Glock v. Moore

• Decision Date: 10 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-3425,98-3425
• Citation: 195 F.3d 625
• Parties: (11th Cir. 1999) ROBERT DEWEY GLOCK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. MICHAEL W. MOORE, Respondent-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 625

195 F.3d 625 (11th Cir. 1999)

ROBERT DEWEY GLOCK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. MICHAEL W. MOORE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 98-3425

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Nov. 10, 1999

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D. C. Docket No. 89-00054-CIV-T-17

Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Robert Glock appeals the district court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to his sentence of death. Petitioner argues that he was denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, during the penalty phase of his trial. The district court denied the writ and we now affirm in all respects.

I.

A.

Glock and his codefendant, Carl Puiatti, were charged in Florida with the first-degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery of Sharilyn Ritchie. The Florida Supreme Court described the evidence against Glock as follows:

[O]n August 16, 1983, the woman victim arrived at a Bradenton shopping mall. As she exited her automobile, Puiatti and Glock confronted her, forced her back inside the car, and drove away with her. They took $50 from her purse and coerced her into cashing a $100 check at her bank. They then took the victim to an orange grove outside Dade City[,] where they took the woman's wedding ring and abandoned her at the roadside. After traveling a short distance, the appellants determined that the woman should be killed, and they returned in the car to her. When the car's window came adjacent to the woman, Puiatti shot her twice. The appellants drove away, but, when they saw she was still standing, they drove by the victim again and Glock shot her. When the woman did not fall, the appellants made a third pass with the automobile, Glock shot her another time, and the woman collapsed.

Puiatti v. State, 495 So. 2d 128, 129 (Fla. 1986), vacated in part, 481 U.S. 1027, 107 S. Ct. 1950, 95 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987).

The facts surrounding Glock's arrest and trial have been developed extensively in Glock v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1014, 1017-18 (11th Cir. 1994), vacated, 51 F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc), and Glock v. Singletary, 65 F.3d 878, 880-81 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Glock was found guilty of all three offenses. At the penalty phase¹ Glock presented three witnesses, and also testified himself. Willie May Glock, Glock's stepmother with whom he lived since the age of fourteen, testified that Glock regretted participating in the murder of Sharilyn Ritchie; that he was more of a follower than a leader, and thus she doubted that his participation in the crime was voluntary; that she loved Glock; and that his early childhood was characterized by a lack of parental guidance.² Dr. Gerald Mussenden, a clinical psychologist, testified that he had performed a battery of evaluative tests on Glock.³ From these tests, Dr. Mussenden concluded that Glock had difficulty relating to authority; special difficulties relating to women; suffered from a poor self- concept; was easily led by people who could make him feel comfortable; experienced rejection by his parents and stepparents as a child;⁴ did not have a criminal personality; and was a good candidate for rehabilitation. Tammy Yonce, Glock's sister with whom he lived until age thirteen, testified that Glock was a follower; that he regretted his participation in the murder of Sharilyn Ritchie; that she loved him; and that Glock's early childhood was characterized by extensive physical and emotional abuse from his alcoholic mother.⁵ Finally, Glock, himself took the stand and testified that he felt much remorse and sorrow about his participation in the murder.

In his closing argument during the penalty phase, Glock's attorney, Robert Trogolo, argued against the finding of any statutory aggravating circumstances.⁶ He also argued that there were several mitigating circumstances that weighed against the imposition of the death penalty. As for statutory mitigating circumstances, Trogolo argued that Glock had no significant history of prior criminal activity; the felony was committed while Glock was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; Glock acted under the substantial domination of another person (his codefendant, Puiatti); Glock's capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; and that while Glock was chronologically twenty-two years of age, his emotional or psychological age was much younger, and thus the "age of the defendant" should be considered in his favor. See Fla. Stat. Ann. 921.141(6).⁷

