Goenen v. Schroeder

• Decision Date: 01 January 1863
• Citation: 8 Minn. 344
• Parties: JOHN H. GOENEN vs. JOHN N. SCHROEDER.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

8 Minn. 344

JOHN H. GOENEN vs. JOHN N. SCHROEDER.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Error to district court, Hennepin County.

Points and authorities for plaintiff in error: —

1. The justice of the peace had no jurisdiction in the cause subsequent to the filing of the complaint; because the statements of the complaint involved the title to real estate. He should, therefore, have granted the defendant's motion. Minn. Const. art. 6, § 8.

2. The time of redemption had not expired, for the reason that the mortgage was made after the taking effect of the act of July 29th, 1858, which provides that the mortgagor may redeem at any time within one year after the sale, or within such other time as may be prescribed by law. Comp. Stat. 646, § 1, of Act of July 29, 1858. That "such other time" had been prescribed by law some eighteen months prior to the foreclosure, by the act of March 10th, 1860, and the defendant in error took his mortgage, subject to the right of the legislature to so prescribe the time of redemption.

Points and authorities for defendant in error: —

1. The action was not properly brought to district court. Const., arts. 5 and 6.

2. By the parenthetical clause of the act of July 29, 1858, (as construed by plaintiff in error) the legislature tried to reserve what they never had, a right to pass retrospective law, a law affecting a vested right, the obligations of a contract. Comp. Stat. 396, § 60; 4 Minn. [298], [483]; Smith Com. on Const. § 170; 5 Minn. [277]. Land law should be settled, and so understood.

L. M. Brown, for plaintiff in error.

Brisbin & Warner, for defendant in error.

FLANDRAU, J.

A mortgage was executed on the premises in question by the defendant and wife on the third day of August, 1858, which was conditioned to pay a certain sum of money in eight months from its date. Default was made in the condition, and on the twenty-six day of October, 1861, the land was sold by virtue of a power of sale contained in the mortgage, and purchased by the plaintiff for the sum of $280.59. The proper certificates were executed by the sheriff. The premises not being redeemed by the first day of November, 1862, the sheriff on that day executed and delivered to the plaintiff, as purchaser, a deed of the same. On the seventh day of April, 1863, the plaintiff demanded possession of the land of the defendant, who refused to deliver it up. This action is brought before a justice of the peace to recover the possession.

The answer sets up, that on the twentieth day of February, 1863, the defendant offered to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $400 in good and lawful money of the United States, and requested the plaintiff to convey the land to him, which was refused, unless the defendant would pay the sum of four hundred dollars in gold and silver coin. The defendant also denies that the time for redeeming the land has expired. The defendant asked to have the suit dismissed, on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action, which was denied by the justice. The plaintiff had judgment. The case went to the district court on certiorari, and the judgment was there affirmed.

Two points are here presented: First, should the justice have refused to hear the case on the ground that the title to real estate is involved in the pleadings? and, second, was the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the premises under the purchase at the mortgage sale?

The constitution of the state by art. 6, § 8, provides, that "no justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction in any cause involving the title to real estate." The court below held, that "on a trial before a justice of the peace, the title to real estate cannot, under the statute, come properly in question upon the pleadings, but is raised by the evidence." The statute referred to is, probably, Comp. Stat. 502, § 38, where it is provided, that "if it shall appear on the trial of any cause before a justice of the peace, from the evidence of either party, that the title to land is in question, which title shall be disputed by the other party, the justice shall certify the case to the district court, etc."

This section was passed when the organic act of the territory was the fundamental law. The provision in this act concerning justices of the peace was, that they "shall not have jurisdiction of any matter in controversy, where the title or boundaries of land may be in dispute." This provision is similar in all respects to that contained in the constitution on the same subject, both ousting the justice whenever title is controverted, that is, necessarily and in fact controverted. If the defendant should plead several defenses to a cause of action, some of which involved the title to real estate, and some of which did not, then the justice might enter upon the trial, and unless evidence was offered to the issue of title, he might proceed and render judgment; but if the evidence brought the issues of title in dispute, he could go no further, but would certify the case up under section 38. The same would also be the result when the question arose upon the evidence, and was not made in the pleadings, if such a state of things could occur. The more difficult question arises when the issue tendered by the answer is one of title alone. Here it would seem to be "involved," within the letter of the constitution; but we think the intention was simply that the justce should not, in fact, try such issues, and that the legislature, by providing that the case should be certified to a higher court, only in the event of title coming in question on the evidence, designed to carry out the intention of the fundamental law, and only oust the justice from trying and deciding upon such important issue. The defense may be pleaded, and no evidence offered under it; in such case the justice, in deciding upon the case made by the plaintiff, would, in no sense, try the issue of title. The court was right in its holding upon this point.

The issue made by the answer does involve the title to real estate. The plaintiff claims the possession on the ground that the time for redemption has expired, and the title become absolute in him. The answer sets up a redemption on the 20th of February, 1863, and within three years from the date of the sale, claiming that the defendant had that length of time within which to redeem under the act of March 10, 1860. Sess. Laws, 1860, p. 275. Under these pleadings, the justice is called upon to decide whether the title became absolute in the plaintiff at the expiration of one year from the date...