Goff v. Edwards
| Decision Date | 22 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-SC-0452-MR |
| Parties | DEBRA GOFF, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ELBERT GOFF, SR. APPELLANT v. HONORABLE BRIAN C. EDWARDS, JUDGE, JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT APPELLEE AND BRENDA DAUGHERTY, JENNIFER LYNN GOFF ARMSTRONG, AARON MATTHEW GOFF, JESSICA GOFF, TRAVIS EUGENE GOFF, BRANDON GRIDER, DONELLA SIMMS GRIDER, ANNETTE THOMPSON, AND TINA THOMPSON REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
COUNSEL FOR BRENDA DAUGHERTY; ANNETTE THOMPSON; AND TINA THOMPSON, APPELLEES/REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST: John Key Schoen Key Schoen Law Jennifer Lynn Goff Armstrong, Pro Se Appellee/Real Party in Interest Aaron Matthew Goff, Pro Se Appellee/Real Party in Interest Jessica Goff, Pro Se Appellee/Real Party in Interest Travis Eugene Goff, Pro Se Appellee/Real Party in Interest Brandon Grider, Pro Se Appellee/Real Party in Interest Donella Simms Grider, Pro Se Appellee/Real Party in Interest
This writ action requires us to once again consider the interplay of district and circuit court jurisdiction in matters related to probate. Appellant, Debra Goff (Goff), individually and in her capacity as the personal representative (Executrix) of the Estate of Elbert Goff, Sr., seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to dismiss the underlying Jefferson Circuit Court action filed by Annette Thompson Tina Thompson, and Brenda Daugherty (Goff's sisters, hereinafter referred to as "Sisters"). The underlying complaint brings a cause of action against Goff[1] and against Brandon Grider, Donella Simms Grider, Jennifer Lynn Goff Armstrong, Travis Eugene Goff, Aaron Matthew Goff, and Jessica Goff. Goff contends that the Jefferson Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint because it concerns probate matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Jefferson District Court. Goff also argues that because the complaint sets forth claims on behalf of the Estate which are actionable only by the personal representative, the Sisters lack standing to bring the action. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. For reasons stated below, we affirm.
Goff is the oldest of Elbert Goff, Sr.'s (Elbert) six children. In 1981, Elbert executed his Last Will and Testament, naming Goff as the Executrix and leaving his estate to his six children in equal amounts "per stirpes." In 2002, Elbert executed a Power of Attorney, naming Goff as his attorney-in-fact. Elbert died in November 2017. In March 2019, Goff presented Elbert's Will for probate in Jefferson District Probate Court and Goff was appointed Executrix. In March 2020, the Sisters, beneficiaries, filed a complaint against Goff and others. The complaint was amended in April 2021. The Sisters allege that Goff breached her fiduciary duties to Elbert before he died by self-dealing through the misuse of the Power of Attorney and after he died by self-dealing through the misuse of her authority as Executrix of Elbert's Estate. The Sisters also claim Goff failed to pursue debts owed to Elbert, particularly mortgage loans made to Goff's son and daughter-in-law. The Sisters demanded Goff provide an accounting of Elbert's assets and alleged that Goff herself did not report to the probate court the $400,000 she owed to Elbert. Their demand for relief from the circuit court includes the imposition of a constructive Trust upon the assets of Elbert's Estate, Goff being held liable for all money and assets that should be part of Elbert's Estate, punitive damages for Goff's willful and/or reckless misconduct as Elbert's fiduciary, and Goff's restraint from further administration of Elbert's Estate.
Goff moved to dismiss the original complaint against her on the basis that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction of the claims, but the circuit court denied the motion. The circuit court concluded that the Sisters, Elbert's heirs, have standing to pursue the asserted claims. While citing Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 395.510(1) as allowing the Sisters to file a circuit court action, the circuit court also concluded that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the Sisters' claims under the provision in KRS 24A.120(2) excluding "an adversarial proceeding involving probate" from district court jurisdiction.
