Goad v. State
| Decision Date | 29 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 79977-COA,79977-COA |
| Citation | 488 P.3d 646 |
| Court | Nevada Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Ralph Edmond GOAD, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. |
John L. Arrascada, Public Defender, and Kathryn Reynolds, Deputy Public Defender, Washoe County, for Appellant.
Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Christopher J. Hicks, District Attorney, and Kevin Naughton, Appellate Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for Respondent.
BEFORE GIBBONS, C.J., TAO and BULLA, JJ.
The United States and Nevada Constitutions prohibit trying a criminal defendant while he is mentally incompetent. An incompetent defendant lacks the requisite mental cognizance to receive a fair trial and appreciate the rights associated therewith. A defendant cannot, among other things, effectively assist counsel, confront witnesses, or intelligently decide whether to testify or remain silent. Thus, both the United States and Nevada Supreme Courts have recognized that conviction of an incompetent criminal defendant violates due process.
The right to stand trial while competent being paramount, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a procedural due process right to a hearing to determine whether a defendant is competent if sufficient doubt of competency arises at any time. The Nevada Supreme Court has embraced this right by requiring a trial court to order a competency hearing sua sponte when any evidence before the court—in isolation or in light of other evidence—gives rise to reasonable doubt as to the defendant's competency. Nevada prescribes statutory procedures that trial courts must follow when determining whether doubt is reasonable. If there is such doubt, the court must conduct a competency hearing; neither the defendant nor defense counsel can waive the right to a hearing. The Nevada Supreme Court has consistently remedied violations of a defendant's right to a competency hearing with reversal of the conviction and remand for a new trial but has not mandated that a new trial is the only permissible remedy.
This case presents three questions that Nevada competency jurisprudence has yet to answer or clarify. First, does reasonable doubt exist where a defendant has a history of mental health issues and use of psychoactive medications, been deprived of an unknown medication during trial, and becomes debilitated during trial? Second, is a trial court required to consider evidence of incompetence adduced during pretrial proceedings in its reasonable doubt determination if a different judge adjudicated pretrial matters? Third, is it permissible to remedy a violation of a defendant's right to a competency hearing by remanding the case to the trial court to determine whether the defendant was incompetent during trial?
We now extend Nevada's procedural due process requirement of a hearing to determine competency to novel factual circumstances and apply a new remedy. Accordingly, we conclude that (1) reasonable doubt exists as to a defendant's competency where the defendant has a history of mental health issues and psychoactive medication use, is deprived of medication during trial, and becomes debilitated thereafter; (2) a trial court must consider any evidence of incompetence in the record when determining whether reasonable doubt exists notwithstanding whether the case is transferred from another judge; and (3) we may remedy a violation of a defendant's right to a competency hearing by remanding the case to the trial court to determine whether the defendant was incompetent during trial, but the trial court must first determine if the competency hearing is feasible before holding it.
Appellant Ralph Edmond Goad and Theodore Gibson lived in apartments located in the same hallway of an apartment building in Reno. Goad and Gibson were apparently close friends and frequently spent time together. Both Goad and Gibson were in their seventies and received Social Security benefits through a payee counseling service that managed income from Social Security on behalf of beneficiaries who were unable to manage their own finances. Near the end of 2018, the payee service closed. Goad received his last payment from the payee service in November 2018. On January 11, 2019, Goad received a notice of eviction for nonpayment of rent. He was locked out of his apartment on January 30.
On February 13, employees of the apartment building found Gibson's dead body in his apartment. According to the autopsy report, Gibson suffered a total of 250 stab wounds to the face, head, neck, and other parts of his body. Inside the apartment, police found Gibson's wallet on the floor with its contents strewn about and containing no cash. Police recovered scissors and a knife from inside Gibson's apartment with Gibson's blood on them. Police found Goad's DNA on the handle of the scissors. Police later recovered Goad's clothes from his apartment, on which police detected Gibson's blood. Police obtained video surveillance footage of the hallway in which Gibson's and Goad's apartments were located. The footage shows Gibson entering his apartment on January 18, which was the last time Gibson was seen alive, and Goad entering and exiting Gibson's apartment multiple times between January 18 and January 22. Goad was arrested in Sacramento on March 7.
for sleep. And, uh, 1 milligram of Ativan three times a day to stop the shakes [, which are from] this and that. See, I've been a nervous wreck all my life.
...
No, I'm definitely not fine. ... I don't know [what's wrong,] I just don't get along like, um, I'm different.... [I just don't get along with people] because I can't sleep right and I'm nervous all the time.
...
[I take] Amitriptyline and the Ativan. The Amitriptyline is for depression and sleep. And the Ativan is for bad nervous, anxiety. It's much better than Valium. Valium just makes you sleepy. Ativan calms you down like that.
...
[The last time I took my medications was] 7 years ago, ‘cause when they took me out of the mental hospital and gave me that payee, she was independent, so I wasn't allowed to go back and see a doctor or get medicine anymore. So it was good in a way. But I wasn't able to get any medication anymore. So 7 years, I went without medicine.
...
[When I'm not on medication, I] get angry [and] have to drink beer to calm down.... [When] the beer wears off, it makes you angry ‘cause now I gotta walk to the store and buy more beer to calm down again.
In this case, one judge presided over all pretrial matters, and the case was transferred to another judge for trial. The trial judge acknowledged during trial that he was not entirely familiar with what occurred pretrial by stating, "I did not conduct the pretrial hearings," and "I reflected on the fact that I don't know everything that was argued in front of" the pretrial judge.
On the first day of trial, during jury selection but outside the presence of the prospective jurors, the court, defense counsel, and the State briefly discussed Goad's mental health and whether the State would seek admission of the transcript of the police interrogation of Goad. The State informed the court that it would not seek to introduce the transcript at trial. The parties discussed the interrogation transcript again after opening statements because defense counsel quoted a line from the transcript in his opening statement but could not provide a viable theory for admission of the transcript at trial.
At around 2 p.m. on the third day of Goad's trial, the district court and counsel discussed Goad's condition and demeanor outside the presence of the jury. The court explained that "there had been some inquiries about Mr. Goad's health." Court staff informed the court that, according to medical staff at the jail, Goad had not received his medication that morning and that it was "the type that cannot wait [to be administered] until the end of" the day. Therefore, Goad needed to be transported immediately to the sheriff's office in order to receive the medication. The district court and the parties did not discuss the name or effects of the medication Goad was deprived of on the third day of trial.
After staff came forward, the court solicited comments from the State and defense counsel on the matter. Both informed the court that Goad appeared infirm that morning and that his condition worsened as the day progressed. Defense counsel reported that Goad had been "degrading in his physical [condition]." The State reported that, when Goad came into the courtroom on the morning of the third day of trial, "he did not sit down, he stood there with a look that I think was objectively concerning to the [S]tate."
The district court expressed that it had also observed a change in Goad's demeanor. The court stated, The court added, "Mr. Goad is entitled to be present and well as he both observes trial and...
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