Godbey v. Grinnell Elec. & Heating Co.

Citation181 N.W. 498,190 Iowa 1068
Decision Date10 February 1921
Docket NumberNo. 32069.,32069.
PartiesGODBEY v. GRINNELL ELECTRIC & HEATING CO.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Superior Court, Grinnell County; P. G. Norris, Judge.

Action at law to recover damages for personal injury. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals. Affirmed on condition.Carr, Carr & Evans, of Des Moines, for appellant.

J. H. Patton, of Grinnell, for appellee.

WEAVER, J.

The defendant is proprietor of an electric light plant at Grinnell, Iowa, and plaintiff is a resident of the same city. One of the wires of the electric lighting system is suspended on poles in the immediate vicinity of plaintiff's home. On the same poles, and above this wire, are carried several telephone wires. Plaintiff's residence has service connection with both systems. It is the theory of the plaintiff's case that defendant negligently maintained said wire without proper insulation or other protection against contact with other wires in that vicinity; that by some means unknown a telephone wire became broken, and one of the strands fell or lay across the electric light wire at a point where the latter was not insulated, and the lower end of it lay upon the lawn of the plaintiff's residence. Plaintiff alleges that in walking over the lawn he discovered what appeared to be a piece of wire lying in the grass, and, not knowing that it had any connection with the electric light wires, he attempted to pick it up and throw it from his premises, and that in so doing he received a severe electric shock, which knocked him down and rendered him temporarily helpless. The wire so picked up proved to be the lower end of the broken strand above described. Later in the day he went to his place of employment, and for several days continued at his work, though with difficulty, but soon had to quit and cease all work. For a period of 18 weeks he was very sick from some abnormal condition of the heart with various complications. At the time of the trial below, a year and a half later, he was still in a disabled condition, and the evidence was such the jury could find that his disability was of a permanent character. There was other testimony of an expert character tending to show that his injury and disability were the result of the alleged shock received by him as above stated, and because thereof and of the alleged negligence of the defendant he demanded compensation in damages. The defendant's answer to the claim thus stated is a simple denial of all allegations of the petition.

Plaintiff's evidence tended to show the truth of the material allegations set forth in his pleading--the location of the wires; the defective insulation of the electric light wire; the broken telephone wire lying upon an uninsulated portion of the light wire and extending thence into the plaintiff's yard; his discovery of it; his failure to observe its connection with the light wire; his attempt to pick up the broken strand and an immediate shock therefrom which served to prostrate him for the time being; his reasonably good condition of health prior to said occurrence, and his sick and disabled condition following such experience. His testimony as to his condition before and after his injury is corroborated by the members of his family and by his family physician. For the defense there was evidence tending to prove that plaintiff was not a man of rugged health prior to his alleged shock, but none of these witnesses show any very intimate knowledge of the fact, and none of them testify as experts or as having personal knowledge of his condition, either before or after his alleged injury, except as a matter of casual observation.

The fact of the imperfect condition of the insulation of the light wire is shown without material contradiction. It is admitted that at the time in question the primary wires of the defendant's lighting system were carrying about 2,200 volts of electricity and the service wires about 110 volts, and that the wire alleged to have been imperfectly insulated was in use on the day of plaintiff's alleged injury. The defendant's witnesses express a doubt whether the broken telephone wire, in the condition described by the plaintiff, would transmit a current of sufficient strength or power to seriously injure a person. All admit that a person picking up the wire under such circumstances might receive a slight shock, but in their opinion as experts they think the current would have been grounded, or nearly so, between the end which plaintiff took hold of and the point of contact between that wire and the electric wire.

The day was rainy and the ground wet, and in regard to these conditions defendant's lineman says:

“I don't see how he could have been knocked down by the electric current in that telephone wire. The fact that the ground was wet would make a difference; it would not increase the chances of receiving a greater shock in this case the way it was as the wire grounded before he got it; it would otherwise increase the chances of receiving a greater shock, but not in any great strength. I have made tests along that line, and say that a wet ground, water present, would increase the flow of electricity through the body of a person standing on the ground coming into contact with an electric light wire, if they get it outright, but if it is laying on the ground they do not.”

