Glick v. Greenleaf

• Decision Date: 02 April 1981
• Citation: 419 N.E.2d 272,383 Mass. 290
• Parties: Linda Greenleaf GLICK v. Richard S. GREENLEAF.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 272

419 N.E.2d 272

383 Mass. 290

Linda Greenleaf GLICK v. Richard S. GREENLEAF.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Argued Dec. 5, 1980.

Decided April 2, 1981.

Alexander H. Pratt, Jr., Boston, for defendant.

Matthew H. Feinberg, Boston, for plaintiff.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and BRAUCHER, KAPLAN, WILKINS and ABRAMS, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

In this appeal we are asked to consider whether the Probate Court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action brought by the plaintiff against her father concerning the interpretation of a separation agreement incorporated into her parents' divorce judgment. A judge in the Probate Court concluded that the court had jurisdiction and entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The Appeals Court reversed, holding that the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction should have been allowed. See Glick v. Greenleaf, --- Mass.App. ---, --- - --- ^a, 403 N.E.d 947 (1980). We granted further appellate review. We affirm the judgment entered in the Probate Court.

The case was before the Probate Court on the following statement of agreed facts. The defendant and the plaintiff's mother (now deceased) were divorced in Connecticut in 1966. A separation agreement was executed and incorporated into the judgment of divorce. At the time of the divorce, the defendant was employed by Morris Alper & Sons, Inc. (Morris Alper), and had a vested interest in the amount of $18,570.41 in that company's retirement plan. Paragraph 5 of the separation agreement, set forth in the margin, ¹ contained provisions regarding this interest. Paragraph 5 required the defendant to waive certain rights in the earmarked funds and to obtain the written consent of his wife if he wished to receive the funds in a lump sum rather than an annuity. In the event he severed himself from the retirement plan the $18,570.41 was to be placed in trust for the benefit of the wife and children. Demands were made on the defendant to comply with the separation agreement and execute the instruments ² necessary to transfer the $18,570.41. The judge found, however, that the defendant failed to execute any such instruments and did not place funds in trust for the benefit of his wife and children.

On December 21, 1966, the defendant left the employ of Morris Alper & Sons, Inc. In April, 1974, he authorized withdrawal of his $18,570.41 interest in the retirement fund to be used to purchase an annuity contract from the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan Life). The annuity is assignable and can be surrendered by the defendant for cash value at any time. The defendant's attorney, Frank Mongillo, is designated the primary revocable beneficiary. The plaintiff and her brother are named contingent revocable beneficiaries. ³ The plaintiff's mother died on September 14, 1976, more than two years after the annuity contract was purchased.

The judge ruled that the Probate Court had subject matter jurisdiction over a valid separation agreement entered into in another State, and that G.L. c. 215, § 6, confers jurisdiction on the Probate Court. He determined that "where, as here, a Separation Agreement between the parents is made and is for the benefit of the children as well as the parents, the children or either of them is entitled to enforcement of the Agreement." The judge concluded that pursuant to paragraph 5(c) the plaintiff was entitled to the sum of $9,285.20 with interest thereon "from September 14, 1976 until the date of (the) judgment as provided by law." The defendant appealed.

Jurisdiction. The defendant claims that the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint and her request for money relief deprive the Probate Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's complaint. He asserts that since the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, there is no jurisdiction in equity.

General Laws c. 215, § 6, ⁴ recognizes the special expertise the Probate Courts have developed in the areas of family law, trusts, and constructive trusts, see Thirty-sixth Report of the Judicial Council, Pub.Doc.No. 144, at 56-57 (1960), and grants Probate Courts jurisdiction to interpret various types of written agreements concerning family matters.

The plaintiff is seeking equitable relief relative to a matter enumerated in the statute and cognizable under the general principles of equity jurisprudence. The complaint alleges fraud by the defendant in transferring certain funds into an annuity plan, in violation of a separation agreement entered into by the plaintiff's parents. The plaintiff also asks the court to establish a constructive trust of the assets which should have been placed in trust under paragraph 5(c). In substance, the allegations suggest that the defendant is violating a fiduciary duty toward his daughter in failing to give due recognition to her interests under paragraph 5(c). The fact that the plaintiff included in her complaint a prayer that the defendant be ordered to compensate her directly does not remove the case from the Probate Court's jurisdiction. "Relief is based on the allegations of a bill, and not on its prayers." Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, 246, 316 N.E.2d 748 (1974), and cases cited. ⁵

Further, the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure permit a litigant to assert separate claims in a complaint, regardless of whether they are legal or equitable. Mass.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), 365 Mass. 749 (1974).

