Gmeiner v. Yacte

• Decision Date: 13 March 1979
• Docket Number: No. 12201,12201
• Citation: 592 P.2d 57,100 Idaho 1
• Parties: Lillis GMEINER, personal representative of the Estate of Beryl MacArthur, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Danny V. YACTE and Ronda V. Yacte, husband and wife, and Elroy Frushour andFrances Frushour, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 57

592 P.2d 57

100 Idaho 1

Lillis GMEINER, personal representative of the Estate of Beryl MacArthur, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Danny V. YACTE and Ronda V. Yacte, husband and wife, and Elroy Frushour andFrances Frushour, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 12201.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

March 13, 1979.

Pat W. Arney, Coeur d'Alene, for plaintiff-appellant.

Thomas M. Vasseur, Coeur d'Alene, for defendants-respondents Danny V. and Ronda V. Yacte.

C. J. Hamilton, Coeur d'Alene, for defendants-respondents, Elroy and Frances Frushour.

BISTLINE, Justice.

Beryl MacArthur died on September 22, 1973, at the age of 78. It is uncontradicted that in the last years of her life she made numerous transfers of property and money to the defendant-respondent Danny Yacte, a 32-year-old man who befriended her in those last years. On Beryl's death, Lillis Gmeiner, Beryl's sister, was appointed the personal representative of her estate. Beryl was unmarried and left no lineal descendents; her heirs at law are her six brothers and sisters. This suit against the Yactes and Frushours was filed in October, 1973, alleging undue influence on the part of Yacte, and knowledge thereof on the part of the Frushours, when they loaned money to Yacte in exchange for the deed to Beryl's house. The complaint demanded judgment against Yacte for $2,000 (the amount he allegedly received from Beryl out of the D. J. MacArthur estate of which Beryl was executrix), various other sums of money and a court order quieting title in the decedent in various properties.

Danny Yacte answered that the money and properties transferred to him from Beryl were all in consideration for her one-half interest in his business; that the fish business had failed leaving him with $15,000 in debts, of which $7,500 were valid claims against the estate; and that Beryl had executed an oral will giving all her property to him. The district court ruled before trial that nuncupative wills no longer existed in Idaho and struck the last claim. It held further that the $7,500 claim against the estate violated the statute of limitations (not having been filed within the 4-month limit) but that it remained as a possible set-off or counterclaim.

The Frushours answered that they received a warranty deed from Danny Yacte, the record title-holder of the property in question, to secure a loan to him of approximately $6,500, which loan had never been paid. They prayed the court to order a judicial sale of the property to pay off the loan. Gmeiner replied that the Frushours knew of Yacte's alleged undue influence, that they held title to the property as equitable trustees for the estate and that the most they could hope to recover was the amount loaned to Yacte.

At jury trial, plaintiff Gmeiner presented numerous witnesses real estate agents, neighbors, relatives who testified concerning the various transactions and personalities involved. At the close of plaintiff's case, the Yactes and Frushours each moved for a directed verdict. The district court granted both motions. In addition, the court quieted title to Beryl's house in Yacte and ordered a foreclosure sale so that the Frushours could receive the money they had loaned on it. A motion for a new trial was denied.

I

Gmeiner first argues on appeal that the trial judge committed reversible error by entering his own findings of fact and conclusions of law, contrary to what she alleges are the provisions of I.R.C.P. 52(a). Respondent Yacte admits that findings are not required by Rule 50(a), dealing with directed verdicts, and that Rule 52(a) does not envision a need for findings in such cases. He argues, however, that no rule Prohibits the making of findings in such cases either. The trial court so ruled in denying objections to the findings.

Neither side has presented this Court with case citations as authority for its position. Nonetheless, it is respondent Yacte's argument which is correct. In a case squarely on point, a federal circuit court has held.

If the court grants it (a motion for directed verdict) no findings of fact are necessary and upon review the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. . . .

We will therefore . . . disregard the findings of fact of the trial court, reviewing the entire evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and giving him the benefit of all reasonable inferences which may be deduced from the evidence in his favor . . . . To adopt any other view in a jury case is to risk the deprivation of a plaintiff's right to trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment.

