Dominguez v. N.Y. Sports Club

• Decision Date: 14 July 2020
• Docket Number: AC 42089
• Citation: 234 A.3d 1017,198 Conn.App. 854
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Joseph DOMINGUEZ v. NEW YORK SPORTS CLUB et al.

198 Conn.App. 854

234 A.3d 1017

Joseph DOMINGUEZ

v.NEW YORK SPORTS CLUB et al.

AC 42089

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 13, 2020

Officially released July 14, 2020

James T. Baldwin, Fairfield, for the appellants (defendants).

John J. Morgan, for the appellee (substitute plaintiff).

Alvord, Elgo and Eveleigh, Js.

ELGO, J.

This case concerns the mandate of General Statutes § 31-294c (b), which obligates an employer presented with proper notice of a workers’ compensation claim to respond within twenty-eight days by either filing a notice contesting liability or commencing payment on the claim. The employer in the present case did neither, which led the Compensation Review Board (board) to conclude that the employer was precluded under § 31-294c (b) from contesting both liability for, and the extent of, injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff, Joseph Dominguez.¹ On appeal, the defendant New York Sports Club² asks us to extend the narrow exception to the preclusion provision of § 31-294c (b) recognized by this court in Dubrosky v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp ., 145 Conn. App. 261, 76 A.3d 657, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 935, 78 A.3d 859 (2013), to cases in which an employer (1) provides no response to a properly filed claim for compensation within the twenty-eight day statutory period, (2) makes no payments on the claim, (3) files an untimely notice contesting liability for the claimant's injuries, and (4) alleges in subsequent administrative proceedings before the Workers’ Compensation Commission that it was impossible to commence payment due to the claimant's failure to submit medical bills within the twenty-eight day statutory period. We decline to do so and, accordingly, affirm the decision of the board.

The relevant facts were stipulated to by the parties and are not in dispute. On June 29, 2016, the plaintiff completed a form 30C,³ in which he sought compensation for the exacerbation of a preexisting injury to his upper left extremity. The plaintiff allegedly sustained that exacerbation in the course of his employment with the defendant "while moving equipment or other items in the [defendant's] gym" on March 24, 2016. The Workers’ Compensation Commission received the plaintiff's notice of that claim for compensation on July 5, 2016; the defendant received it on July 6, 2016. Over the next seven weeks, the defendant did not file any response to that notice.

On August 26, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion, pursuant to § 31-294c (b), to preclude the defendant from "contesting [his] right to receive compensation on any ground" due to its failure "to file a timely response to [his] form 30C." It is undisputed that the defendant did not file a form 43⁴ or provide any other response within the twenty-eight day time period mandated by § 31-294c (b). It also is undisputed that the defendant made no payments on the claim and that the plaintiff's medical bills were processed through his group medical insurance.⁵

The defendant filed a belated form 43 with the Workers’ Compensation Commission on September 19, 2016—seventy-five days after receiving the plaintiff's form 30C. In the portion of the form titled "Reason(s) for Contest," the defendant stated: "Alleged injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment; no medical records supporting compensability presented to employer and no request for medical or indemnity benefits presented to employer for payment to date."

A formal hearing was held before the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner (commissioner) on February 6, 2017, at which the sole issue was whether to grant the plaintiff's motion to preclude. In her subsequent decision, the commissioner found that the defendant had not filed a timely form 43 within the twenty-eight day period of § 31-294c (b). At the same time, the commissioner found that the plaintiff had "presented no medical bills, nor did he request payments for indemnity benefits within the twenty-eight (28) day period, thereby preventing the [defendant] from complying with [that statute]." The commissioner then concluded that the exception to the preclusion provision of § 31-294c (b) articulated by this court in Dubrosky v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp ., supra, 145 Conn. App. 261, 76 A.3d 657, "applies to this situation" despite the fact that Dubrosky "deals with an accepted work injury, and this claim deals with a wholly denied injury ...." The commissioner reasoned that the defendant's form 43 "was filed too late to contest the compensability of the [plaintiff's] claim, but due to its inability to pay indemnity benefits or medical payments, the [defendant's] form 43 is not too late to contest the extent of disability ...." The commissioner thus granted the motion to preclude in part and ordered that the defendant "must accept the underlying injury but may contest its extent."

