Godar v. Edwards
| Decision Date | 21 January 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-2032,96-2032 |
| Citation | 588 N.W.2d 701 |
| Parties | 132 Ed. Law Rep. 173, 14 IER Cases 1311 Luke GODAR, Appellant, v. Gerald EDWARDS, a/k/a Jerry Edwards Defendant, and Marion Independent School District, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Linda Hansen Robbins of Irvine & Robbins, L.L.P., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Matthew G. Novak and Stephanie L. Hinz of Pickens, Barnes & Abernathy, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and HARRIS, CARTER, SNELL and TERNUS, JJ.
Plaintiff Luke Godar appeals a decision of the district court granting defendant Marion Independent School District's (school district) motion for a directed verdict. The district court held that Godar failed to present sufficient evidence to create a jury question concerning his claims against the school district for negligence based on allegations that he was sexually abused by defendant Gerald Edwards, a former school district employee.
Upon our review, we conclude that the district court properly sustained the school district's motion for directed verdict. We affirm that ruling and judgment in favor of the school district. We remand for further proceedings as to defendant Edwards.
Plaintiff Luke Godar filed an action naming as defendants, the school district and Gerald Edwards, seeking damages for sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated upon him by Edwards who was curriculum director for the school district. 1 The petition alleged that Edwards sexually abused plaintiff Godar over the course of several years while Godar was a student and that the abuse occurred both on and off school district property. Godar thus sought damages based on claims of intentional torts by Edwards and negligence by the school district.
The case proceeded to jury trial against the school district and Edwards. At the time of trial, Godar was thirty-seven years old. 2
Evidence presented at trial showed that defendant Edwards was hired as the curriculum director for the school district in 1968. As curriculum director, Edwards was responsible for various duties, including supervising teaching in classrooms, assisting in selection of textbooks, and holding in-service meetings with staff members. Edwards was also a volunteer and assistant with a local Boy Scouts group.
Plaintiff Luke Godar testified that he was introduced to Edwards through the Boy Scouts and that Edwards often visited his mother at their home.
Godar testified that he remembered Edwards first sexually abusing him at a boy scout camp when he was in elementary school. Godar further testified he remembered being sexually abused by Edwards during his seventh grade year on the premises and parking lots of several school district buildings approximately once a month. According to Godar, the abuse continued into his high school years and occurred both on and off school district property.
Godar testified that he never told his parents about the abuse because his parents considered Edwards a "wonderful person." He stated that he never told an administrator or teacher at school about the abuse. He further explained that he discovered the injury from the alleged sexual abuse in 1991 or 1992 during counseling.
Godar's mother testified that she remembered Edwards coming to the home when Godar was in seventh and eighth grade. She explained that Edwards was a friend of the family and that he helped Luke deal with problems associated with his epilepsy.
Plaintiff Godar's younger brother, Edward, testified that defendant also sexually abused him when he was in junior high and that the abuse occurred at a school in the district. Edward also testified that defendant sexually abused him throughout his seventh grade year both on and off school district property. Edward stated that he did not tell anyone about the abuse until the present lawsuit was filed.
On the third day of trial, Godar's counsel informed the court of newly discovered evidence consisting of information that an individual, Mike Benedict, now thirty-nine years old, had come forward stating that he had been sexually abused by defendant Edwards when he was a student. Although counsel was given the option to call the witness in plaintiff's case in chief, counsel informed the court that she would rest the case and call witness Benedict as a rebuttal witness.
After Godar rested his case in chief, the court heard arguments concerning motions by the school district and defendant Edwards for a directed verdict. The court reserved ruling on the motions.
Thereafter, Dr. Richard Sorensen testified on behalf of defendants. Dr. Sorensen was superintendent of the school district during the time the alleged sexual abuse occurred. He testified that he had no knowledge of any inappropriate conduct or allegations of inappropriate conduct on the part of defendant Edwards. He further explained that he would have immediately investigated any such allegations.
Next, defendant testified in his own defense. He denied that he ever sexually abused plaintiff Godar or his brother Edward, or that he inappropriately touched either of them.
On the sixth day of trial, Godar's counsel moved to reopen his case in chief against both defendants. Counsel informed the court that another individual, John Stuelke, had come forward, stating that he also had been sexually abused by defendant Edwards when Stuelke was a student in the school district. Counsel explained that she was not claiming that any additional evidence would show a school district employee or administrator had knowledge of an improper relationship between defendant Edwards and Benedict and Stuelke but argued that the new evidence would go to the "should-have-known-test."
The district court concluded that Godar failed to show good cause to justify reopening his case in chief and overruled the motion.
The court then proceeded to hear arguments concerning the motions for directed verdict by the school district and defendant Edwards.
Thereafter, the court granted the school district's motion for directed verdict as to all counts of Godar's petition. With respect to claims concerning vicarious liability/respondeat superior, the court concluded that defendant Edwards was not acting within the scope of his employment during the course of any alleged sexual abuse and thus the school district was not liable. With respect to Godar's claim against the school district for negligence, the court concluded that Godar failed to show that the school district knew or should have known of defendant Edward's alleged sexual abuse of plaintiff or anyone else, or that the school district was negligent in hiring, supervising, or retaining defendant Edwards.
Thereafter, defendant Edwards moved for a mistrial, which the court granted for reasons unrelated to this appeal.
Plaintiff Godar appeals, asserting that the district court erred in granting the school district's motion for directed verdict and in overruling his motion to reopen his case in chief.
The district court sustained defendant school district's motion for directed verdict. Our standard of review concerning appeal from the grant of a motion for directed verdict involves looking for substantial evidence. Thus, where no substantial evidence exists to support each element of a plaintiff's claim, the court may sustain a motion for directed verdict. See Stover v. Lakeland Square Owners Assn., 434 N.W.2d 866, 873 (Iowa 1989). "Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion." Johnson v. Dodgen, 451 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 1990). In reviewing the district court's decision, we view the evidence as the trial court did in ruling on the motion, that is, in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was directed. Id.
Godar first contends the district court wrongly concluded that the school district was not liable for the alleged sexual abuse committed by Edwards under the doctrine of respondeat superior because such conduct was not within the scope of his employment.
The well established rule is that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the negligence of an employee committed while the employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment. Jones v. Blair, 387 N.W.2d 349, 355 (Iowa 1986); Sandman v. Hagan, 261 Iowa 560, 566, 154 N.W.2d 113, 117 (1967). Thus, "[a] claim of vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior rests on two elements: proof of an employer/employee relationship, and proof that the injury occurred within the scope of that employment." Biddle v. Sartori Mem'l Hosp., 518 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Iowa 1994); see also Vlotho v. Hardin County, 509 N.W.2d 350, 354 (Iowa 1993).
We have said that for an act to be within the scope of employment the conduct complained of "must be of the same general nature as that authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized." Sandman, 261 Iowa at 567, 154 N.W.2d at 117. Thus, an act is deemed to be within the scope of one's employment "where such act is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the employment and is intended for such purpose." Id. at 566-67, 154 N.W.2d at 117. The question, therefore, is whether the employee's conduct "is so unlike that authorized that it is 'substantially different.' " Id. at 567, 154 N.W.2d at 117. Said another way, "a deviation from the employer's business or interest to pursue the employee's own business or interest must be substantial in nature to relieve the employer from liability." Id. at 568, 154 N.W.2d at 118.
Section 229(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1957) lists the following factors to be considered in determining whether conduct of an employee may be characterized as occurring within the scope...
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