O'Brien v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 293 F.2d 1, 9-10 (3d Cir. 1961). In short, since a motion for directed verdict in a jury trial presents the trial judge with a pure question of law, there is no need for him to enter his own findings of fact in such circumstances. The entry of findings, though superfluous, does not constitute reversible error. The task of the appellate court remains the same, namely, to determine whether plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to survive defendant's motion for a directed verdict and to justify submitting the case to the jury, I. e., whether, as a matter of law, plaintiff produced sufficient evidence (not a mere scintilla) from which reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the plaintiff was proper. See Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 518 P.2d 1194 (1974); 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 2524, 2536 (1971). ¹

II

The theory on which Gmeiner relied in her cause of action against defendant Danny Yacte was that of "undue influence." ² After Gmeiner presented her case, both sets of defendants moved for a directed verdict, both motions being based upon the insufficiency of the evidence to make a Prima facie case.

In ruling on the motions, the court below, in stating that "the record is completely void of any direct or positive evidence of any undue influence . . .", went on to analyze the evidence to see "whether or not any presumption or inferences arise" which would support the claim of undue influence. He concluded that the evidence was "not sufficient to show the existence of any confidential or fiduciary relationship between the Yactes and Beryl MacArthur." Citing Kelley v. Wheyland, 93 Idaho 735, 471 P.2d 590 (1970), he added that that case required as an element of proof that lack of consideration for a transfer or conveyance must be established, and "that the mere existence of a fiduciary confidential relationship will not give rise to any inference that a transaction between parties was without consideration." He ruled that evidence as to the element of consideration was "silent." Concluding, he added:

The record would show that at the time most of these were made, she was declining in physical health but still was a mentally competent person. There is nothing in the record to show that the transfer was made under any undue influence. In summary, there is no testimony of influence having been exerted over Beryl MacArthur, There is no evidence of fact and circumstances from which it can be inferred that influence or any improper influence was asserted. There is nothing really of record here to rebut the presumption that Miss MacArthur was at all times acting totally, mentally on her own free will and volition. For that reason the Defendants Yactes' motion for directed verdict will be granted.

Gmeiner, citing the second In re Estate of Randall, 60 Idaho 419, 93 P.2d 1 (1939), does not question the trial court's conclusion that she had no direct evidence tending to prove Yacte's undue influence. ³ Rather, citing statements of this Court found in In re Lunders' Estate, 74 Idaho 448, 454, 263 P.2d 1002, 1006 (1953) (quoting In re Hannam's Estate, 106 Cal.2d 782, 236 P.2d 208, 210 (1951)), wherein this Court said:

"Direct evidence as to undue influence is rarely obtainable and hence a court or jury must determine the issue of undue influence by inferences drawn from all the facts and circumstances. Taken singly the facts or circumstances may be of little weight, but taken collectively they acquire their proper weight and may then be sufficient to raise a presumption of undue influence,"

Gmeiner, in challenging the ruling of the trial court, points to nine enumerated instances in the record each of which it is contended gave rise to an inference of undue influence on Yacte's part:

(1) The progressive failure of Beryl's physical and mental health Infers that she was easily subject to undue influence.

(2) The total value of the receipt of property and cash by Danny from Beryl, without any payment thereof, total failure of consideration, failure of Danny to respond under oath to what consideration was given, evidence in general, together with admissions before trial, and failure of Danny to obey the Court's order compelling answer . . . to Interrogatory No. 4 . . . inferred that there was no consideration involved and no claim of gift was made by Danny as to the total cash and property of about $33,472.00.

(3) The respective ages (77-78) and (32-33), the fascination by Beryl of Danny in the tropical fish business, Beryl's reliance and imposing of confidence in Danny, Beryl's weakening condition and rejection of her sister (plaintiff), Inferred a confidential relationship.

(4) Danny's failure to admit receipt of about $9300.00 additional funds from Beryl through Ratliff Realty during the deposition a year before trial Infers Danny's disposition to exert undue influence.

(5) Danny's statement to his supposed wife, Ronda: "You better be nice to Beryl because she is worth $30,000.00 more than I have already gotten out of her," Infers undue influence.

(6) Danny's statement to Gus Gmeiner, in effect, that: "I am her legal guardian," and statements to plaintiff, in effect, that: "I am her business coordinator," Infers a disposition to exert control and undue influence over...