Godbout v. Attanasio
| Decision Date | 14 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | AC 42683 |
| Citation | 199 Conn.App. 88,234 A.3d 1031 |
| Parties | David GODBOUT v. Tony ATTANASIO et al. |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
David Godbout, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Mark S. Zamarka, with whom, on the brief, was Edward B. O'Connell, New London, for the appellees (defendants).
Alvord, Prescott and Bright, Js.
In this statutory civil action brought pursuant to General Statutes § 12-170,1 the plaintiff, David Godbout, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the action against the defendants, all of whom are individual members of the East Lyme Board of Assessment Appeals (board).2 In his action, the plaintiff sought to recover monetary relief pursuant to § 12-170 on the basis of alleged misconduct by the defendants related to his motor vehicle tax assessment appeal. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of his action because he (1) failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the Freedom of Information Commission (FOIC) before filing his action in Superior Court and (2) failed to allege sufficient facts in his complaint demonstrating that each of the defendants had engaged in some unlawful act, or had failed to perform a necessary act, related to the tax assessment appeal. Although we agree with the plaintiff with respect to his first claim, we disagree with the second. We also conclude that the form of the judgment is incorrect in that, rather than granting the motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, the court should have rendered judgment in favor of the defendants.3
The following facts, which either are undisputed or are taken from the underlying complaint and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are relevant to our consideration of the plaintiff's claims on appeal. The plaintiff is a resident of East Lyme (town). The plaintiff has a history of disputes with the town and the board.4 In 2012, he filed a complaint with the FOIC against the board and the town alleging that they had violated the state's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., "by not permitting [the plaintiff] or others with assessment appeals to view, listen, observe and attend the hearings of other persons appealing their motor vehicle tax assessments." Godbout v. Board of Assessment Appeals , Freedom of Information Commission, Docket No. FIC 2012–504 (August 28, 2013). The FOIC, after a hearing, concluded that the board had violated General Statutes § 1-225 (a) —FOIA's open meeting provision—as alleged by the plaintiff, and the FOIC ordered the town and board to comply strictly with § 1-225 in the future in conducting hearings and meetings concerning tax assessment appeals.
Following this decision by the FOIC, the plaintiff moved the board to disqualify the defendant Michael Foley from participating in any subsequent tax assessment appeal brought by the plaintiff because Foley allegedly had displayed bias against him, including calling him by vulgar names. Thereafter, Foley elected to recuse himself in matters involving the plaintiff. As of May, 2017, the defendant Patrick Hughes also elected not to participate in property assessment appeals brought by the plaintiff due to Hughes’ own negative interactions with the plaintiff.
On September 8, 2018, the plaintiff appeared before the board to challenge the taxes assessed by the town on his motor vehicles pursuant to General Statutes § 12-71 (f).5 The board consisted of five elected members. Present at the hearing were the four defendants and a town clerk, Brooke Stevens, who acted as the recording secretary.6 When it was time for the plaintiff to present his appeal to the board, the defendants Foley, Hughes, and William W. Mather III "indicated that they were disqualif[ying] themselves ... by getting up and leaving the room." Although Hughes and Foley provided no explanation for their decisions on the record, Mather indicated that he worked for the law firm that represents the town in many legal matters.7
The plaintiff indicated to the defendant Tony Attanasio, the sole remaining board member present at the hearing, that the board appeared no longer to have a quorum present, and he assumed that, without a quorum, the proceedings automatically would be adjourned. The plaintiff also indicated to Attanasio that he was prepared to proceed with his argument but warned that any further proceedings might be void and also might violate the FOIC's prior orders directing the board to comply strictly with the FOIA requirements. Attanasio adjourned the proceedings, and the plaintiff indicated to Attanasio that he would await further instructions regarding a hearing on his appeal.8 Shortly thereafter, on or about September 11, 2018, the board mailed the plaintiff a copy of the minutes of the September 8, 2018 hearing and a copy of his appeal application, both of which indicated that the board had taken no action on the plaintiff's appeal.
On October 1, 2018, the plaintiff, in response to the board's September 11, 2018 mailings, commenced the underlying action as a self-represented party. Although the plaintiff initiated his action as a small claims matter, the court, on motion by the defendants, subsequently transferred it to the regular civil docket of the Superior Court. See Practice Book § 24-21. The plaintiff filed the operative amended complaint on October 3, 2018. In that complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had engaged in official misconduct in violation of § 12-170 because they failed to comply with certain provisions of the FOIA.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action on October 25, 2018, claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over it. In their memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, the defendants argued that because the plaintiff's complaint was premised on alleged noncompliance with the FOIA, he was required, pursuant to General Statutes § 1-206 (b) (1),9 to seek relief by way of an appeal to the FOIC, and that his failure to exhaust this administrative remedy deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over this statutory action. According to the defendants, the plaintiff did not file an appeal with the FOIC because he knew that the FOIC would not schedule a hearing "due to his abusive history." The defendants also argued that the plaintiff sought to avoid the administrative appeal requirement by framing his action as one seeking relief pursuant to § 12-170, but that such an action required allegations that the individual board members had engaged in some unlawful act or the omission of a necessary act, and, even construing the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint failed to contain any such allegations.
The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss. In it, he argued that a civil action commenced in Superior Court, and not an administrative appeal to the FOIC, was the proper vehicle to obtain the monetary relief provided by § 12-170, and that he was not seeking an adjudication of whether a FOIA violation had occurred but instead was asserting that the board members’ actions amounted to a criminal violation of an existing FOIC order, a remedy for which was beyond the authority of the FOIC.
The court, Calmar, J. , heard argument on the motion to dismiss on December 17, 2018. The court rendered a judgment of dismissal on February 4, 2019, agreeing with the arguments of the defendants. The court reasoned as follows:
The court concluded: "Because the plaintiff has not exhausted all of his administrative remedies with the FOIC, and because no criminal or unlawful act, or omission of a necessary act performed by the [board] has been alleged in the amended complaint, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the motion to dismiss is granted." This appeal followed.
We begin our discussion by setting forth the well settled standard of review that governs an appeal from a judgment granting a motion to dismiss on the ground of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ...
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