The fact that the relief ultimately awarded by the Probate Court was direct payment of a sum of money from the defendant to the plaintiff does not take the case out of the court's jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is established if the specific matter falls within the general grant of jurisdiction to a particular court. ⁶ In an action in equity to establish a constructive trust in certain property, "alternative relief by compensation for wrongful use of the money is within (the scope of general equity) jurisdiction." Jones v. Jones, 297 Mass. 198, 203-204, 7 N.E.2d 1015 (1937). In sum, the subject matter of the plaintiff's complaint is plainly within the court's jurisdiction of the issues raised. There was no error in the probate judge's assertion of jurisdiction. ⁷

Construction of the separation agreement. The Probate Court judge found that, by the terms of paragraph 5(a) of the separation agreement, the defendant irrevocably divested himself of all right or interest to the extent of $18,570.41 in the Morris Alper retirement plan. The judge held that the defendant was required to place that amount in trust for his wife and children at the time of his severance from the plan and that the trustee had no authority to disburse the $18,570.41 except in compliance with paragraph 5(c). The judge concluded that, at the time of the death of the plaintiff's mother on September 14, 1976, the defendant or trustee was obligated to disburse one-half of the money to the plaintiff.

On the other hand, the defendant asserts that, if paragraphs 5(b) and 5(c) are read together in the context of the entire agreement, it is evidence that it was the intent of the parties that the defendant receive payments from an annuity purchased by the retirement fund until his death. The trust agreement in paragraph 5(c), he argues, was merely intended to segregate a fund from which alimony payments would continue to be made after the defendant's death. If the withdrawal of the $18,570.41 from the Morris Alper retirement fund to purchase an annuity contract was a "severance" within the meaning of 5(c), the defendant argues, then the Metropolitan Life annuity contract naming his attorney (as trustee) and children as beneficiaries fulfils the purpose of paragraph 5(c). In any event, the defendant contends, the plaintiff was to receive the balance of the fund only if the defendant predeceased his former wife and her alimony payments were taken, after his death, from the trust fund.

When an element of ambiguity appears in a written instrument, we consider the entire instrument and the general scheme it reveals to determine the significance and meaning of the ambiguous terms. See MacDonald v. Gough, 326 Mass. 93, 96, 93 N.E.2d 260 (1950); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Hartfield Realty Co., 284 Mass. 540, 544, 188 N.E. 220 (1933); Lovell v. Commonwealth Thread Co., 272 Mass. 138, 140-141, 172 N.E. 77 (1930). Although the question is close, on the whole we think the construction of the separation agreement favoring the plaintiff is more persuasive.

At the time of the divorce, the defendant was required to execute the documents needed to effectuate the provisions of paragraphs 5(a), (b), and (c). He failed to do so. He now argues that the annuity contract he purchased from Metropolitan Life effectuates the same purpose as the trust which should have been created under paragraph 5(c). Further, he argues that paragraph 5(b) expressly reserves in him the right to receive his interest in the fund as an annuity until his death.

We agree that under paragraph 5(b) the defendant could have elected to receive his interest in the retirement fund as an annuity. However, he was required by the separation agreement to execute documents making that election at the time of the divorce. He did not do so. Moreover, the defendant was also required to execute a waiver of any right to accept a lump sum payment, except on the written consent of his wife. The defendant did not execute a waiver. The annuity contract bought by the defendant is contrary to the provisions of paragraph 5(b), as it was paid for upon receipt of the lump sum of the defendant's interest in the Morris Alper plan, without the written consent of his former wife.

Since the annuity contract does not meet the requirements of paragraph 5(b), the withdrawal of the fund with which it was purchased must be viewed as a severance from the Morris Alper plan. In the event of a severance, paragraph 5(c) requires the defendant's interest in the Morris Alper plan...