Glick v. Glick
| Decision Date | 21 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 72353,72359.,72353 |
| Citation | 729 NE 2d 1244,133 Ohio App.3d 821 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
| Parties | GLICK, Appellant, v. GLICK, Appellee; Commerce Exchange Bank, Appellant. |
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Reid, Berry & Stanard and Margaret Dazdin Stanard, for appellant.
Stafford & Stafford Associates and John J. Dyer III, for appellee.
Kirk W. Roessler; Strachan, Green, Miller, Olender & Hobt and William R. Strachan; Stafford & Associate and Joseph G. Stafford, for appellant Commerce Exchange Bank.
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In this consolidated appeal appellant Gregory Glick assigns eight errors challenging the domestic relations court's property division and spousal support awards, while Commerce Exchange Bank ("Commerce") assigns two errors challenging the court's order directing it to transfer approximately $32,000 from a savings account to appellee Dixie Glick. Having reviewed the record and the legal arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow.
For purposes of appellant Commerce's assigned errors, these facts must be noted at the outset.
Gregory Glick filed for divorce on January 4, 1993. Dixie Glick counterclaimed, and the trial court issued various restraining orders against banks doing business with the Glicks. Commerce received the restraining order and submitted its answer claiming a priority interest in the bank account. At the trial of the matter, neither party appeared and the matter was dismissed. On October 11, 1994, Dixie Glick moved to reinstate the action. Commerce did not appear at the hearing and has maintained throughout that it had no notice that the proceedings had been reinstated. The case proceeded to trial, and the trial court divided the marital estate and granted a divorce to the parties on March 12, 1997, based on the facts contained herein.
Gregory Glick and Dixie Glick were married on October 4, 1975, and had two children, Anthony (born July 2, 1979) and Jeremy (born October 7, 1982). Gregory Glick, a forty-eight-year-old attorney and entrepreneur, earned over $180,000 per year. Prior to 1993, Gregory Glick was in the business of buying real estate and forming limited partnerships to manage the property for a fee. After a downturn in the real estate market, he became involved in business litigation, which included lease drafting and consultations, security work, and general business consulting. Dixie Glick, a forty-six-year-old housewife, was unemployed and had no income. She had not worked outside the home since 1979.
The evidence presented at the divorce hearing revealed that Gregory Glick had an account at Commerce Exchange Bank with a balance of $30,197. Although the account bore his name, Glick maintained that the account actually belonged to a limited partnership known as Consource One Limited.1 He also added that he used the account as collateral for a loan issued in his name. According to Glick, the loan was used for the partnership as well as for his own personal use. The loan agreement listed the savings account as collateral for the loan and provided:
"To secure the payment and performance of obligations incurred under this Note, Borrower grants Lender a security interest in, and pledges and assigns to Lender all or Borrower's rights, title, and interest, in all monies, instruments, savings, checking and other deposit accounts of Borrower's * * * that are now or in the future in Lender's custody or control."
In its journal entry of divorce, the trial court determined that the term of the marriage was from October 4, 1975 to February 20, 1997 (the date of the final divorce hearing). The trial court valued the marital home at $333,000 with a mortgage balance of $192,000. The trial court also found that the parties owned a small interest in a property management corporation known as Claymore Industries and had several accounts at Commerce Exchange Bank and Star Bank. In addition, Gregory Glick had partnership interests in several other real estate management corporations.
The court determined that the parties' funds at Commerce Exchange Bank, their interest in Claymore Properties, and the $30,000 in Star Bank Account No. XXXX-XXXX-X were marital funds. The court ordered Commerce Exchange Bank to release $32,000 from the Commerce Exchange Bank Account No. 01-3770 to Dixie Glick and ordered Star Bank to release $15,000 from Star Bank Account No. XXXX-XXXX-X. Gregory Glick was awarded his interest in Claymore Properties and the balance of the money on deposit in Star Bank Account No. XXXX-XXXX-X.