The testimony further tended to show that the broken wire picked up by the plaintiff was carrying no electric current from the telephone plant, as the strand so taken hold of by him was on the wrong side of the break to receive any electric energy from that source, and the only source from which it could become charged with electricity (so far at least as the record discloses) was its contact with the uninsulated wire belonging to the defendant.

The issues were submitted to a jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Motion for new trial was denied, and judgment rendered on the verdict in plaintiff's favor.

Turning to the appellant's argument, we find the discussion confined to the following propositions, and to them alone can we give attention.

[1] I. Error is assigned upon the denial of defendant's motion to direct a verdict in its favor on the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to suport a finding that the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Sustaining this position, it is said by counsel that it was a “physical impossibility” for plaintiff to have received a shock in the manner stated by him, for the reason that it is shown without dispute that the wire was in such position that any current it carried would have passed into the earth before it reached the point where plaintiff touched it.

We are compelled to differ with counsel concerning the record at this point. No witness so testifies. Defendant's witnesses do not say that no shock could have been received. On the contrary, they admit some current would or might be so transmitted; but say, in substance, they do not see how a current of sufficient power to have produced injurious results could have been transmitted. It will be seen from the record that this opinion of the witnesses--(and it is all a matter of opinion)--is based upon the simple proposition that the wire between the point where plaintiff took hold of it and the place where it crossed defendant's live electric light wire lay on the earth, and would necessarily have grounded the greater part of the current, leaving only a slight charge to reach plaintiff. The court cannot say as a matter of law that no injurious current can be transmitted under such circumstances. Even if, when the broken strand was lying inert upon the ground, it might serve as a perfect conductor to carry the current into the earth, who can say that, as plaintiff picked it up with the idea of throwing it into the alley, the contact of the wire with the ground was not for an instant severed or so lessened that the charge of electricity carried by it was instantly diverted in whole or in part through the person of the plaintiff? We are satisfied that the record presents no case on which the court can say it was impossible for the plaintiff to have received an electric shock as alleged by him.

[2] It is next said it was the falling of the telephone wire over which defendant had no control which caused the accident, and not the lack of insulation of the electric wire. This objection, we assume, is grounded upon the thought that the falling of the telephone wire and its contact with the defendant's exposed electric wire is an independent intervening cause, sufficient to relieve defendant from liability for the injury of which plaintiff complains, but we think the evidence, most of which is undisputed, leaves no room for the application of that principle. It is not questioned that in cities and towns insulation of electric light wires is a reasonably necessary precaution against danger. The necessity is greatly emphasized where aerial wires of various kinds and uses are so multiplied or congested that accidental contact or connection between them may convert the whole array into instruments of death. It is a matter of common knowledge and observation that telephone wires are ordinarily of comparatively small size, and not infrequently some strand breaks; and the possibility that the fallen or swaying ends of the broken wire may come in contact with unprotected electric light or power lines, if any there be in that vicinity, is an everpresent hazard and this is especially true where these various lines are attached to the same poles. The authorities are uniform that companies and individuals constructing and operating light plants and other utilities employing electric power are bound to exercise a high degree of care, not only in the work of such construction, but in vigilant supervision and inspection to maintain the same in safe condition and to keep the highly destructive power...

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3 cases
  • Henneman v. McCalla
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • February 7, 1967
    ...Iowa 949, 953, 282 N.W. 312; Gray v. City of Des Moines, 221 Iowa 596, 599, 265 N.W. 612, 104 A.L.R. 1228; Godbey v. Grinnell Electric & Heating Co., 190 Iowa 1068, 1074, 181 N.W. 498; and Liming v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 81 Iowa 246, 252, 47 N.W. Touching on this subject the court, in Mil......
  • Knudtson v. Swenson
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • January 9, 1968
    ...N.W.2d 310, 313; Gray v. City of Des Moines, 221 Iowa 596, 599, 265 N.W. 612, 613, 104 A.L.R. 1228, 1230; Godbey v. Grinnell Electric & Heating Co., 190 Iowa 1068, 1076, 181 N.W. 498, and citations. * * 'Section 443 of the Restatement expresses the rule on which plaintiff places special rel......
  • Godbey v. Grinnell Elec. & Heating Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • February 10, 1921

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