Goff also objected to the subsequent filing of the amended complaint which also makes claims against other family members alleged to owe money to the Estate. Goff argued that claims against third parties do not fall within the purview of a KRS 395.510 settlement action and incorporated her previously- made standing and subject-matter jurisdiction arguments. The circuit court overruled Goff's objections and allowed the amended complaint to be filed.
Goff petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ mandating the Jefferson Circuit Court dismiss the Sisters' complaint. The Court of Appeals denied the request, concluding first that the Jefferson Circuit Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims alleged in the Sisters' complaint, making a first-class writ unavailable. As for Goff's argument that the Sisters did not have standing to bring the claims, the Court of Appeals concluded that even if that were true, Goff has an adequate remedy by appeal, making a second-class writ unavailable. This appeal followed.[2]
Being an extraordinary remedy, a writ is cautiously and conservatively granted. Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Ky. 1961). One type of writ, commonly known as a first-class writ, may be granted when a lower court is acting on matters outside its subject-matter jurisdiction. Goldstein v. Feeley, 299 S.W.3d 549, 551-52 (Ky. 2009). "The court has subject matter jurisdiction when the 'kind of case' identified in the pleadings is one which the court has been empowered, by statute or constitutional provision, to adjudicate." Daugherty v. Telek, 366 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Ky. 2012) (citation omitted).
One seeking a writ when the lower court is acting "outside of its jurisdiction" need not establish the lack of an adequate alternative remedy or the suffering of great injustice and irreparable injury. Those preconditions apply [when one seeks a second-class writ, which may be granted] when a lower court acts "erroneously but within its jurisdiction."
Goldstein, 299 S.W.3d at 552. The lower court's grant or denial of a writ is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 810 (Ky. 2004). However, when it is alleged that the lower court is acting outside its jurisdiction, a question of law is generally raised, and we review that question de novo. Id.
Goff insists this is a case in which the Court needs to disentangle the overlap of district and circuit court jurisdiction in probate matters and in doing so define a "settlement" action as referenced in KRS 395.510. The Court of Appeals primarily relied on Priestley v. Priestley, 949 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1997), and Myers v. State Bank & Trust Co., 307 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1957), authority cited within Priestley, to conclude the circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction of this case. Goff contends, citing Maratty v. Pruitt, 334 S.W.3d 107 (Ky. App. 2011), that Priestley's subject-matter jurisdiction analysis is only dicta. She also cites PNC v. Edwards, 590 S.W.3d 818 (Ky. 2019) (analyzing KRS 386B.8-180); Karem v. Bryant, 370 S.W.3d 867 (Ky. 2012) (analyzing KRS 387.520); Maratty, 334 S.W.3d 107 (analyzing KRS 395.617); and Privett v. Clendenin, 52 S.W.3d 530 (Ky. 2001) (analyzing KRS 385.192(1)), as recent cases which establish with clarity the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court in the management and settlement of probate estates. Upon review of these cases and the various statutes at issue in each, other than Maratty perhaps, we do not view the cases as adding to the guidance for resolving district and circuit court jurisdiction disputes in probate matters under KRS Chapter 395 and Chapter 24A. Instead, the plain language of the statutes, the foundation for discerning legislative intent, Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162, 169-70 (Ky. 2005) , leads to the conclusion that the Jefferson Circuit Court has subject-matter jurisdiction of the underlying case. Our analysis requires consideration of the jurisdictional structure of the circuit court and the district court generally and the treatment of probate matters particularly. Goff's focus within this structure is KRS 395.510(1). She asserts that the claims against her, claims related to management or mismanagement of the Estate, do not fall within the boundary of a KRS 395.510(1) "settlement" action.
In 1976, a restructuring of the courts occurred upon amendment of the Kentucky Constitution with the new Judicial Article. West v. Goldstein, 830 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Ky. 1992). Within the Kentucky Judiciary Act of 1976, KRS 23A.010(1) was enacted specifying that the "Circuit Court is a court of general jurisdiction; it has original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not exclusively vested in some other court." Id.[3] KRS 24A.120 was enacted specifying the district court's exclusive jurisdiction. Id.[4] The district court has exclusive jurisdiction in ...
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