Glover v. State

• Citation: 860 P.2d 1169
• Decision Date: 13 October 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-258,92-258
• Parties: Charles GLOVER, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

Page 1169

860 P.2d 1169

Charles GLOVER, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Defendant).

No. 92-258.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Oct. 13, 1993.

Harold F. Buck of Buck Law Offices, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Josephine T. Porter, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR, JJ.

MACY, Chief Justice.

Appellant Charles Glover appeals from the district court's order granting a summary judgment in favor of Appellee State of Wyoming. The district court found that Glover did not exhaust his administrative remedies after he was dismissed as a permanent employee for the State.

We affirm.

Glover presents the following issues for our review:

ISSUE ONE

Did the State, in adopting its personnel rules, prescribe as exclusive that all matters as to their interpretation be left to an administrative hearing authority?

ISSUE TWO

Does the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply where the remedy is neither mandatory nor the administrative agency one vested with particular expertise?

Glover began working for the State in 1984. He was employed in a number of positions from that time through 1990. During this period, he worked both indoors and outdoors. He had experienced severe frostbite before he began working for the State, and, as a consequence, he was hypersensitive to cold temperatures and experienced pain when he was exposed to cold weather conditions.

Because of his medical condition, Glover met with the director of the Department of Administration and Information (the department) in January 1991 and requested that he be transferred to a position where his duties would allow him to work indoors. Glover also requested that the new position not conflict with his night job at the Holiday Inn.

In order to accommodate Glover's request, the director reassigned him to an entry level position as a bindery technician in the central duplicating section of the department. Glover began working as a bindery technician on Friday, February 1, 1991. As the bindery technician with the least seniority, he was required to make deliveries outdoors during cold weather.

Glover called in sick on Monday, February 4, 1991, his second day of working as a bindery technician. Later that same day, he talked with the director and indicated that he could not continue working as a bindery technician because he was required to make outdoor deliveries during cold weather. After a discussion, the director gave Glover three options: He could (1) return to his job as a bindery technician; (2) take a position on the night crew; or (3) quit. Glover refused the first two alternatives and would not quit, so the director fired him effective immediately.

Soon thereafter, the director learned that he did not have authority under the personnel rules to fire Glover without following the proper procedures. In order to conform with the personnel rules, the director sent Glover a notice of his intent to dismiss him from State service. The notice set forth the reasons for the dismissal, reiterated the first two employment options, and informed Glover that he had ten working days in which to respond to the notice and that he was suspended with pay during the dismissal review period.

On February 26, 1991, Glover responded to the notice by requesting that he be allowed to perform his bindery technician job without making outdoor deliveries. On February 28, 1991, the director sent a letter to Glover, terminating his employment with the State. He specifically informed Glover that he had the right to file an appeal to his dismissal in accordance with the personnel rules.

Glover did not file an appeal within the administrative scheme. Instead, he filed an action in the federal district court, alleging that his due process rights had been violated. The federal district court granted a summary judgment in favor of the State.

On April 20, 1992, Glover filed a complaint in the state district court, alleging that his due process rights had been violated by the dismissal and that the State had breached its employment contract with him. The State filed a motion for a summary judgment. Following a hearing on the motion, the district court granted a summary judgment in favor of the State. Glover had earlier conceded that his constitutional and due process claims were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because of the federal court decision. As to the remaining issues, the district court held that the personnel rules set forth the terms of Glover's employment and his remedies upon being terminated and that, since Glover did not follow the proper procedure by filing an appeal to the dismissal decision, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and, therefore, was barred from bringing an action in the district court. Appellant appeals from the district court's order.

Glover presents two closely related arguments. First, he argues that the administrative procedure for filing an appeal to a personnel decision, as articulated in the rules and statutes, was neither mandatory nor exclusive. He contends that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the case and that he was not required to pursue his administrative remedies. In support of his argument, he makes a distinction between original jurisdiction and primary jurisdiction. He also argues that, if this Court interprets the rules and statutes to require him to obtain administrative review first, the district court would be denied its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 5, Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution.

In Glover's second argument, he states that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply because the remedy provided by the rules was not mandatory and the department was not vested with any particular expertise in personnel matters. He contends that the district court confused the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Glover's arguments address the related doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction. This Court explained the two doctrines in People v. Fremont Energy Corporation, 651 P.2d 802, 810-11 (Wyo.1982) (quoting United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Company, 352 U.S. 59, 63-64, 77 S.Ct. 161, 165, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956)):

"The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, like the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties. 'Exhaustion' applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has run its course. 'Primary jurisdiction,' on the other hand, applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views."

We first consider the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and its application in this case. The decision to decline jurisdiction because a party failed to exhaust his administrative remedies is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court. Union Pacific Resources Company v. State, 839 P.2d 356, 366 (Wyo.1992).

This Court defined the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies in Fremont Energy Corporation:

The exhaustion doctrine applies where an agency alone has been granted or found to possess exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The purpose of the doctrine then is to avoid premature interruption of the administrative process where the agency has been created to apply a statute in the first instance.

651 P.2d at 811. The reasons for applying the exhaustion doctrine are apparent:

A primary purpose is, of course, the avoidance of premature interruption of the administrative process. The agency, like a trial court, is created for the purpose of applying a statute in the first instance. Accordingly, it is normally desirable to let the agency develop the necessary factual background upon which decisions should be based. And since agency decisions are frequently of a discretionary nature or frequently require expertise, the agency should be given the first chance to exercise that discretion or to apply that expertise. And of course it is generally more efficient for the administrative process to go forward without interruption than it is to permit the parties to seek aid from the courts at various intermediate stages. The very same reasons lie behind judicial rules sharply limiting interlocutory appeals.

McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1662-63, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) (reversing 395 F.2d 906 (6th Cir.1968)). We conclude that the department possessed exclusive jurisdiction over State personnel matters until the available administrative remedies had been exhausted.

The Legislature charged the department with the personnel management responsibilities for the State of Wyoming. Wyo.Stat. §§ 9-2-1002(d)(iii) ¹ and 9-2-1022 (SUPP.1990)². To that end, the Legislature directed the department to promulgate rules concerning discipline, grievances, and appeals. Section 9-2-1022(a)(xi)(C). Wyo.Stat. § 9-2-1019(a) (1991) provides for the appointment of a personnel review board to conduct personnel appeal hearings in accordance with the contested case procedures provided in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act states that a party who obtains a final ruling after a contested case hearing has been held is entitled to have judicial review of the decision. Wyo.Stat. § 16-3-114(a) (1990). However, judicial review is...