As for nonstatutory mitigators, Trogolo argued that Glock's history of childhood abuse should be weighed in his favor. He also contended that Glock was an excellent candidate for rehabilitation. To support this claim, Trogolo argued that during the early stages of the police investigation, Glock acknowledged his wrongdoing; Glock's conduct while incarcerated had been exemplary; Glock had a history of nonviolence; Glock could adjust to law-abiding behavior; he had served honorably in the military; he was a person of good character, as testified to by his stepmother and his sister; his criminal conduct was the result of circumstances that were unlikely to recur; and Glock's attitude was one of penitence and contrition. In addition, Trogolo argued that the testimony of Willie Mae Glock and Tammy Yonce was evidence that Glock now had a stable and loving family network that could assist him in adjusting to law-abiding behavior. He stated to the jury, "[a]s Mrs. Yonce said and Willie Mae Glock, they both still love Robert." Trogolo then asked the jury to "[k]eep [Glock] where his family can still love him. They can love him in prison."

By a vote of eleven to one, the jury recommended that Glock be put to death. Because the Florida capital sentencing scheme does not require it do so, see Fla. Stat. Ann. 921.141(2), the jury did not advise the court on which aggravating and mitigating circumstances it found were established during the trial. The court accepted the jury's recommendation and imposed the death penalty, finding as to Glock that three statutory aggravating circumstances and one statutory mitigating circumstance had been established. The court found that the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest, or effecting an escape from custody; it was committed for pecuniary gain; and that the capital felony was a homicide and that it was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, without any pretext of moral or legal justification. See Fla. Stat. Ann. 921.141(5)(e), (f), (i). The court also found that Glock had established a mitigating circumstance in that he had no significant history of prior criminal activity. See Fla. Stat. Ann. 921.141(6)(a). In its written findings, the court specifically found that Glock had not established that he "was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disurbance" when he committed the crime, Fla. Stat. Ann. 921.141(6)(b), because "there was no credible evidence whatsoever to support a finding that either of these defendants suffered from any disrubance [sic] that would mitigate a calculated, premeditated murder." Further, the court specifically found that Glock had not established that he was under the "substantial domination of another person" when he committed the crime. Fla. Stat. Ann. 921.141(6)(e).

B.

Following the imposition of sentence, Glock appealed his murder conviction and death sentence. The Florida Supreme Court found no error in the proceedings before the trial court and therefore affirmed.⁸ Puiatti, 495 So. 2d 128. Glock then moved the trial court for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. In his Rule 3.850 petition Glock listed sixteen claims, including a claim that his attorney was ineffective at both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial.⁹ The trial court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, examined and rejected each of Glock's claims, finding that some of his claims had been waived, some had been decided against him on direct appeal and thus were not cognizable in a Rule 3.850 proceeding, and the rest lacked merit.

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Rule 3.850 relief. Glock v. Dugger, 537 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1989).¹⁰ In its opinion, the court discussed only two of the sixteen claims that Glock presented: (1) that the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's (Puiatti's) confession violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968), and as applied in Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 107 S. Ct. 1714, 95 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1987); and (2) that Glock's attorney rendered ineffective assistance because he failed to obtain additional information from Glock's family to aid the mental health experts in showing the deficiencies in Glock's personality which affected Glock's confession and presentation of evidence during the penalty phase. The court found Glock's remaining claims to be patently meritless.

The Florida Supreme Court rejected Glock's Cruz claim. Glock, 537 So. 2d at 102. The court also found the ineffective assistance claim to be without merit because "[t]he `additional information' Glock now seeks to submit is not new, but cumulative to that which was presented in the sentencing process. In addition to the reports provided to the experts, Glock's stepmother and sister testified to the substance of his family background." Id. After the court handed down its decision, the Governor signed Glock's death warrant and his execution was scheduled for January 17, 1989.

On January 3, 1989, Glock, replicating the sixteen claims raised in his Rule 3.850 petition, filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas...