Goff's Adm'r v. Norfolk & W.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 February 1888
• Citation: 36 F. 299
• Parties: GOFF'S ADM'R v. NORFOLK & W.R. CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

36 F. 299

GOFF'S ADM'R v. NORFOLK & W.R. CO.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Virginia.

February 11, 1888

Daniel Trigg, F. S. Blair and D. F. Bailey, for plaintiff.

Fulkerson & Page, for defendant.

PAUL J.

This is an action of trespass, brought by J. G. Queesenbury administrator of Walter Goff, deceased, and commenced August 29, 1887, which is the date of the summons sued out at the institution of the suit. The declaration alleges that the said J. G. Queesenbury is a citizen of the state of Maryland while it is admitted that his intestate was a citizen of the state of Virginia. The defendant files three pleas in abatement; two of them going to the capacity of the plaintiff to sue, the third to the jurisdiction of the court. Two of the pleas allege that at the time this action was instituted the plaintiff was not the administrator of the deceased Goff. The third plea is that said administrator is not a resident of the state of Maryland. The evidence shows that at the April term, 1887, of the county court of Wythe county one Painter qualified as administrator of the estate of said decedent, giving bond as such administrator, but without security. On the 12th day of August, 1887, said county court, in term, made the following order, shown by a certified copy produced in evidence here now, to-wit:

'Virginia. At a court continued and held for Wythe county at the court-house, on Friday, 12th August, 1887,-- present the same judge as on yesterday,-- upon motion of Henry Painter he has leave to resign the administration of Walter Goff, decd., heretofore committed to him, it appearing that no funds of any kind have come to his hands. Ordered that court be adjourned until to-morrow morning, 10 o'clock. G. J. HOLBROOK.

'A copy. Teste: E. H. UMBARGER, D. Clerk. For WM. B. FOSTER, Clerk of the County Court of Wythe County, Virginia.'

On the following day of said court the plaintiff was appointed administrator of said Walter Goff, and duly qualified as such by giving bond with security. The court is of opinion that at the time the plaintiff was appointed administrator the powers of the former administrator had been revoked, and that the appointment of the plaintiff was regular and legal, and that he was the legally qualified representative of the deceased at the date of the institution of this suit.

Another objection to the jurisdiction of the court is based on the allegation by the defendant, and the facts admitted by the counsel for the plaintiff, that the plaintiff, a citizen of the state of Maryland, was selected by the friends of the deceased, and requested to qualify as administrator of his estate, in order to give this court jurisdiction of this suit. The court has carefully examined all of the authorities cited by counsel. Those chiefly relied on by counsel for the plaintiff are Childress v. Emory, 8 Wheat. 642; Bonafee v. Williams, 3 How. 574; Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172; Rice v. Houston, 13 Wall. 66. These cases really have no bearing upon this question, but they all bear upon the question as to the power of a foreign administrator to maintain a suit in a federal court, where the beneficiary and the defendant live in the same state; a question which was decided by this court at the November term, 1886, in Harper v. Railroad Co., ante, 102. It is not necessary to discuss these authorities further. The authorities relied upon by the defendant are Jones v. League, 18 How. 76; New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 2 S.Ct. 176; New York v. Louisiana, Id. In the case of Jones v. League it was shown that the plaintiff was not a resident of a state different from that in which the defendants lived. It was a question of the bona fide citizenship of the plaintiff; a very different question from the one now under discussion. The cases of New Hampshire and New York v. Louisiana were cases arising on statutes authorizing citizens of the former states to sue a state in the name of their respective states; the question being, as Chief Justice WAITE, puts it: 'Whether a state can allow the use of its name in such a suit for the benefit of one of its citizens?'-- the object plainly being to evade the eleventh amendment to the constitution of the United States, which forbids a citizen suing a state. And it was held the state had no such power. The court fails to see any analogy of that case to the question under consideration. In the case before us it is conceded that the plaintiff is a citizen of the state of Maryland. By reason of his citizenship he has a right to resort to the jurisdiction of this court. This right is conferred by the constitution and laws of the United States, and this right cannot be annulled by any agreement or understanding on the part of the relatives of the decedent and the plaintiff that he should qualify as such administrator with a purpose, by reason of his citizenship, to give this court jurisdiction of this suit. The reasons and motives actuating the real beneficiaries and the administrator in bringing his suit in this court are immaterial. He is authorized by the Virginia statute (chapter 145, Code Va. 1873) to bring this suit. He is the only party that could maintain it. He is officially responsible for the administration of the estate committed to his hands. He is here in accordance with the...