Glynn v. Donnelly
Decision Date | 11 June 1973 |
Docket Number | Misc. Civ. No. 72-103. |
Citation | 360 F. Supp. 214 |
Parties | Francis T. GLYNN, Petitioner, v. Robert H. DONNELLY, as he is Superintendent of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
James W. Kelleher, Boston, Mass., for petitioner.
Charles Chase, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boston, Mass., for respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
This case is before the Court on a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner Glynn was convicted in two jury trials (generally known as the "small loans" cases) on four indictments charging that he conspired to bribe, and did bribe, two executive officers of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Petitioner's convictions were affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co. et al., 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh. 1367, 275 N.E.2d 33.
Upon objection by petitioner to the preliminary hearing before a United States magistrate, this Court held a de novo hearing on the petition on January 29, 1973. By stipulation of the parties, only the legal claim embodied in paragraphs 9 and 13 of the petition is pressed in this proceeding. As to that claim, petitioner has indisputably exhausted his state judicial remedies. See Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., supra, at 1469-1470, 275 N.E.2d 33.
Paragraph 9 of the petition reads as follows:
"Verdicts in the First and Second Trials may not stand because the petitioner was denied Due Process of Law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution by the application of a rule authorizing the prosecutor to make to the judge (in jury cases) ex parte statements bearing on guilt and on disposition, as more fully set forth in paragraph 13 below."
Paragraph 13 of the petition, with record references and footnotes deleted, reads as follows:
This Court concurs in petitioner's view that the constitutional question of whether the statutory procedure for securing the attendance of out-of-state witnesses, as employed by the state court trial judge in the first trial, violated petitioner's right to due process of law is not adequately answered by noting that the trial judge "merely discharged his duty under the statute." Nor does it suffice to say that the uniform law to secure the attendance of witnesses from without a state in criminal proceedings, M.G.L. c. 233, §§ 13A-13D, would be rendered "useless" if it were held that the "prosecution's representations so prejudiced the judge as to preclude a fair trial." Rather, the issue to be determined is whether petitioner was, in fact, deprived of a fair trial by the prosecution's ex parte communications with the trial judge.
In support of his contention that the statutory procedure, as applied, did deprive him of a fair trial, petitioner offers no evidence of prejudicial consequences in the conduct of the trial.1 Instead, petitioner invokes the doctrine of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), that, once a constitutional right has been shown to have been violated, a court, in order to hold the violation harmless, "must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id., at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. In Chapman, it was "completely impossible to say that the State has demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecutor's comments and the trial judge's instruction did not contribute to petitioner's convictions." Id., at 26, 87 S.Ct. at 829. On the basis of Chapman, argues petitioner, it is the respondent's burden to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution's ex parte communications with the trial judge were harmless.
Petitioner's argument rests upon a premise which this Court does not accept as valid. Specifically, petitioner assumes, as he must in order to invoke the support of Chapman and of Haller v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857 (1st Cir. 1969), that it was constitutional error for the trial judge to pass upon the Commonwealth's requests for out-of-state witnesses under M.G.L. c. 233, §§ 13A-13D. Petitioner's assumption is based upon an unreasonable construction of the trial judge's statutory function under M.G.L. c. 233, §§ 13A-13D. It is clear that in certifying, for example, that "J. Miller Redfield, of Rancho Bernardo, County of San Diego, State of California, is a necessary and material witness for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts at such trial by reason of the fact that he has personal knowledge that a sum of money was delivered to another...
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...had made an adequate showing that the testimony of the prospective witnesses was material (see State v. Tolley, supra; Glynn v. Donnelly, 360 F.Supp. 214 (D.Mass.1973)) and had adequately designated the location at which they could be found (see Lancaster v. Green, 175 Ohio St. 203, 192 N.E......
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