Goehring v. Campbell Cnty. Bank

• Decision Date: 21 February 2022
• Docket Number: 1:21-CV-1030-CBK
• Parties: SUSAN GOEHRING, Plaintiff, v. CAMPBELL COUNTY BANK, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota

SUSAN GOEHRING, Plaintiff,
v.
CAMPBELL COUNTY BANK, Defendant.

No. 1:21-CV-1030-CBK

United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Northern Division

February 21, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CHARLES B. KORNMANN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Campbell County Bank ("defendant," "Bank") moved on December 22, 2021, to partially dismiss the complaint brought by its former employee, Ms. Susan Goehring ("plaintiff). Doc. 9. Ms. Goehring responded to the defendant's motion on January 12, 2022. Doc. 11. With its reply filed on January 26, 2022, this matter is ripe for adjudication. Doc. 15.

Goehring asserts she was fired in December 2020 from her position at the Bank, where she has worked since 1988, because of her sex and age. At 57-years-old, the plaintiff was one of the longest tenured employees at the Bank, and one of its oldest. She brings before this Court allegations surrounding disparate treatment against female employees, as well as against older staff members. This ranged from missives such as calling female employees "the girls" to inappropriate stereotypes percolating in the office culture. Further, the plaintiff maintains older employees would be pressured to retire and be treated as second-class staff compared to younger employees. Because of her alleged challenges to this office culture of sex and age-related discrimination, which went unanswered, Ms. Goehring asserts she was retaliated against through removal of job

1

duties, a reduced annual bonus compared to younger male employees, and the ultimate punishment: termination.

While on approved medical leave in December 2020, Goehring was served by an officer from the sheriffs office with a notice demanding resignation by December 31, 2020. If she refused, she would be terminated. Goehring refused and was accordingly fired. Subsequently, the plaintiff notes, the Bank refused to process her 401k request in a timely manner, leading to a difficult delay in accessing her 401k funds as well as issues pertaining to her health and long-term care insurance. Additionally, Goehring claims that the Bank provided false information to the state agency processing reemployment claims, failed to advise the agency that it had requested plaintiffs resignation, and other attempts to prevent her from receiving properly owed reemployment benefits. On October 22, 2021, Ms. Goehring filed suit against the Bank alleging: (I) sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"); (II) reprisal in violation of Title VII; (III) age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ('ADEA"); and (IV) reprisal in violation of the ADEA. Doc. 1.

Matters of discrimination and retaliation fall under an administrative regime that must be adhered to before filing suit in this Court. First, a plaintiff such as Ms. Goehring will file an intake questionnaire with the appropriate state or federal agency listing the alleged allegations of workplace discrimination and retaliation and will subsequently receive a "charge." After receiving a charge, as was done here, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") may offer a plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue. Once this has been provided, plaintiffs such as Goehring may bring suit in federal court. The Bank argues that the administrative demands of Title VII and the ADEA were not adhered to by plaintiff, and thus her claims should be partially dismissed. Specifically, the defendant argues: (1) Goehring failed to administratively exhaust her sex and age-based retaliation claims; (2) that the plaintiffs discrimination charges fail to the extent they are based on alleged adverse actions other than discharge, specifically taking issue with allegations of discrimination based on adverse compensation, adverse privileges,

2

and failure-to-promote; (3) plaintiff failed to properly exhaust the charges focused on adverse terms and conditions of employment; (4) any failure to present a claim below at the administrative level cannot be cured by filing a new charge; and (5) that even when taken as true, Goehring's alleged transgressions do not rise to the high threshold of "adverse employment actions." Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss, doc. 9 at 3-12.

