Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Foil
| Decision Date | 09 December 1938 |
| Docket Number | 14785. |
| Citation | 200 S.E. 97,189 S.C. 91 |
| Parties | GLOBE & RUTGERS FIRE INS. CO. v. FOIL. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from County Court of Spartanburg County; Arnold R. Merchant Judge.
Action by the Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Company against R. E Foil for conversion of a stolen automobile insured by plaintiff against theft. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Odom Bostick & Taylor, of Spartanburg, for appellant.
Carlisle, Brown & Carlisle, of Spartanburg, for respondent.
The respondent alleges that on August 29, 1929, it insured against theft in the sum of twelve hundred dollars, a Chrysler sedan automobile, motor number 259584, owned by Arthur J. Roussel, of New Orleans, Louisiana. In October of the same year, the automobile was stolen and taken to Spartanburg, South Carolina, by the thief, who there sold it to R. E. Foil, the appellant, who is an automobile dealer. The sale of the automobile was made to Foil on November 25, 1929, for $650, and two days thereafter he sold it to a customer for $1,350.
The respondent discharged its liability under the policy by paying the insurance to Roussel and Commercial Credit Company,-the latter holding a mortgage over the car at the time it was stolen. The respondent then instituted this action, in May, 1932, to recover damages from the appellant by reason of the conversion of the automobile. In his answer, the appellant denied the material allegations of the complaint, except that the automobile came into his possession. Other defenses were pleaded, but they are not material on this appeal. From an adverse judgment, the appellant brings the case to this court upon several specifications of error.
Over the objection of the appellant, the respondent was permitted to introduce in evidence, as an admission, the record of a criminal prosecution of the appellant in the United States Court for the Western District of South Carolina at Spartanburg, wherein the indictment charged that on or about November 25, 1929, "he feloniously, knowingly, and willfully did receive, conceal, and store a certain motor vehicle,-to wit: one Chrysler Sedan, Motor Number 259584, then and there moving in Interstate Commerce, to wit: from the city of New Orleans, in the State of Louisiana, to the city of Spartanburg, in the State of South Carolina; he, the said R. E. Foil, at the time he received, concealed, and stored said motor vehicle, knowing the same to have been stolen." This indictment charged the same offense in two other counts, with reference to a Buick sedan, on April 22, 1930, and a Nash coupe, on September 6, 1930. Upon this indictment, the appellant entered a plea of guilty, on February 16, 1932, and on the same day was sentenced.
Over the objection of the appellant, the respondent also introduced in evidence for the same purpose, the record of another criminal prosecution against the appellant, wherein he pleaded guilty on the same day and in the same court to an indictment charging him and Ray B. Curlee, the person who stole the car, with unlawfully conspiring to violate the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 408, and that in pursuance of the said conspiracy Curlee transported the Chrysler sedan in question, the property of Arthur J. Roussel, from New Orleans to the city of Spartanburg, and that the appellant here, R. E. Foil, did receive, conceal, and store the said Chrysler sedan, knowing the same to have been stolen, and did sell the same to one L. L. McKinney. Upon his plea of guilty, entered upon this indictment, he was duly sentenced.
The appellant contends that the introduction of these records was inadmissible and incompetent in a civil action.
The appellant denied in this case that he knew the Chrysler sedan had been stolen when he purchased it from Curlee. The sole value of these criminal records was to show an admission contrary to that contention.
In Freeman, Judgments (4 ed.), Sec. 319, the rule and reason for the introduction of such evidence is thus stated: "So a judgment of conviction founded upon a plea of guilty may be received in a civil action as an admission by the defendant of the facts confessed by his plea; but this is manifestly only a mode of proving such admission, and cannot be regarded as estopping the defendant from showing that notwithstanding such confession and conviction he was not guilty."
To the same effect it is said in Black, Judgments (3d ed.), Sec. 529:
In Albrecht v. State, 62 Miss. 516, it was said:
While it is well settled that a conviction in a criminal prosecution is not an adjudication binding the defendant in a subsequent civil action based on the same facts (See 15 R.C.L., Judgments, page 1000), a plea of guilty is an admission of the matters alleged in the indictment and the judgment entered thereon is admissible in a civil action involving the same issues as proof of that admission. Spain v. Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Company, 78 Or. 355, 153 P. 470, Ann.Cas.1917E, 1104. And see annotated note following the report of this case in Ann.Cas.1917E, 1109.
For instance, the principle is well established that in an action for damages for assault and battery, the plaintiff may prove that the defendant pleaded guilty in the criminal prosecution for the same assault. Eno v. Brown, 1 Root, Conn., 528; Hendle v. Geiler, Del., 50 A. 632; Young v. Copple, 52 Ill.App. 547; Rudolph v. Landwerlen, 92 Ind. 34; Hamm v. Romine, 98 Ind. 77; Root v. Sturdivant, 70 Iowa 55, 29 N.W. 802; Crawford v. Bergen, 91 Iowa 675, 60 N.W. 205; Hauser v. Griffith, 102 Iowa 215, 71 N.W. 223; Corwin v. Walton, 18 Mo. 71, 59 Am.Dec. 285; Green v. Bedell, 48 N.H. 546; Clark v. Irvin, 9 Ohio 131; Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 67.
The American decisions concur in holding that a judgment on a plea of guilty when introduced in a subsequent civil action involving the same subject matter is to be regarded merely as an admission, subject to explanation or rebuttal by the person charged thereby. Schreiner v. High Court, etc., 35 Ill.App. 576; Rudolph v. Landwerlen, supra; Crawford v. Bergen, supra; Albrecht v. State, supra; 4 Am.Jur., Sec. 156, Page 199.
Therefore, the appellant's plea admitting guilt of receiving the Chrysler automobile which he knew had been stolen, and of disposing of it, is like any other admission of the kind, inconclusive, but subject to contradiction or explanation, when proved against him in the civil proceeding.
The record in this case shows that he was permitted to fully explain the circumstances under which he made the plea, and the jury had the benefit of the explanation. He denied knowledge of the theft and said that he pleaded guilty upon advice of counsel.
In our opinion, the records were properly admitted.
The point is made that the lower court erred in permitting the introduction in evidence of so much of the indictment as charged similar offenses involving the Buick sedan and the Nash coupe, and the appellant's plea of guilt. It is contended that the admission of this evidence was prejudicial. We are of the opinion that this evidence...
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