Goe v. Northern P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1903
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: GOE v. NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO.

71 P. 182

30 Wash. 654

GOE v. NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 7, 1903

Appeal from superior court, Lewis county; A. E. Rice, Judge.

Action by Arthur Goe against the Northern Pacific Railway Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Anders J., dissenting.

B. S. Grosscup and Jas. F. McElroy, for appellant.

Maurice A. Langhorne and C. H. Forney, for respondent.

DUNBAR J.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the superior court of Lewis county in favor of respondent for the sum of $1,500 and costs. Respondent was employed by appellant as a common laborer. His duties were to assist as such laborer in the operation of a steam shovel at Skookum Chuck gravel pit, near Centralia, in Lewis county. He had been working at such employment for five days at the time of his injury, assisting in leveling the track, setting jack blocks, and other such work. Foster was foreman of the work, and had supervision over all the men. Shortly prior to the injury to the respondent, the steam shovel had tipped over, and the men under the supervision of Foster, were engaged in righting the machinery to resume the work. The machine consists of a boom a crane, and a dipper arm, to which is attached the dipper or shovel. The boom is a stand mounted on wheels running on a track out into the gravel pit. The crane is a movable arm attached to the boom. The boom is run by a main engine inclosed in a car. The crane is worked by a smaller engine, called the 'crane engine,' stationed at the foot of the boom. Power is furnished to the crane engine by a steam pipe running from the larger engine, and is controlled by a globe valve or shut-off directly over the head of the crane engineer. The crane engine is manipulated by a throttle lever at the cranesman's hand. The steam may be shut off from the crane engine along, or it may be shut off back of the crane engine between there and the main engine. At the time of the accident to the machinery, under the order of Foster, the superintendent, the cranesman was sent from his particular post of duty to assist in putting things in order above, leaving the lever unguarded and unlocked. The steam was not shut off at the valve, being shut off from the crane engine only. The respondent was called by the superintendent Foster, from his place of work in the gravel pit, and ordered to ascend the boom, and assist there in replacing some machinery that had slipped out of place. In attempting to obey the order, he stepped on the lower part of the boom, which was wet from rain, slipped and fell,--he having on rubber boots at the time,--struck against the unguarded lever, and set the machinery in motion. In attempting to save himself, his hand came in contact with the cogwheel, which, proceeding to revolve, ground off his thumb.

It is not contended by the appellant that the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence, and there is none shown by the record; but it is strenuously insisted that there was no proof of negligence on the part of the appellant, and that the injury sustained was the result of an accident for which no one is responsible. It is not necessary to enter into a discussion of the familiar principles, so often and so uniformly asserted by this court, that it is the duty of the master to furnish the servant a reasonably safe place in which to work, that the servant assumes the risks of apparent dangers of the employment, that the employer is not an insurer of the safety of the servant, and that the servant is bound to use his faculties and exercise his common sense to avoid dangers. These may all be conceded as the accepted doctrines of this court, and, if it appeared in this case, as it did in Bullivant v. City of Spokane, 14 Wash. 577, 45 P. 42, cited by appellant, that the injured employé could have seen and appreciated the perils to which he was exposed in his employment, the judgment would have to be reversed. But the record does not show that the respondent was aware of the danger which beset him, and which was the cause of his injury, for he testified that he was not acquainted with the machinery of the crane; that he had not been on it before, and had not paid any attention to its working, his attention having been absorbed by his own duties; and that he had not been notified of the danger when he was sent upon the crane to work. So that the questions of apparent dangers and prudent actions on the part of respondent are eliminated from the case on appeal, the jury having passed upon those questions under competent testimony and legal instructions. The main insistence is that the injury was caused by an accident, for which the appellant was in no...