While most of plaintiff s claims survive this early stage of litigation, some must be discarded due to failures of proper administrative exhaustion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court assumes that all facts in the complaint are true and construes any reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Delker v. MasterCard Int'l. Inc.. 21 F.4th 1019, 1024 (8th Cir. 2022) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly. 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007)); Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts ordinarily do not consider matters outside the pleadings." Gillick v. Elliott. 1 F.4th 608, 610 n.2 (8th Cir. 2021). However, courts may "consider materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint, and materials that are 'necessarily embraced by the pleadings.'" Nelson Auto Ctr.. Inc. v. Multimedia Holdings Corp.. 951 F.3d 952, 955 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp.. 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999)). The complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Smith v. S. Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co.. 18 F.4th 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 662). The factual allegations must be enough to raise specificity '"above the speculative level.'" Richardson v. BNSF Ry. Co.. 2 F.4th 1063, 1068 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Minn. Majority v. Mansky. 708 F.3d 1051, 1055 (8th Cir. 2013)). In addition, the factual contents of the complaint must allow the Court '"to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Meardon v. Register, 994 F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 678).

3

Nevertheless, courts '"are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."' Stoebner v. Opportunity Fin., LLC. 909 F.3d 219, 225-26 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678). When assessing the merits of a complaint challenged under Rule 12(b)(6), a court should '"begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.'" McDonough v. Anoka Cntv.. 799 F.3d 931, 945-46 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

B. Whether Any of Goehring's Claims are Administratively Exhausted

The critical inquiry here is what this Court can consider for purposes of administrative exhaustion. Before filing suit in federal court, plaintiffs alleging violations of federal discrimination statutes must first file their complaints with the EEOC. Sellers v. Deere & Co.. 791 F.3d 938. 943 (8th Cir. 2015). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1). This Court may only consider Goehring's claims once they have been exhausted through the administrative process with the EEOC. Weatherly v. Ford Motor Co.. 994 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 2021).

First, Ms. Goehring must, and did, file an intake questionnaire with the EEOC alleging her instances of discrimination by the Bank. Next, the EEOC provided Goehring the necessary charge, listing her specific allegations of abuse. The agency's error on translating plaintiffs list of claims from the questionnaire to the charge is at the core of this matter. Finally, only after the charge has been signed and notarized by the plaintiff, the EEOC may provide a Notice of Right to Sue to the party if it elects not to bring a civil suit or enter into a conciliation agreement with the employer, so that she may then commence a suit on those exhausted claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(e). These administrative remedies stand so that the EEOC is offered the "initial opportunity to investigate allegations of employment discrimination and to work with the parties toward voluntary compliance and conciliation." Parisi v. Boeing Co.. 400 F.3d 583, 585 (8th Cir. 2005).

Ms. Goehring's intake questionnaire to the EEOC clearly asserts her factual allegations pertaining to both instances of workplace sex and age discrimination, as well

4

as retaliation because of plaintiff s challenges to alleged age-based discrimination. See Intake questionnaire, doc 14-1 at 6, 7 (signed on February 21, 2021). On her actual charge, the EEOC checked the box for "Retaliation" as well as for "Sex" and "Age" discrimination. CHARGE, EEOC FORM 5, doc. 9-1 (signed on March 1, 2021). However, crucial to this Motion to Dismiss, the actual four listed "charges" do not provide assertions of retaliation-based discrimination. The charge, not the intake questionnaire, is forwarded to the employer. See generally Diez v. Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co., 88 F.3d 672, 676-77 (8th Cir. 1996) (explaining that when EEOC treats intake questionnaire to be "preliminary, it does not notify the employer of the charge."). In this instance, it appears that the EEOC's Bismarck office "distorted [Goehring's] claims when transferring allegations from an intake questionnaire onto the charge form." B.K.B. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1102 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (Feb. 20, 2002). Several months later, on July 29, 2021, Ms. Goehring received her Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC. Notice of Right to Sue, EEOC Form 161-B, doc. 9-2.

Only the charge and Notice of Right to Sue is what is provided to an employer, not the questionnaire. After the administrative process is complete, and conciliation was not achieved by the adverse parties, only those claims that are specifically raised in the charge, or those that are '"like or reasonably related'" to the...