Goard v. Crown Auto, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 March 2016
• Docket Number: Civil No. 6:15-CV-00035
• Citation: 170 F.Supp.3d 915
• Parties: Jacquelin Goard, Plaintiff, v. Crown Auto, Inc., d/b/a Auto Villa, Midnight Express Auto Recovery, Inc., Jonathan Howard, Joseph McKinley, and John Does 1-3, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

170 F.Supp.3d 915

Jacquelin Goard, Plaintiff,

v.Crown Auto, Inc., d/b/a Auto Villa, Midnight Express Auto Recovery, Inc., Jonathan Howard, Joseph McKinley, and John Does 1-3, Defendants.

Civil No. 6:15-CV-00035

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Lynchburg Division .

Signed March 21, 2016

Dale Wood Pittman, Law Office of Dale W. Pittman, Petersburg, VA, Heryka Rodriguez Knoespel, Jeremy Paul White, Virginia Legal Aid Society, Lynchburg, VA, for Plaintiff.

Danielle Deanna Giroux, Harman Claytor Corrigan & Wellman, Richmond, VA, Linda Davis Frith, Nathan Henry Schnetzler, Frith Anderson & Peake PC, Roanoke, VA, Jim H. Guynn, Jr., Guynn & Waddell, PC, Salem, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NORMAN K. MOON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants Jonathan Howard, Joseph McKinley, Edward Cook and Ryan Ball's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. Dkt. 27 & 55. Plaintiff's lawsuit alleges that Jonathan Howard, Joseph McKinley, Edward Cook, and Ryan Ball, who are police officers for the Lynchburg Police Department, assisted, encouraged, facilitated, and caused the unlawful repossession of Plaintiff's vehicle in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants assert that qualified immunity shields them from liability for these actions. Because Plaintiff alleges a violation of her clearly established constitutional rights, I will deny Defendants' motion.

I. Factual Allegations

On January 31, 2015, Goard went to Auto Vila¹ to purchase a Honda Accord. Compl. ¶ 20. On or about June 17, 2015, Goard's mother visited Goard at her apartment. Compl. ¶ 40. As her mother arrived, Matthew Snyder, an employee of Midnight Express, pulled a tow truck behind her vehicle in order to block her exit. Compl. ¶ 41. After unsuccessfully repossessing the vehicle due to Goard's objection, several police vehicles and five police officers, including Jonathan Howard, Joseph McKinley, Edward Cook, and Ryan Ball, arrived at the scene. Compl. ¶¶ 47, 48, 49, 55. The officers reviewed the documents of the repossession company and declared that Goard should turn over her Honda Accord. Compl. ¶¶ 54, 56. However, Goard continued to object to the repossession. In the face of these continued objections, Goard contends that she was told by officers, including Cook, Howard, Ball, and McKinley, that if she did not turn over the vehicle to Snyder, she would be arrested or go to jail. Compl. ¶¶ 55, 56, 57. As a result of these threats, Goard claims that she relinquished possession of her vehicle to Midnight Express. Compl. ¶ 59.

II. Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint to determine whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim: “it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of North Carolina v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.1992). Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations omitted). A court need not “accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts” or “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Eastern Shore Markets, Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir.2000). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, with all allegations in the complaint taken as true and all reasonable inferences drawn in the plaintiff's favor. Chao v. Rivendell Woods, Inc., 415 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir.2005). Rule 12(b)(6) does “not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Consequently, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

III. Discussion

a. Goard has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “two—and only two—allegations are required in order to state a cause of action under the statute. First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him [or her] of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.” Gomez v. Tole d o , 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980).

The second requirement applies with simplicity to the facts of this case and so I will start there. When an on-duty police officer actively participates in a creditor's repossession, as clearly alleged in Goard's complaint, “the officers are participating in the removal of the debtor's property while cloaked in the mantle of their authority as agents of the state.” Wallace v. Chrysler Credit Corp. , 743 F.Supp. 1228, 1234 (W.D. Va.1990) ; see also Lugar v. Edmon dson Oil Co. , 457 U.S. 922, 935 n. 18, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) ; Abbott v. Latshaw , 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3rd Cir.1998). Therefore, Goard's complaint satisfies the second requirement set forth in Gomez.

As for the first requirement, Goard's complaint also provides sufficient factual details to “state[ ] a plausible claim for relief” of a violated constitutional right. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Goard alleges that Cook, Ball, Howard, and McKinley deprived her of federal rights protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. More specifically, the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect against “meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in that property.” Soldal v. Cook Cnty. Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); See also Fuentes v. Shevin , 407 U.S. 67, 87, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). Furthermore, the Third Circuit has held that “it is ... well established that possessory interests in property invoke procedural due process protections” and these “procedures [must] guarantee protection[s] against erroneous or arbitrary seizures.” Abbott v. Latshaw , 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3rd Cir.1998) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin , 407 U.S. 67, 87, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972) and Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 605–06, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974) ). Specifically, the Abbott Court held that were officers are involved in the repossession of property and then threatened to arrest the property owner if they do not relinquish possession a deprivation of a Constitutional right has been sufficiently alleged. Id. at 147.

In addition to Abbott, the District Court of Maryland has decided a case with similar factual circumstances to the case at hand at the equivalent procedural stage. Morozov v. Howard Cnty . Md., No. MJG–10–1515, 2012 WL 2048296 (D.Md. June 5, 2012). In Morozov, the vehicle owner objected to the repossession of the vehicle. Id. at *1. Due to this objection, the repossession company called the police. Id. Upon arriving to the scene, the police threatened to arrest the vehicle owner. Id. Ultimately, the owner gave over the keys to the vehicle. Id. Because the “possessory interest in a vehicle is sufficient to invoke the protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,” the court held that plaintiff's claim survived a motion to dismiss. Id. at *3–4. Similarly, in this case, Goard's complaint suggest that Howard, Ball, Cook, and McKinley: (1) arrived on the scene, (2) threatened to arrest Goard, and (3) ultimately caused Goard to turn over possession of the vehicle to Midnight Express. Compl. ¶¶ 47–57. Therefore, Goard's complaint states a “plausible claim” upon which relief can be granted unless qualified immunity protects the Defendants' actions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

b. Defendants' have failed to establish Qualified Immunity

Howard, Ball, Cook, and McKinley assert that qualified immunity shields them from liability for their actions. Dkt. 28 at 4. Qualified immunity protects “government officials performing discretionary functions ... insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). To be entitled to qualified immunity, a defendant must show either that [1] his conduct did not violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights, or that even if there was a constitutional violation, [2] the right in question was not clearly established at the time that the defendant acted.² Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir.2011) (en banc); Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir.2006). “The burden of proof and persuasion with respect to a defense of qualified immunity rests on the official asserting that defense.” Meyers v. Baltimore Cty., 713 F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir.2013).

The right to due process prior to the seizure of one's property is subject to Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972) (holding that Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes unconstitutionally deprived persons of property without due process of law because they denied the right to be heard before taking the property away); Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 61, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992) (providing Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protection to the removal of a mobile home by police officers). Courts have...