Goff v. State

• Decision Date: 04 June 1910
• Citation: 60 Fla. 17,53 So. 327
• Parties: GOFF v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

53 So. 327

60 Fla. 17

GOFF v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

June 4, 1910

Rehearing Denied Oct. 12, 1910.

Error to Criminal Court of Record, Suwannee County; H. E. Carter Judge.

J. L Goff was convicted of arson, and brings error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

An information or indictment should state a prima facie case and where the exclusion of any matter constitutes an essential and affirmative element of the offense charged such matter should be negatived in the allegations. Matters that are not essential elements of the offense, but are in the nature of a defense, need not be negatived in charging the offense.

An intent to injure the insurer of the building is not an element of the offense defined in section 3276 of the General Statutes of 1906 and the offense defined in section 3278 is a substantive crime. Therefore an information under section 3276 need not negative that the building was burned with intent to injure the insurer of the building.

In a prosecution under section 3276 of the General Statutes of 1906, an allegation that the 'building was then and there the property of' a named person is sufficient as to the ownership of the building, and the description of the building as 'a business house * * * used and occupied as a meat market' is sufficient.

Alleged errors in the admission or rejection of testimony, which do not weaken the effect of testimony properly admitted, and which do not reach the legality of the trial itself, will not cause a reversal of a judgment of conviction, where the legal evidence admitted leaves no room for reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.

COUNSEL

John F. Harrell, for plaintiff in error.

Park Trammell, Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

WHITFIELD C.J.

The plaintiff in error was convicted of arson in the criminal court of record for Suwannee county, and on writ of error argues that a motion to quash the information should have been granted, and that immaterial evidence was introduced at the trial.

The information charges that the defendant did in Suwannee county on the day named 'unlawfully, willfully, and maliciously set fire to and burn a certain building there situate, to wit, a business house, which said building was then and there being used and occupied as a meat market and bowling alley; that said building was then and there the property of E. L. Parshley, and that said building was not then and there a dwelling house, nor a building adjoining a dwelling house, and was not then and there a house or building erected for public use, nor a banking house, warehouse, manufactory, nor mill, nor a barn, stable, shop, or office within the curtilage of a dwelling house nor any other building by the burning whereof any of the aforesaid buildings were burned.'

The statute under which this information is brought provides that 'whoever willfully and maliciously burns a barn, stable, shop, office, outhouse or other building whatsoever of another, other than is mentioned in sections 3273 and 3274, or a bridge, lock, dam, or flume, or a sloop or vessel of another, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding ten years.' Section 3276, General Statutes of 1906.

It is contended that, as section 3278 of the General Statutes prescribes that 'whoever burns a building * * * which is at the time insured against loss or damage by fire, with intent to injury the insurer, whether such person is the owner of the property burnt or not, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding twenty years,' the indictment in this case should negative that the building was burned 'with intent to injure the insurer,' to prevent a prosecution under section 3278.

An information or indictment should state a prima facie case; and where the exclusion of any matter constitutes an essential and affirmative element of the offense charged, such matter should be negatived in the allegations. Matters that are not essential elements of the offense, but are in the nature of a defense, need not be negatived in charging the offense. See 1 Bishop's New Crim. Proc. par. 631; State v. Turner, 106 N.C. 691, 10 S.E. 1026; 10 Current Law, 76; 8 Current Law, 196; 5 Current Law, 1803; 22 Cyc. 344; 10 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 495; State v. Paige, 78 Vt. 286, 62 A. 1017, 6 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 725, and notes.

An intent to injury the insurer of the building is not an element of the offense defined in section 3276, and the offense as defined in section 3278 is a substantive crime; therefore an information under section 3276 need not negative that the building was burned with intent to injure the insurer of the building.

If a prosecution under one of the sections is a bar to a prosecution under the other, that is a matter of defence in the second prosecution.

The indictment does negative matters stated in sections 3273 and 3274, because their exclusion is an essential element in the offense under section 3276.

It is also contended that the information should allege by whom the building was occupied. This is...