Goad v. State
| Decision Date | 02 December 1996 |
| Citation | 938 S.W.2d 363 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
| Parties | William Wesley GOAD, Appellant, v. STATE of Tennessee, Appellee. |
Paul J. Morrow, Jr., Nashville, Louis W. Oliver, III, Hendersonville, for appellant.
Charles W. Burson, Attorney General and Reporter, John P. Cauley, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Lawrence Ray Whitley, District Attorney General, Gallatin, for appellee.
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the petitioner, William Wesley Goad, was afforded his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial.
The Tennessee death penalty statute, Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-203, requires at the sentencing phase of a capital trial that the jury weigh statutory aggravating circumstances against statutory and other mitigating circumstances. If the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances 1, the jury must return the death penalty.
In this case, the State relied on and proved one aggravating circumstance, Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(2)(1982), conviction of one or more felonies involving violence or the threat of violence. The defense mitigation theory at sentencing was that Goad's experience in Vietnam had drastically changed him from a model citizen to a violent, mentally ill criminal. The only proof, however, that was introduced to support this marked change was that of Goad's parents and two high school friends. The record establishes that trial counsel failed to produce an available expert witness to introduce proof that Goad had been diagnosed with a mental illness--post-traumatic stress disorder--arising out of his harrowing Vietnam military service experience and his wife's infidelity while he served there.
Under these circumstances, the standards for effective assistance of counsel required in the United States Supreme Court case of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), apply. We conclude that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to present the available expert mitigating evidence of mental illness which would have substantially strengthened the mitigation case of the defense. That ineffectiveness undermines our confidence in the outcome of the penalty proceeding. As a result, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing hearing would have been different but for counsel's ineffectiveness. We reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment denying post-conviction relief, vacate the petitioner's death sentence, and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.
The petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder in the perpetration of a robbery and sentenced to death by electrocution. See State v. Goad, 707 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn.1986). The only aggravating circumstance found by the jury was that in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(2)(1982), "the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, which involved the use or threat of violence to the person." The proof presented at the sentencing hearing at trial was summarized by this Court in its opinion on direct appeal.
Appellant was about 35 years of age at the time of the trial. He had been reared in Maury County, Tennessee, and had entered military service shortly after his graduation from high school in Mount Pleasant. He served for about two years in the armed services, one portion being in Europe and the other in Vietnam. After his return from service he had been married three times. He was shown to have been subject to drug abuse to some extent, had been convicted of six major felonies and had been incarcerated for some time as a result of these convictions. He had no history of mental illness or of treatment for drug abuse. He was evaluated prior to trial at a state mental health facility and found to be competent to stand trial. No plea of insanity was interposed, nor was there any specific claim of diminished mental capacity. At the sentencing hearing, however, it was contended that his personality had "changed" since his return from military service, and apparently his career of crime and poor citizenship was attributed to his military experiences.
As the summary reflects, the defense attempted to establish at the sentencing hearing that Goad had been a model citizen until he served in Vietnam. Goad's parents testified that Goad had a "typical" childhood. He made good grades, attended church, and graduated from high school. Shortly after his graduation in 1967, Goad enlisted in the U.S. Army and eventually served in Vietnam. Goad's parents related the drastic changes they noticed in Goad's behavior upon his return home from Vietnam. He was "altogether different," acted "nervous," and appeared to be involved with drugs. Similarly, two of Goad's high school friends testified that Goad was a passive, non-violent person while in high school.
During the sentencing hearing, petitioner's counsel requested that the court adjourn early at 5:45 p.m. one day so that Dr. Oakley Ray of the Veterans Administration Mental Health Section could testify the next morning. Counsel said that Dr. Ray had been out of town for two weeks and would be available the next day. The State requested an offer of proof. In response, defense counsel stated that Dr. Ray had "spent some time" with the petitioner, was "an expert in the field of post-traumatic stress syndrome," and would testify about how Goad's experiences in Vietnam had affected his mental health. The trial court denied the request for an early adjournment, stating that it "wouldn't allow that testimony at the sentence hearing." Id. at 852. The sentencing hearing proceeded, and the jury returned a verdict of death.
