Godsey v. Houston

• Decision Date: 10 July 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-CA-0958,89-CA-0958
• Citation: 584 So.2d 389
• Parties: Walter Thomas GODSEY v. Christine HOUSTON, Director of Records, Mississippi Department of Corrections; Carmen Gettis Castilla, Chairperson, Mississippi Board of Parole; Steve Richeson, Parole Officer, Jackson, Tennessee; Jerry A. McClain, Nashville, Tennessee; Tressie Myers, Jackson, Mississippi; Donald Cabana, Warden of the South Mississippi Correctional Institution; Mike Moore, Attorney General for the State of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 389

584 So.2d 389

Walter Thomas GODSEY v. Christine HOUSTON, Director of Records, Mississippi Department of Corrections; Carmen Gettis Castilla Chairperson, Mississippi Board of Parole; Steve Richeson Parole Officer, Jackson, Tennessee; Jerry A. McClain Nashville, Tennessee; Tressie Myers, Jackson, Mississippi Donald Cabana, Warden of the South Mississippi Correctional Institution; Mike Moore, Attorney General for the State of Mississippi.

No. 89-CA-0958.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

July 10, 1991.

Walter T. Godsey, pro se.

Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Jeffrey M. Rosamond, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER and PITTMAN, JJ.

PRATHER, Justice, for the Court:

This appeal addresses a parolee's rights following extradition proceedings arising from Walter Thomas Godsey's application for writ of habeas corpus. From a denial of the writ by the Circuit Court of Greene County, Godsey appeals.

I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On November 16, 1981, Godsey was convicted as an accessory to murder and kidnapping in Jackson County, Mississippi, and was sentenced to the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), for terms of five years and fifteen years respectively, to run concurrently. Godsey was paroled by MDOC on July 2, 1984, to the State of Tennessee, conditioned on obedience to the criminal laws and on his agreement to waive extradition for return to the State of Mississippi from any other state of the United States. On May 24, 1985, Godsey was convicted of burglary and concealing stolen property in McNairy County, Tennessee, and sentenced to the Tennessee Department of Corrections for a term of four years. The petitioner alleges in his pleading that because of a court case, he was paroled from this conviction after four months, on June 25, 1985. Godsey was then on parole from both the States of Mississippi and Tennessee. Mississippi verbally requested a hold "order" on Godsey in Tennessee and thereafter issued a fugitive warrant for Godsey's arrest. Godsey was arrested and detained by the State of Tennessee on July 25, 1985. Godsey refused to waive extradition from Tennessee back to Mississippi. On April 9, 1986, the Governor of Mississippi issued a writ of extradition, and on April 26, 1986, the Governor of Tennessee issued a rendition warrant.

On May 23, 1986, the Circuit Court of Bledsoe County, Tennessee ordered that Godsey be brought before it to consider the rendition warrant. Godsey wrote a letter to the Circuit Court complaining of illegal detention and requesting a hearing. The Circuit Court treated the letter as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Godsey challenged his detention for extradition purposes, alleging there was a violation of 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3182 because the delay between his arrest for purpose of extradition and the filing of formal charges was beyond the thirty day limit provided by the statute.

The Circuit Court held that the thirty day period ran from either July 25, 1985 or September 24, 1985, that the delay violated the period, and ordered Godsey's release. However, this order was appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that the thirty day period of 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3182 did not begin to run until the issuance of the rendition warrant by Tennessee and not from the time of arrest on the fugitive warrant. Thus, there was no violation. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded the case for the extradition of Godsey to Mississippi.

Godsey failed to timely request permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Godsey also petitioned the United States District Court of the Western District of Tennessee for a writ of habeas corpus. This federal petition was dismissed because Godsey failed to exhaust state remedies. A certificate of probable cause to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was denied.

Upon return to Mississippi on August 22, 1988, Godsey waived all rights to notice and a waiting period prior to his parole revocation hearing. After a preliminary parole revocation hearing on February 24, 1989, and an actual parole revocation hearing, Godsey's parole was revoked, and he was placed in the South Mississippi Correctional Institute.

Godsey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the writ in issue here, with the Greene County Circuit Court, repeating the claim he filed in the Tennessee courts, plus a claim that he was not afforded a timely parole revocation hearing. The Greene County Circuit Court refused to grant the petition on the ground that Godsey failed to show that he was entitled to relief, and Godsey appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Is the Code Section Mandatory?

Godsey contends that his constitutional rights were violated when the State of Mississippi failed to return him to Mississippi within the 30 days as required by 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3182. That section states:

Whenever the executive authority of any state or territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or a affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such a demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within thirty days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged.

Authority is divided as to whether the prisoner's discharge is mandatory or permissive if appearance by an agent of the demanding state is not made within the thirty day period. See State v. Campbell, 233 Mont. 502, 761 P.2d 393, 396 (1988) (30 day provision is not mandatory but discretionary); Hill v. Roberts, 359 So.2d 911, 913 (Fla.1978) (provision considered mandatory after a two and one half year delay); Prettyman v. Karnopp, 192 Neb. 451, 456, 222 N.W.2d 362, 365 (1974) (provision considered to be permissive). This Court has held that 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3182 does not mandate discharge if the agent of the demanding state fails to appear within thirty days of arrest. McEwen v. State, 224 So.2d 206, 207 (Miss.1969). This Court reaffirms the McEwen holding.

B. When Does the Time Period Commence?

The thirty day period begins to run from the date of issuance of the rendition warrant by the executive authority of the asylum state upon the demand of the demanding state. Bergen v. Carson, 417 So.2d 1081, 1082 (Fla.1982); see also Bolton v. Timmerman, 233 S.C. 429, 433, 105 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1958). The period is tolled if habeas corpus proceedings are instituted by the prisoner. Whatever the effects of the provision, no discharge is allowed where the delay is attributable to the actions of the prisoner which challenge his extradition. Bowersox v. State, 790 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex.1990); State v. Paskowski, 647 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tenn.Cr.App.1983). In the case sub judice, it should be noted that Godsey refused to waive extradition from Tennessee, in violation of his agreement in the terms of his Mississippi parole. Godsey challenged this issue in state and federal courts of Tennessee unsuccessfully.

The same law is applicable here, but it is not necessary for this Court to delve into whether 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3182 was violated as Godsey has already been returned to Mississippi. Once a prisoner has been returned to the demanding state, the legality of the extradition is no longer subject to legal attack. The proper place for a prisoner to complain about compliance with the extradition law was in the asylum state. State v. Allen, 450 So.2d 1378, 1389 (La.1984); see also Siegel v. Edwards, 566 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.1978); State v. Flint, 171 W.Va. 676, 301 S.E.2d 765, 772 (1983). Tennessee was the proper place for a challenge to the legality of his detention. Godsey challenged that issue in the Tennessee courts; he cannot now repeat the same challenge in Mississippi.

III.

A. Was Due Process Afforded?

As for Godsey's claim that the MDOC failed to give him a...