Goforth v. Fifield

• Decision Date: 11 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. S–14–0255.,S–14–0255.
• Parties: Stuart GOFORTH, Appellant (Defendant), v. Jamey FIFIELD, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

352 P.3d 242

2015 WY 82

Stuart GOFORTH, Appellant (Defendant)

v.Jamey FIFIELD, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. S–14–0255.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

June 11, 2015.

Representing Appellant: Bernard Q. Phelan, Attorney at Law, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: David G. Ditto of Associated Legal Group, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

Opinion

DAVIS, Justice.

[¶ 1] Appellee Jamey Fifield sued Appellant Stuart Goforth for trespassing on his property. Counsel for both parties attended a scheduling conference at which deadlines, a final pretrial conference, and a trial date were set. Goforth's counsel¹ failed to file the pretrial disclosures required by the scheduling order and he did not attend the pretrial conference. Because counsel did not appear at the conference and otherwise failed to comply with the scheduling order, the district court sanctioned his client by limiting his presentation of evidence at trial to testifying himself and cross-examining witnesses called by Fifield. The court ultimately found in Fifield's favor and awarded actual damages, quieted title, and granted an injunction against further trespass.

[¶ 2] On appeal, Goforth challenges the district court's sanction limiting his ability to present evidence, its finding that he had trespassed, and the award of damages. We find that the district court's judgment is sound in all respects except for a portion of the damages award. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ISSUES

[¶ 3] Appellant presents three issues for appellate review, which we have rephrased for exactitude:

1. Did the district court abuse its discretion in limiting Goforth's ability to present evidence at trial as a sanction for failure to attend the pretrial conference and to comply with the pretrial order?

2. Did Goforth raise an implied easement claim or present any evidence of such at trial, which could cause the district court's ruling concerning trespass to be in error?

3. Was the district court's decision on the amount of damages clearly erroneous?

FACTS

[¶ 4] Fifield and Goforth own adjacent lots in Cheyenne, Wyoming.² Goforth has a recorded easement for ingress and egress over the west portion of Fifield's property, but for years Fifield allowed him to cross on the east side.

[¶ 5] Their neighborly relationship deteriorated after Goforth began driving wherever he wanted, widened a road, and trenched a water line on Fifield's property without permission. Goforth also parked a pickup truck and camper just over his property line on the edge of Fifield's property.

[¶ 6] After paying for a survey and researching land records, Fifield demanded that the water line be removed and that Goforth use the deeded easement on the west side of his property rather than crossing it on the east side. He also demanded that Goforth remove the pickup truck and camper. Goforth did not accede to any of these demands, but instead further aggravated the situation by fencing off the recorded easement on the west side.

[¶ 7] Fifield filed a complaint seeking damages for trespass, a permanent injunction, and an order quieting title as to the east side access and the water line. He also sought punitive damages. Goforth timely answered, generally denying the allegations. He did not raise any affirmative defenses.

[¶ 8] The district court set a scheduling conference which counsel for both parties attended. The court then entered a scheduling order which was served on counsel by placing it in the respective attorneys' boxes in the clerk of court's office (commonly referred to as “the clerk's boxes”) as permitted by Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d).

[¶ 9] Fifield complied with the scheduling order by filing expert designations and a trial summary which included witness designations and exhibit lists. Goforth filed nothing. His counsel also failed to attend the final pretrial conference.

[¶ 10] At the pretrial conference, the district court noted on the record that Goforth's counsel was not in attendance, and that he had not submitted a pretrial memorandum or otherwise complied with the scheduling order. The judge explained to Fifield's counsel that if Goforth's attorney appeared for trial, she would probably not allow him to call any witnesses other than his client. She was uncertain as to whether she would allow Goforth's counsel to cross-examine Fifield's witnesses, and she reserved ruling in case Goforth's counsel contacted the court or otherwise requested a hearing to explain his failure to comply with the order and to appear and was able to provide a satisfactory explanation. Unfortunately, Goforth's counsel did nothing after missing the conference until trial.

