Goggins v. Harwood, 85-10
Decision Date | 13 August 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 85-10,85-10 |
Parties | Jack E. GOGGINS and Mary Ellen Goggins, husband and wife, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. Ed HARWOOD and Harwood Enterprises, a Wyoming corporation, Appellees (Defendants). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
C.S. Hinckley of Hinckley & Hinckley, Basin, for appellants.
Jeffrey J. Gonda of Lonabaugh and Riggs, Sheridan, for appellees.
Before THOMAS, C.J., ROSE, ROONEY and CARDINE, JJ., and LANGDON, District Judge.
This appeal grows out of a judgment entered upon a jury's verdict which finds that even though appellee Ed Harwood committed an assault and battery upon appellant Jack Goggins on September 14, 1981, the assault and the battery were not "a proximate cause of the injuries sustained" by appellant, and the jury's further finding that "[w]ithout considering" its answer to other questions on the verdict form, the amount which it believed would "fairly compensate the Plaintiff, Jack E. Goggins, for his alleged injuries" was "One Hundred Thousand $100,000.00." 1
Plaintiff-appellant Goggins alleged but defendant-appellee Harwood denied that Harwood committed an assault and battery upon Goggins by striking him on the head with his fist while he, Goggins, was sitting in his pickup truck. The jury decided this issue in Goggins' favor and, for purposes of this opinion, we are bound by that finding. The evidence is, however, in conflict with respect to the extent of the injury. Appellant's doctors testified that, as a consequence of the striking, and in addition to minor abrasions, contusions and a headache, Goggins suffered epilepsy, post-traumatic brain damage resulting in intelligence-quotient reduction and a serious ear injury. The appellee's doctors denied that these serious and permanent injuries or conditions resulted from the blow. Since we are bound to accept the testimony most favorable to the successful party and disregard the evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, 2 it will be our assumption throughout these considerations that the assault did not cause the appellant's alleged epilepsy, post-traumatic brain damage and permanent ear injury.
He described the "puncture type thing" as:
A request for a further description of the ear area brought this response:
"Well, they were scrapes and pin point punctures, whatever you want to call them, small breaks in the skin and some minor abrasions around the ear, abrasions just being a break on the skin as a pin prick being a small break in the skin or puncture wound."
Dr. Willson also reported that Goggins had a vascular headache due to a blow on the head.
Dr. Schwidde, a neurologist, to whom Dr. Willson referred Goggins, wrote to Willson after examining the appellant on September 15, 1981, that Goggins had "sustained a blow to the left ear" at 6:00 p.m. on September 14, 1981, and "he developed a right frontal headache." He said that he had received a "cranial cerebral trauma, blow to left ear" and that he had developed a "severe headache and neck and left pectoral pain" as a result of the blow and that Goggins was "dazed" after the blow but not rendered unconscious. The doctor prescribed some "Talwin Compound" to treat the headache.
It is to be further observed that both Dr. Willson and Dr. Schwidde submitted bills for services rendered to appellant, which services were necessitated by the assault and battery in issue here, and the appellant incurred medical prescription expense that was occasioned by the doctor's ordering medicine relief for the headaches.
The appellant represents that "the primary basis for this appeal" is the "Special Verdict Form." For clarity of the issues and the discussion which follows, we herewith publish the relevant part of that document:
The appellant argues that the trial court's instructions having to do with the allegations of the parties, causation, burden of proof, disability, and damages, when considered together with the special-verdict form, caused the jury to become confused, resulting in the return of a fatally inconsistent and faulty verdict. The questioned instructions pertaining to allegations of the parties, proximate cause, burden of proof, disability, and damages are the following: 3
Allegations of the Parties
Instruction No. 3 provided:
Instruction No. 6 provided "The Plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence the following:
Instruction No. 12 provided:
"You are further instructed that mental anguish and suffering arising proximately from said injuries, is a proper element of damages, which with reasonable certainty can be expected to hereafter endure, arising from the decrease of the ability of any part of the body to function." (Emphasis added.)
Instruction No. 13 provided:
"When preexisting condition or disability is so aggravated, the damages as to such condition or disability are limited to the additional injury caused by the aggravation." 6 (Emphasis added.)
Damages
Instruction No. 9 provided:
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