Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 August 1998
• Docket Number: Nos. 96-56830,s. 96-56830
• Citation: 150 F.3d 1217,80 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 890
• Parties: 98-2 USTC P 45,470, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6275, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6783, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8677, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9447 Marsha GODWIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HUNT WESSON, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1217

150 F.3d 1217

98-2 USTC P 45,470, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6275,

98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6783,

98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8677,

98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9447

Marsha GODWIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HUNT WESSON, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 96-56830.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 8, 1998.

Decided Aug. 11, 1998.

As Amended Aug. 31, 1998.

Linda Hart Chandler, Sunil, Lewis, Vatave, Newport Beach, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Sharyl P. Bilas, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Irvine, California, for the defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Alicemarie H. Stotler, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-95-00178-AHS.

Before: SCHROEDER, FLETCHER, ^* and Harry PREGERSON, Circuit Judges.

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

The issue in this case is a familiar one: what showing of pretext by a plaintiff in a sex discrimination suit is sufficient to overcome a defendant's motion for summary judgment, where the defendant asserts that its refusal to promote the plaintiff was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons? This is an issue that has troubled the courts in their endeavors to follow the Supreme Court's decisions in this field. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); see also Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1122 (7th Cir.1994) ("The federal courts ... have not been entirely clear on what constitutes a showing of pretext.").

The district court granted the employer's summary judgment motion, holding that the plaintiff did not offer sufficient evidence that the employer's conduct was discriminatorily motivated. A close review of our decisions reveals that in this circuit a plaintiff who offers substantial evidence that the employer's proffered reasons were not reliable, see, e.g., Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1438-39 (9th Cir.1991), or direct evidence of discrimination, see e.g., Cordova v. State Farm Ins., 124 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir.1997), has made a sufficient showing to create triable issues with respect to the employer's motivation. The plaintiff-appellant in this case did both. We therefore reverse.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff-appellant, Marsha Godwin, had been a member of the Hunt Wesson sales force for nine years when two marketing manager positions became available in the Rosarita and Wesson brands division. Alcy Grimes, the most senior female executive for the defendant, resigned from her position as senior marketing manager for the Wesson brand, creating a vacancy. Jim Ruschman, the marketing manager for the Rosarita brand, took her position, and therefore, the Rosarita marketing manager position became available. In addition, Ruschman persuaded Ron Guthier, the Director of Marketing, to create another Wesson marketing manager position to assist Ruschman. Godwin applied for both the Rosarita and Wesson positions.

Guthier and Ruschman had primary responsibility for selecting the qualified candidates for the marketing manager positions. Guthier and Ruschman considered Godwin and Jim Rossi for the Wesson position and Godwin and Mark Smith for the Rosarita position. They selected the male candidates over Godwin for both jobs.

Although Guthier and Ruschman offer facially nondiscriminatory explanations for their selection of the male candidates, Godwin contends she has direct and circumstantial evidence to support her allegations that Guthier and Ruschman wanted to give the positions to males. She relies upon evidence that the selected candidates would reside on the almost all-male 10th floor and that the only female marketing manager on the 10th floor, Louise De PreFontaine, had caused dissension among the all-male employees, in support of her position that Guthier and Ruschman discriminatorily refused on account of her gender to consider Godwin seriously for either marketing position.

Godwin seeks general and punitive damages for gender discrimination in employment in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) Cal. Gov't Code 33 12.900-12.955.

DISCUSSION

Because California law under the FEHA mirrors federal law under Title VII, federal cases are instructive. See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.1996); Clark v. Claremont Univ. Ctr. & Graduate Sch., 6 Cal.App.4th 639, 662, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 151 (1992). We review the district court's decision to grant summary The parties debate the required showing to create a triable issue with respect to the employer's motivation at the so-called "pretext" stage of the McDonnell Douglas shifting analysis. The McDonnell Douglas analysis imposes on the plaintiff an initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must offer evidence that "give[s] rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089. "The prima facie case may be based either on a presumption arising from the factors such as those set forth in McDonnell Douglas, or by more direct evidence of discriminatory intent." Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994) (citations omitted). "The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for Title VII ... on summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 889.

                judgment de novo.  See Lindahl, 930 F.2d at 1436.   We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.  See Cordova, 124 F.3d at 1146
                

Here, Godwin unquestionably established the McDonnell Douglas factors for a prima facie case: (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was performing according to her employer's legitimate expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) other employees with qualifications similar to her own were treated more favorably. See Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1109 n. 7 (9th Cir.1991); see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973).

Once Godwin established her prima facie case, the burden then shifted to the defendant to articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for the allegedly discriminatory conduct. See id. Hunt Wesson, in its motion for summary judgment, produced evidence that it chose the male candidates because of their better experience and more "easygoing" personalities.

The employer's articulation of a facially nondiscriminatory reason shifts the burden back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's reason was a pretext for discrimination. See St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742. "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Id.

The district court required Godwin to present substantial direct evidence of discrimination at the pretext stage. After reviewing our cases, we conclude that this ruling is incorrect for it conflates the standards we have articulated for two different types of evidence--circumstantial and direct--available at the pretext stage to prove discriminatory motive.

Confusion is understandable, because although we have articulated two different ways in which a plaintiff may prove pretext, we have not expressly recognized the difference. Our law stems from the Supreme Court's holding that the plaintiff may establish pretext "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089.

We have held, clearly, that a plaintiff at the pretext stage must produce evidence in addition to that which was sufficient for her prima facie case in order to rebut the defendant's showing. See Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890. We have been less clear about what additional showing is required. We have said that the plaintiff "need produce very little evidence of discriminatory motive to raise a genuine issue of material fact." Lindahl, 930 F.2d at 1438; see also, Strother v. Southern Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 870 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting Lindahl); Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 443 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Lindahl); Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1111 (when a plaintiff introduces "direct or circumstantial" evidence "a factual question will almost always exist with respect to any claim of a nondiscriminatory We have also said, however, that the plaintiff must produce "specific, substantial evidence of pretext." See Bradley, 104 F.3d at 270; Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir.1995); Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890; Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir.1983); see also, Tarin v. County of Los Angeles, 123 F.3d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir.1997) ("plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reasons are pretexts" in a Title VII retaliation case); Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir.1996) (evidence must be "sufficiently probative").

reason"); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th Cir.1985) ("[a]ny indication of discriminatory motive ... may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a factfinder").

These apparently differing standards, however, are reconcilable, for they depend upon the nature of the plaintiff's evidence. When the plaintiff offers direct evidence of discriminatory motive, a triable issue as to the...