Gregory Glick was ordered to pay a total of $2,241.96 per month in child support and $3,570 per month in spousal support. Gregory Glick was also ordered to pay Dixie Glick the sum of $65,000 in attorney fees as additional spousal support. Dixie Glick was awarded the marital home and all the household furnishings.
The court also found that the parties' marital debts totalled $40,000. Gregory Glick was ordered to pay all marital debts and obligations incurred from October 4, 1975 to February 20, 1997. Gregory Glick was ordered to buy a term life insurance policy paying a death benefit of $300,000 with Dixie Glick as the sole beneficiary. He was also ordered to provide medical, dental, and optical insurance for the parties' minor children and to pay all medical, dental, hospitalization, prescription and psychiatric expenses for the children.
Gregory Glick's objections to the trial court's journal entry of divorce were overruled. The court also denied his motion to stay the divorce judgment. Thereafter, Dixie Glick filed a motion to show cause why Gregory Glick should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the court's order to pay child support and spousal support. These appeals followed.
In his first and second assignments of error, Gregory Glick challenges the trial court's division of the parties' marital property. Specifically, he argues that the trial court's property division unduly favored Dixie Glick and left Gregory Glick with virtually no liquid assets. An equitable distribution of property need not necessarily be equal. Winkler v. Winkler (1997), 117 Ohio App.3d 247, 252, 690 N.E.2d 109, 112-113; Leadingham v. Leadingham (1997), 120 Ohio App.3d 496, 498, 698 N.E.2d 465, 465-466. The trial court is vested with broad discretion to make its determination of what constitutes an equitable property division. Walker v. Walker (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 90, 93, 677 N.E.2d 1252, 1253-1254; Neel v. Neel (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 24, 32, 680 N.E.2d 207, 212-213; Vanderpool v. Vanderpool (1997), 118 Ohio App.3d 876, 878, 694 N.E.2d 164, 165; Carman v. Carman (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 698, 703, 672 N.E.2d 1093, 1096.
The relevant factors to be considered by the trial court in making a division of marital property are (1) the duration of the marriage, (2) the assets and liabilities of the spouses, (3) the desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to reside in the family home for reasonable periods of time, to the spouse with custody of the children of the marriage, (4) the liquidity of the property to be distributed, (5) the economic desirability of retaining intact an asset or an interest in an asset, (6) the tax consequences of the property division upon the respective awards to be made to each spouse, (7) the costs of sale, if it is necessary that an asset be sold to effectuate an equitable distribution of property, (8) any division or disbursement of property made in a separation agreement that was voluntarily entered into by the spouses, and (9) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable. R.C. 3105.171(F)(1) through (9).
The trial court's journal entry explained the factors found to be relevant by the trial court. The trial court concluded that the parties were married over twenty-one years. The parties' assets totaled $245,313. The marital debts totaled $40,000. Custody of the children was awarded to Dixie Glick, in keeping with a March 15, 1996 agreement entered into by the parties. The court also found that "the voluminous testimony and presentation of the Gregory Glick leave a great deal to be desired regarding Gregory Glick's credibility." After considering Gregory Glick's demeanor, inflection, testimony, and actions throughout the proceedings, the court concluded that Gregory Glick's statements about his income, debts and assets of the marriage were not credible. The court also found that Gregory Glick used the Commerce Bank funds for his own use, despite his claims at trial that the funds were assets of Consource One, one of the property management Corporations he was involved with. The court also found that Gregory Glick diverted funds from another partnership, Dixie Partners, and had depleted that partnership's assets. The court stated that "it would be totally inequitable to make an equal division of property due to Gregory Glick's misconduct, actions and Gregory Glick's ability to earn an income."
After reviewing the record, we find no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion in making its property division. The court's property division, though unequal, was nevertheless equitable under the circumstances of this case. Gregory Glick's first and second assignments of error are overruled.
In his third assignment of error, Gregory Glick argues that the trial court should have used a de facto termination date of the marriage in order to equitably divide the marital property. R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(a). Generally, the terms of the marriage is the time period from the date of the marriage to the date of the final divorce hearing. However, R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(b) provides as follows:
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