The plaintiff filed a petition for review with the board, claiming that the commissioner had improperly applied the Dubrosky exception. The board agreed, emphasizing that, unlike the defendant employer in Dubrosky , the defendant here contested its liability for the injury in question.⁶ Concluding that "the present matter is distinguishable from Dubrosky ," the board unanimously reversed the decision of the commissioner in part and directed "that the [defendant] be precluded from presenting a defense in this matter."⁷ From that decision, the defendant now appeals.

As a preliminary matter, we note certain well established precepts that govern our review. The workers’ compensation system in this state "is derived exclusively from statute"; Wiblyi v. McDonald's Corp ., 168 Conn. App. 92, 104, 144 A.3d 530 (2016) ; and is codified in the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. "The purpose of the [act] is to compensate the worker for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, without regard to fault, by imposing a form of strict liability on the employer .... [The act] compromise[s] an employee's right to a [common-law] tort action for [work-related] injuries in return for relatively quick and certain compensation. ... The act indisputably is a remedial statute that should be construed generously to accomplish its purpose." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gill v. Brescome Barton, Inc ., 142 Conn. App. 279, 298, 68 A.3d 88 (2013), aff'd, 317 Conn. 33, 114 A.3d 1210 (2015). For that reason, when interpreting its provisions, "we must resolve statutory ambiguities or lacunae in a manner that will further the remedial purpose of the act." Doe v. Stamford , 241 Conn. 692, 698, 699 A.2d 52 (1997) ; see also Lucenti v. Laviero , 327 Conn. 764, 774, 176 A.3d 1 (2018) ("[t]he act is to be broadly construed to effectuate the purpose of providing compensation for an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment regardless of fault" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

This appeal does not involve any dispute as to the underlying facts found by the commissioner. Rather, it concerns the proper interpretation of § 31-294c (b) and the proper application of established precedent. Our review over those questions of law is plenary. See Jones v. Redding , 296 Conn. 352, 364, 995 A.2d 51 (2010) ; Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc ., 252 Conn. 596, 604, 748 A.2d 278 (2000).

I

On appeal, the defendant claims that the board improperly determined that the defendant was precluded from contesting the extent of the plaintiff's injuries.⁸ It argues that the plaintiff's failure to submit medical bills or a request for payment to the defendant within the twenty-eight day statutory period rendered it impossible for the defendant to comply with the predicates of § 31-294c (b). In response, the plaintiff contends that an employer that fails to respond in any manner to a notice of claim for compensation within that statutory period, and then later files a notice that it is contesting liability, is subject to the preclusion provision of § 31-294c (b).

In resolving that issue of statutory construction, we are mindful that "[w]hen interpreting a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. General Statutes § 1-2z. ... However, [w]hen a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and [common-law] principles governing the same general subject matter. ... A statute is ambiguous if, when read in context, it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferraro v. Ridgefield European Motors, Inc ., 313 Conn. 735, 747–48, 99 A.3d 1114 (2014).

As its title indicates, § 31-294c sets forth the statutory requirements for both notices of claims for compensation filed by employees; see General Statutes § 31-294c (a) ; and notices contesting liability filed by employers. See General Statutes § 31-294c (b). It is undisputed that the plaintiff properly filed a notice of his claim for compensation pursuant to § 31-294c (a). Accordingly, the issue in the present case is the defendant's compliance with § 31-294c (b).

We begin with the language of the statute in question. Section 31-294c (b) contains several related provisions that govern an employer's obligation to respond to a properly filed notice of claim for compensation. It provides in relevant part: "Whenever liability to pay compensation is contested by the employer, he shall file with the...