Godefroy v. Reilly

• Decision Date: 03 January 1928
• Docket Number: 20748.
• Citation: 146 Wash. 257,262 P. 639
• Parties: GODEFROY v. REILLY et ux.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

262 P. 639

146 Wash. 257

GODEFROY v. REILLY et ux.

No. 20748.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 3, 1928

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Huneke, Judge.

Suit by W. D. Godefroy, doing business under the name and style of the Northern Pacific Land Exchange, against John Reilly and wife, wherein defendants, by cross-complaint, sought damages for false representations. From a judgment for defendants plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

O. C Moore, of Spokane, for appellant.

John M Gleeson, of Spokane, for respondents.

HOLCOMB J.

That this 'tangled skein' between these same parties has received previous consideration before this court several times is evidenced by the reported decisions in 134 Wash. 163, 235 P. 8, and 140 Wash. 650, 250 P. 59; while the same facts were collaterally involved in the previous case of Reilly v. Hopkins, 133 Wash. 421, 234 P. 13.

This case, a suit for $1,640 commission for the sale of real estate, was instituted in the superior court on May 29, 1923. Just previously, May 21, 1923, these respondents, as plaintiffs, had instituted an action for the rescission of the contract involved in the controversy as against Hopkins, and for damages for fraud and deceit as against Godefroy.

In untangling the skein it is necessary, first, to note that in the action against Hopkins and Godefroy a demurrer was interposed and sustained on the ground that there was an improper joinder of causes of action. Thereafter an amended complaint was filed against Hopkins and wife alone. Upon a dismissal being granted by the trial court in favor of Hopkins and wife against plaintiffs, an appeal was taken, which resulted in affirming the judgment sustaining the demurrer for misjoinder of causes of action; the court holding (133 Wash., supra) that, 'so far as the action was one of rescission, it disavowed the contract and sought recovery of consideration. * * * * So far as it was an action for damages against Godefroy, it affirmed the contract and sought recovery thereon. The law does not permit disallowance and affirmance of a contract in the same complaint.'

The dismissal upon the facts as against Hopkins and wife was affirmed because Reilly did not rely upon any representations or statements made by Hopkins, but made his own investigation, and upon information he received was satisfied with the deal, and acted thereon.

In the case reported in 134 Wash. 163, 235 P. 8, a challenge to the evidence, made by respondent there, in support of the affirmative defense and cross-complaint of defendants, was sustained. Defendants appealed, and the judgment dismissing the cross-complaint was again reversed; this court holding that the evidence was sufficient to present a case for the jury as to the fraud and deceit of Godefroy. Several other matters were incidentally passed upon, the court saying:

'Many questions are raised and discussed which we do not find it necessary to now mention. It will be sufficient to say that, except in the matters hereinafter specifically referred to, we find no error on the part of the trial court.

'The chief and vital questions are whether there was evidence on the part of appellants sufficient to carry the case to the jury, and whether or no the judgment in Reilly v. Hopkins, supra [133 Wash. 421, 234 P. 13] was determinative of the issues here.'

This case, with some apparent inconsistencies and discrepancies, which were for the jury to consider and reconcile, was tried upon substantially the same facts as were adduced in the former trials.

Notwithstanding the insistence and able ingenuity of counsel in seeking to differentiate and avoid the effect of the former adjudications, we are of the opinion that most of the questions here raised were passed upon in the decisions in 134 Wash. and 140 Wash., supra.

When this court has once decided a question of law, that decision, when the question arises again, is not only binding on all inferior courts in this state, but it is binding on this court until that case is overruled. Duffy v. Blake, 94 Wash. 319, 162 P. 521; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Scoon (Wash.) 256 P. 74.

Summaries of the issues of law and fact involved may be found in the previous decisions.

At the trial in this case, upon the original complaint and the third amended answer and cross-complaint, and reply and answer thereto, the trial court very ably simplified and summarized the issues to be determined by the jury under the cross-complaint of respondents, in accordance with the previous decisions of this court, as follows:

'(1) That the district in which the Hopkins land lay had ample water at a cost of $1.50 per acre per year.

'(2) That no owner of lands in this irrigation district has ever permitted any of their lands to go delinquent for failure to pay the irrigation assessments or permitted any part thereof to be sold.

'(3) That large profits had been made for a number of years off the lands.

'(4) That there was an abundance of water for irrigating every acre of land in the district.'

In the decision in 140 Wash. we held that the court in the former trial, from which that appeal came, misinstructed the jury on the question of damages, and held that the measure of damages, if respondents were entitled to recover any upon their cross-complaint, should be 'the difference between the actual market value of the property he [respondent] received and its market value if it had been as represented.'

We also held in that case that:

'If there were no misrepresentations, or were misrepresentations not resulting in injury to the respondents, the appellant is entitled to recover the commission agreed to be paid him; or, if there were misrepresentations resulting in injury, and the loss suffered thereby is less than the agreed commission, the appellant is entitled to recover the difference between the amount of the loss and the amount of the agreed commission. On the other hand, if there were misrepresentations causing a loss to the respondents, and this loss equals the amount of the agreed commission, the respondents are entitled to a verdict in their favor without more; if the amount of the loss exceeds the amount of the agreed commission, they are entitled to a verdict for the excess of loss over the commission. On the new trial, the instructions of the court and the forms of verdict should meet these conditions, that there may be no room for controversy as to the effect of the findings of the jury.'

The trial court accordingly instructed the jury strictly in accordance with the foregoing direction. It also, in conformity thereto, submitted to the jury for consideration four forms of verdicts, as follows:

'No. 1. A verdict for plaintiff in the full sum of $1,640, with interest from March 24, 1923, at 6 per cent. to date of trial, which the jury were instructed plaintiff would be entitled to, unless the sum was reduced or wiped out by damages sustained by the defendants.

'No. 2. A verdict for the plaintiff in case the defendants suffered damages, as explained, less than the agreed commission, in which case the verdict should be for the difference.

'No. 3. A verdict for the defendants, to be used in case the damages equaled the amount of the commission, in which case the jury should insert no amount of damages.

'No. 4. A verdict for the defendants, to be used in case the damages exceed the amount of the commission, in which case the jury were to insert the excess of the damages above the commission, as instructed.'

The jury returned a verdict on form No. 3 simply for the defendants.

Since the instructions and the form of verdict returned at the trial of this case were in strict accord with our decision in 140 Wash., there is no merit in appellant's claims 7 and 9 on this appeal.

It is urged that, since the cross-complaint contains no allegation as to either the market or the actual value of the Hopkins land at the date of the exchange, or at any other time, nor any allegation as to what the market or other value of the Hopkins land would have been, had conditions been as the cross-complaint alleged that Godefroy represented them to be, certain evidence received by the court as to such values, and instruction No. 4 given by the court upon the question of damages thereunder, was improperly submitted to the jury, and the jury was thereby directed to return a verdict in favor of the defendants without assessment of damages.

The evidence complained of as having been erroneously received was, first, that of Reilly himself as to values of his Canadian lands on exchange; second, that of one Taylor as to the market value of the Hopkins land; and for the further reason that Taylor was not...