Goddard v. State, Case No. 2D16–2969
| Decision Date | 21 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2D16–2969 |
| Citation | 217 So.3d 1105 |
| Parties | Robert GODDARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Arturo R. Rios of Law Office of Arturo R. Rios, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellant.
Robert Goddard appeals the order summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Because the record does not conclusively refute Mr. Goddard's claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance by misadvising him regarding the deportation consequences of pleading guilty, we reverse and remand for further consideration of Mr. Goddard's claim.
Mr. Goddard is an immigrant from Barbados and is a lawful permanent resident of the United States. In August 2015, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Mr. Goddard pleaded guilty to possession of methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), possession of prescription drugs without a prescription, possession of cocaine, possession of cannabis with intent to sell, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court withheld adjudication and ordered twenty-four months' probation and ten days of confinement in the county jail. As a result of those convictions, the Department of Homeland Security detained Mr. Goddard and initiated removal proceedings in February 2016.
In an amended motion for postconviction relief filed in March 2016, Mr. Goddard raised one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that his trial counsel specifically advised him on two separate occasions that his pleas would not subject him to deportation if the trial court withheld adjudication. Mr. Goddard asserted that had counsel not given him that advice, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to trial.
After ordering the State to respond, the postconviction court issued a two-paragraph order adopting the State's reasoning that the trial court's advisement during the plea colloquy, "if you are not a U.S. citizen you are subject to deportation," cured any prejudice from counsel's misadvice. This appeal follows.
When reviewing the summary denial of a motion filed under rule 3.850, this court applies de novo review and "must accept the movant's factual allegations as true to the extent that they are not refuted by the record." Jennings v. State , 123 So.3d 1101, 1121 (Fla. 2013) (citing Occhicone v. State , 768 So.2d 1037, 1041 (Fla. 2000) ). Since there was no evidentiary hearing, the court "must examine each claim to determine if it is legally sufficient[ ] and, if so, whether the record refutes it." Allen v. State , 854 So.2d 1255, 1258 (Fla. 2003). "[U]nless the record shows conclusively that the appellant is entitled to no relief, the order shall be reversed and the cause remanded for an evidentiary hearing or other appropriate relief." Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(d).
Mr. Goddard raises one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, for which he is required to show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced him. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To establish that counsel was deficient, Mr. Goddard must overcome the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "In the plea context, a defendant satisfies the prejudice requirement only where he can demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ " Hernandez v. State , 124 So.3d 757, 762 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) ). "[A] petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356, 372, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) ).
First, the record does not conclusively refute Mr. Goddard's claim that counsel's misadvice constituted deficient performance, as the deportation consequences of pleading guilty could be easily determined from reading the federal removal statute. In Padilla , 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284, the Supreme Court held that counsel has a duty to advise noncitizen clients of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty. The Court ruled that it is deficient performance for counsel to fail to advise or to affirmatively misadvise a client regarding the deportation consequences of pleading guilty when those consequences are "truly clear." Id. at 369, 130 S.Ct. 1473.
Like Mr. Goddard, Mr. Padilla was charged with committing a crime involving a controlled substance (transportation of a large amount of marijuana). Id. at 359, 130 S.Ct. 1473. In concluding that counsel was deficient for not advising Mr. Padilla that he would likely be deported if he pleaded guilty, the Court stated "counsel could have easily determined that [Mr. Padilla's] plea would make him eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the statute, which addresses not some broad classification of crimes but specifically commands removal for all controlled substances convictions except for the most trivial of marijuana possession offenses." Id. at 368, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) ). In that situation, where the deportation consequence of pleading guilty was clear, counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to accurately advise his client that a conviction would almost certainly lead to deportation.
Similarly, Mr. Goddard faced controlled substance charges that would be grounds for deportation under the same federal removal statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2015) (). Mr. Goddard's MDMA, cocaine, and marijuana convictions would each qualify under the statute. Thus, as was the case in Padilla , the deportation consequence of pleading guilty was clear, and counsel therefore would have been deficient for providing anything short of accurate advice that deportation would be all but certain.
On that point, Mr. Goddard asserts in a sworn affidavit that counsel specifically told him on two occasions that he would not be deported if he pleaded guilty. According to Mr. Goddard, counsel was adamant that if the court withheld adjudication then he would not have any formal convictions that would allow for deportation. This advice was incorrect, as a withholding of adjudication qualifies as a conviction for deportation purposes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (); Gomez v. State , 126 So.3d 444, 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (). Taking his assertions as true, as we are required to do, Mr. Goddard has made a sufficient showing of deficiency, and the record does not refute his claim on this point.
Second, the record does not conclusively refute Mr. Goddard's claim that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, as he alleges that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known that he would likely be deported, and the court's plea colloquy was insufficient to cure counsel's misadvice. The State contends that the court's advisement during the plea colloquy was unequivocal and negated counsel's errors. However, in the context of refuting prejudice, a court must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine if the defendant knew of the deportation consequences of entering a guilty plea, and the record in this case does not conclusively show that Mr. Goddard knew of those consequences.
The Florida Supreme Court explained in Hernandez , 124 So.3d at 763, that for a plea colloquy to cure counsel's deficiency it must rise to the same level of accuracy and clarity that Padilla requires of counsel:
Where deportation consequences are "truly clear," the United States Supreme Court in Padilla requires effective counsel to provide more than equivocal advice concerning those consequences. At least in those circumstances, an equivocal warning from the trial court is less than what is required from counsel and therefore cannot, by itself, remove prejudice resulting from counsel's deficiency.
(Citation omitted.) Thus, in cases such as this one, where counsel is required to provide clear and accurate advice that a guilty plea will almost certainly result in deportation, the court's advisement in the plea colloquy must be equally clear and accurate in order to erase any prejudice.
In addition to looking at the clarity of the plea colloquy, the supreme court in Hernandez also indicated that the analysis should look at the totality of the circumstances to determine if the defendant was on notice of the deportation consequences of his plea:
The fact that an equivocal warning from the trial court is insufficient to categorically eliminate prejudice in every circumstance is not to say, however, that the plea colloquy is meaningless .... Instead, a colloquy containing an equivocal warning from the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Alsubaie v. State
...the defendant to consider the plea in light of deportation consequences. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(c)(8) (2018). See Goddard v. State , 217 So.3d 1105, 1110 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (recognizing the effect of rule amendment). I have not found any cases where a defendant was permitted to withdraw......