judgment in the case or from any special order after final judgment. Section 512.020 RSMo. (Supp.2009). Exceptions exist for enumerated orders and interlocutory judgments.²

In every appeal, this Court must determine whether we have authority to decide it on its merits. Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. banc 1994); Bannister v. Pulaski Fin. Corp., 255 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Mo.App. E.D. 2008). This judgment does not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated in section 512.020, including an appeal from an order refusing to revoke, modify, or change an interlocutory order appointing a receiver. Therefore, an appeal pursuant to section 512.020 depends upon a final, appealable judgment. A final, appealable judgment...