On direct appeal, Justice Harbison of this Court found fault with counsel's failure to present a more detailed offer of proof and with the trial court's premature refusal to admit Ray's testimony in his opinion. This Court, however, declined to order a new sentencing hearing without further development of the record. Accordingly, the case was remanded by this Court for a trial court hearing in which defense counsel were to be given an opportunity to establish that they had contacted Dr. Ray and arranged for his appearance at the sentencing hearing. If counsel could not so demonstrate, then the sentence would not be disturbed; if counsel could establish Dr. Ray's availability, then his testimony was to be presented. If Dr. Ray's testimony "credibly tend[ed] to establish that [petitioner] suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome in February 1983," then the death sentence was to be vacated and a new sentencing hearing held. Id. at 854.
At the trial court remand hearing, one of the petitioner's attorneys, John Pellegrin, submitted affidavits detailing his contacts with Dr. Ray prior to trial and his effort to obtain Dr. Ray's testimony for the sentencing hearing. Pellegrin maintained that it was his understanding that Ray would be available to testify at the sentencing hearing about Goad's post-traumatic stress symptoms. Pellegrin also asserted that he had learned after trial for the first time that Goad had actually been evaluated by Dr. Sam Pieper, Jr., acting chief of the Veterans Administration Psychiatric Service, and not Dr. Ray, and that Pieper had completed an evaluation report on November 22, 1983, several months before trial.
Neither Pieper nor Ray were subpoenaed by the defense to testify at the remand hearing, nor was Pieper's report introduced into evidence. Ray, however, told an investigator for the District Attorney General and one of the petitioner's attorneys that he had never been contacted about testifying in Goad's case, that he was not an expert in the area of post-traumatic stress syndrome, and that he had never examined the petitioner. Based on that proof, the trial court concluded that trial counsel "were not actually prepared to offer the testimony of Dr. Ray and that Dr. Ray was not prepared to testify that the defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome." This Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant a new sentencing hearing.
Thereafter, Goad filed this post-conviction action in 1987 2, alleging numerous grounds for relief. He asserted that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his trial due to counsel's failures to introduce mitigation evidence about his post-traumatic stress disorder, his prior drug abuse and treatment, and his prior head injury. A post-conviction evidentiary hearing was held in 1993.
Both of Goad's trial attorneys, John Pellegrin and John Wesley Jones, testified at the post-conviction hearing. Pellegrin said that he had been licensed to practice law in October of 1980, a little more than three years before his appointment to this case. Although he had tried "numerous" criminal cases, this was his first death penalty case. Jones testified that he began to practice law in 1971. He had tried approximately twelve first-degree murder cases, but, like Pellegrin, this was his first capital case.
Pellegrin testified that he learned of Dr. Ray prior to trial from the Public Defender's Office in Davidson County, which was representing Goad on separate charges. After speaking with Ray, Pellegrin discussed the evaluation by the Veterans Administration with Goad, and he reviewed materials on posttraumatic stress syndrome that he had received at a death penalty seminar. Pellegrin, however, did not subpoena Dr. Ray and did nothing else to assure Ray's attendance at trial.
Shortly before trial, Pellegrin once again called Ray's office only to discover that the doctor was out of town for two weeks and would not return until the time the sentencing hearing began. Again, no subpoena was issued. At the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Pittman v. Holloway, Case. No. 1:13-cv-01019-JDB-egb
...omissions were so serious as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)). The prejudice prong of the test is......
-
Hines v. Carpenter
...Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1367 (11th Cir. 1995); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 795, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987)).In Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1996), our supreme court set out the relevant factors to consider when determining if prejudice had resulted from a trial attorney'......
-
Ross v. Parker
...that a particular strategy or tactical decision failed does not by itself establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996). Once the petitioner proves that counsel's representation fell below a reasonable standard, the petitioner must also prove p......
-
Wilson v. Donahue, 10-2796-STA-cgc
...standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." House v. State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001)(citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996)). As for the prejudice prong of the test, the Strickland Court stated that "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reaso......