Goetz v. Autin
| Decision Date | 10 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. W2015-00063-COA-R3-CV,W2015-00063-COA-R3-CV |
| Parties | WILLIAM GOETZ v. DONEL AUTIN, ET AL. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County
This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss. In the proceedings below, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging that false and defamatory statements made about him by the defendants, along with the defendants' subsequent lawsuit against him, caused him to suffer severe physical and emotional distress and incur $150,000 in attorney's fees. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint after determining that it fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Having reviewed the amended complaint and thoroughly considered the arguments raised on appeal, we affirm.
Larry Parrish, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, William Goetz.
J. Lewis Wardlaw, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, Donel Autin and Dana Autin.
OPINIONOn May 18, 2012, Plaintiff/Appellant William Goetz initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint in Shelby County Circuit Court against Defendants/Appellees Donel and Dana Autin (collectively, the "Autins").1 The Autins responded by filing a joint motion to dismiss the complaint. While the Autins' motion to dismiss was pending, Goetz filed an amended complaint on October 22, 2012. In pertinent part, the amended complaint contains the following allegations:
The amended complaint requests a judgment against the Autins of $150,000 for the attorney's fees Goetz incurred in the May 2010 lawsuit and $1,000,000 in punitive damages.
On November 26, 2012, the Autins filed a joint motion to dismiss Goetz's amended complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Autins maintained that although Goetz did not designate the specific theories of liability on which he intended to rely in the amended complaint, he appeared to assert four distinct causes of action: (1) defamation, (2) malicious prosecution, (3) abuse of process, and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). They argued that because Goetz's defamation and IIED claims were based on alleged defamatory statements made prior to the filing of the Autins' lawsuit against Goetz in May 2010, those claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-104(a)(1). Next, the Autins asserted that the malicious prosecution claim should be dismissed because, as the amended complaint states, the underlying lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed by the Autins and was therefore not terminated in Goetz's favor. Lastly, the Autins argued that the abuse of process claim should be dismissed because the amended complaint does not allege that the Autins took any subsequent improper action after the initiation of their lawsuit against Goetz in May 2010.
On April 2, 2013, Goetz filed a response in which he addressed each of the four causes of action cited in the Autins' motion to dismiss. Goetz argued that the defamation claim was not barred by the statute of limitations because it was based on oral and written defamatory statements made in the course of the Autins' underlying lawsuit against him within six months of his original complaint. He further argued that the IIED claim was likewise not barred by the statute of limitations because he did not discover that his physicalinjuries were caused by stress related to the Autins' defamatory statements and the ongoing litigation until August 2011. Goetz asserted that the abuse of process claim should not fail because the Autins took numerous improper actions following the initiation of their May 2010 lawsuit, including: (1) seeking four temporary restraining orders intending to "muzzle" Goetz, (2) asking for the case to be sealed, (3) discarding potentially damaging evidence, (4) offering to settle if Goetz would state in writing that Mr. Autin had not had an extramarital affair, and (5) offering Goetz $25,000 to sign a document absolving the Autins of any wrongdoing. Lastly, Goetz appeared to concede that the claim for malicious prosecution was precluded by the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Himmelfarb v. Allain, 380 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Tenn. 2012), which held that a voluntary nonsuit without prejudice is not a favorable termination for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim.2 Notably, Goetz did not assert that the amended complaint establishes any causes of action other than the four cited by the Autins in their motion to dismiss, nor did he request permission to file a second amended complaint at that time.
On August 16, 2013, the parties appeared before the trial court to make oral arguments on the Autins' motion to dismiss. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court noted that although Goetz's specific theories of liability were "not abundantly clear" from the amended complaint, the parties appeared to have agreed that four potential causes of action were at issue. The trial court discussed the amended complaint's allegations with regard to each of the potential claims and announced its conclusion that the amended complaint "simply does not state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted." Additionally, the trial court stated that "no form, or shape of amendment would be sufficient to, let's say, breathe life into this litigation." On September 25, 2013, the trial court entered a written order granting the Autins' motion to dismiss and dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice.
On October 25, 2013, Goetz filed a post-judgment motion titled "Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend and Memorandum in Support." In the post-judgment motion, which was purportedly filed pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04, Goetz argued that the trial court's conclusion that the amended complaint fails to state a claim for relief was erroneous. Amongother things, Goetz asserted for the first time that the amended complaint states actionable claims against the Autins for a civil rights violation and for conspiracy. Goetz urged the trial court to correct its errors by setting aside the order of dismissal.
The trial court conducted a hearing on Goetz's post-judgment motion on February 14, 2014. During the course of the hearing, the trial court raised the issue of whether Goetz's post-judgment motion, though purportedly filed as a motion to alter or amend under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04, was actually a motion to reconsider not recognized by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court asked the parties to submit additional briefs addressing that issue and its effect, if any, on the trial court's jurisdiction over the case. On November 21, 2014, following submission of the additional briefs, the trial court entered an order denying Goetz's post-judgment motion. Notably, the trial court expressly stated in the order that Goetz's post-judgment motion was actually a motion to reconsider:
The Court has now reviewed the September 25, 2013 Dismissal Order, the August 16, 2013 and February 14, 2014 hearing transcripts along with the briefing and supplemental briefing and concludes and is well convinced that the pending Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend is actually a Motion to Reconsider, which is denied.
Goetz filed a notice of appeal to this Court on December 22, 2014.
Goetz raises the following issues on appeal, as we have restated them from his appellate brief:
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