Godshall v. Unigard Ins. Co.
| Citation | 281 So.2d 499 |
| Decision Date | 27 June 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 43066,43066 |
| Parties | Walter L. GODSHALL, Petitioner, v. UNIGARD INSURANCE COMPANY, etc. and Jean Rumsey, etc., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
S. Victor Tipton, Orlando, for petitioner.
J. Thomas Cardwell of Akerman, Senterfitt, Eidson & Wharton, Orlando, for respondents.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reported at 267 So.2d 383. Our jurisdiction is based on conflict between the decision sought to be reviewed and Stecher v. Pomeroy. 1
Plaintiff, petitioner herein, brought suit for injuries allegedly resulting from a traffic accident. The defendant and her liability insurance company, respondent herein, were joined as defendants. Subsequently, over plaintiff's opposition, defendant insurance company was severed from the case. The jury returned a verdict for defendant, and, on appeal, the District Court affirmed, without opinion, the judgment for the defendant. 2
On petition for writ of certiorari to this Court, conflict was found between the decision of the District Court and Stecher v. Pomeroy, Supra. This Court quashed the District Court's opinion, and remanded for reconsideration in the light of this Court's decision in Stecher v. Pomeroy, Supra. The previous decision of this Court in this cause, 3 emphasizes the following statement from the Stecher opinion:
4
On remand, the District Court, in the decision presently sought to be reviewed, held that the error of the trial court in severing the insurance company was 'harmless' and again affirmed the judgment below, holding:
'Having concluded that the trial court committed error in the entry of its Order For Severance, we must consider whether or not the entry of that order was harmful error. This issue depends, at least in our opinion, on the legitimate purposes to be served by the joining of an insurance carrier as a party to a negligence action against an insured based on conduct allegedly creating a liability covered by the insurance contract. . . .
(T)he legitimate objects of joining the insurance carrier are: (a) facilitation of the resolution of coverage issues; (b) facilitation of discovery; and (c) as a result of the foregoing, the promotion of voluntary settlements. Although there may be other legitimate objects of such joinder, the influencing of the jury verdict on the issue of the tort-feasor's liability for damages is not among them. . . . (T)he only prejudice which the plaintiff claims to have suffered arises out of the fact that the jury was prevented from considering the existence of insurance coverage in connection with its deliberations on the issues of liability and damages. The plaintiff's position seems to be that the jury might have assumed from the absence of an insurance company before it that the defendant Rumsey did not have insurance or other means of paying a judgment and for that reason found against the plaintiff.' 5
Petitioner contends that the foregoing decision of the District Court creates conflict with Stecher v. Pomeroy, Supra, and the previous opinion of this Court in the instant case. 6 We agree. In Stecher, this Court recognized that the jury was entitled to be aware of an insurer as a real party in interest, 'so as to reflect the presence of financial responsibility which should be left apparent before the jury . . .' 7.
Further, the Stecher opinion stated:
8
In this Court's first opinion in this matter, we remanded for reconsideration in the light of Stecher, setting out the rule that a severance should NOT be granted 'absent a justiciable issue relating to insurance, such as the question of coverage or of the applicability or interpretation of the insurance policy. . . .' 9
The District Court, in the opinion under review, refuses to consider the plaintiff's interest in retaining the insurer as a real party in interest 'so as to reflect the presence of financial responsibility' as we said in Stecher, as a legitimate purpose to be served by joining an insurance carrier. On this basis, severance of the insurer was found by ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ramos v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co.
...Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 250 So.2d 259 (Fla.1971), Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So.2d 421 (Fla.1971), Godshall v. Unigard Ins. Co., 281 So.2d 499 (Fla.1973), and Allred v. Chittenden Pool Supply Co., Inc., 298 So.2d 361 Petitioner, Mercedes Ramos, sued Lawrence Williams and Respond......
-
The Florida Bar
... ... John E. Thrasher, Legal Counsel, Jacksonville, for Florida Physicians' Ins. Reciprocal ... Stephen Rossman of Rossman & Baumberger, Miami, and Sammy ... v. Gregory, 237 So.2d 163 (Fla.1970), overruled, Godshall v. Unigard Insurance Co., 281 So.2d 499 (Fla.1973), as stated in Price v. School Board, 342 So.2d ... ...
-
Ramos v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 75--150
...are real parties in interest in automobile accident litigation. Stecher v. Pomeroy, Fla.1971, 253 So.2d 421; Godshall v. Unigard Insurance Company, Fla.1973, 281 So.2d 499; Allred v. Chittenden Pool Supply, Inc., Fla.1974, 298 So.2d 361. That, because of the mandatory requirements of the no......
-
Lane v. Lodal, Inc.
...has not provided this court with trial transcripts. Moreover, we believe the better rule is that set out in Godshall v. Unigard Insurance Co., 281 So.2d 499 (Fla.1973) and more recently enunciated in Darby v. Sheffer, 458 So.2d 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). In Godshall v. Unigard Insurance Co., ......