[¶ 11] Both parties and their attorneys appeared for the scheduled trial.³ At the outset, the following exchange took place:

COURT: ... As you know, the Court did conduct a pretrial conference last week. You failed to appear for that conference, and you failed to comply with the Court's pretrial order concerning pretrial memoranda. As a result, I announced an intention at the pretrial conference to limit the plaintiff's ability to present evidence in this case and will stand by that decision to limit the plaintiff's ability to present evidence in this case. Mr. [Counsel for Goforth], certainly you can call your client to testify. Other than that, no witnesses and no evidence.

[GOFORTH'S COUNSEL]: I think that will work, Your Honor.

At no point during trial did Goforth's counsel make an offer of proof or indicate that he intended or claimed to be entitled to call witnesses other than his client or present exhibits other than those introduced by Fifield.

[¶ 12] Fifield testified and called two expert witnesses, and he offered numerous listed exhibits which were received in evidence without objection, including the following:

• An $8,000 estimate by Professional Landscaping, Inc. for removal and reclamation of the waterline.

• Evidence of the State schedule of fees for surface easements indicating that the State of Wyoming would have paid $1,875 to use a similar easement from June 2011, when the waterline was installed, to the date of trial.

• An estimate by Professional Landscaping, Inc. of $2,800 to reclaim the southwest portion of Fifield's property where Goforth had allegedly improperly graded, and to place a fence on the northwest portion.

• A claim for $1,012.50 for use of Fifield's property as an access road from November 4, 2011, the date that Fifield gave Goforth notice to cease and desist, until the date of trial, based also upon the State schedule of fees referred to above.

• A document indicating that the City of Cheyenne allows towing companies to charge $35 per day to store towed vehicles outside. From this, Fifield claimed $57,820 for Goforth's camper and pickup truck remaining on Fifield's property from November 4, 2011, the date that Fifield gave Goforth notice to remove them, until the date of trial.

[¶ 13] Goforth's counsel cross-examined two of the three witnesses called by Fifield and indicated that he had no questions for the third. Mr. Goforth testified on his own behalf.

[¶ 14] After hearing closing arguments, the district court ruled in Fifield's favor from the bench, finding that Goforth had trespassed, awarding damages in the amount of $71,507.50, and granting the requested injunction. It declined to award punitive damages, and it entered a Judgment and Order Including Injunction reflecting its oral ruling soon thereafter.

[¶ 15] After hiring new counsel, Goforth filed a motion for a new trial under W.R.C.P. 59(a)(5), (6) and (8).⁴ For the first time, he asserted that he had an implied easement over Fifield's property. However, the motion did not—perhaps because it could not—cite to any evidence admitted at trial which would support such a theory. The district court held a hearing and denied the motion.

[¶ 16] Goforth timely perfected this appeal.

DISCUSSION

Sanctions for Failing to Attend Pretrial Conference

[¶ 17] Goforth contends that his trial counsel failed to attend the final pretrial conference because he was not adequately served with the scheduling order and therefore did not know when he was required to file and serve pretrial disclosures or the date of conference. Goforth also asserts that the sanction imposed should have been preceded by an opportunity to be heard.

[¶ 18] The record clearly shows that the scheduling order was served upon counsel for both parties through their respective counsel's boxes at the Clerk of District Court's office as permitted by W.R.C.P. 77(d). That rule states:

(d) Service of orders or judgments. —Immediately upon the entry of an order or judgment the clerk shall provide and serve a copy thereof to every party who is not in default for failure to appear. The clerk shall note in the docket the date of service and the parties served. Service by the clerk may be accomplished by mail, hand delivery, clerk's boxes, or electronic means. The clerk shall provide envelopes and postage for the mailings. If service is accomplished by electronic means, this rule supersedes the requirements of W.S. § 5–3–210 to attach the seal of the court to all writs and orders. Any party may in addition serve a notice of such entry in the manner provided in Rule 5(b) for the service of papers. Lack of notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect the time to appeal or relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party for failure to appeal within the time allowed, except as permitted by the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure.

W.R.C.P. 77(d) (emphasis added).

[¶ 19] Goforth argues that this rule does not provide due process, but when we apply the applicable standard of review, we can easily confirm Rule 77(d)'s constitutional soundness. See Reynolds v. Bonar, 2013 WY 144, ¶ 7, 313 P.3d 501, 503 (Wyo.2013) (“Constitutional issues are questions of law, which we review de novo. ”). Our jurisprudence and that beyond these...