Going v. Pagani

• Decision Date: 30 November 1976
• Citation: 372 A.2d 516,172 Conn. 29
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Wayne A. GOING et al. v. Herbert I. PAGANI et al.

Page 516

372 A.2d 516

172 Conn. 29

Wayne A. GOING et al. v. Herbert I. PAGANI et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Nov. 30, 1976.

Richard A. Wallace and Robert A. Teitenberg, West Hartford, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Joseph F. Skelley, Jr., Hartford, with whom was Jeffrey L. Williams, West Hartford, for appellees (defendants).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and COTTER, LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI and BARBERT, JJ. LOISELLE, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from the judgment rendered following a jury verdict for the defendants and from the court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion to set aside the verdict.

On November 12, 1971, Wayne A. Going, then sixteen years of age, was operating an automobile owned by his father, Merrill L. Going, on route 31 in Coventry. A collision occurred between that vehicle and one owned by Francis Cammisa and operated by Herbert I. Pagani. Through his father, Wayne brought suit against Pagani and Cammisa for personal injuries and other damages and, in his individual capacity, Merrill Going sought to recover for the damages to his automobile and for medical and hospital expenses incurred on behalf of his son. The verdict for the defendants was returned on February 19, 1975.

The principal questions raised on the trial involved the location on the highway of the point of impact between the two automobiles, and which had the right of way. On their appeal, the plaintiffs have briefed and argued two assignments of error addressed to evidential rulings of the court, one claim of error in the court's charge and another in its refusal to set aside the verdict.

The first claim of the plaintiffs is that the court erred in permitting an investigating police officer, Trooper Donald J. Arcari, to testify, as a result of his observations at the scene of the accident, to his opinion as to the location on the highway of the point of collision between the two cars and also erred in admitting into evidence as exhibits two diagrams of the scene prepared by the officer containing his record of the measurements on the highway, the relative positions of the vehicles on it, and his indication of where in his opinion the point of impact was located. The plaintiffs contend that Trooper Arcari did not have such special skill or knowledge beyond the ken of the average juror as to permit him to express his opinion about the location of the point of impact. Secondly, the plaintiffs argue that even if he did have special skill or knowledge, he lacked sufficient facts on which to express an opinion. The plaintiffs also claim that the exhibits based on the trooper's observation, in illustration of his testimony, were inadmissible if his testimony was.

In Waldron v. Raccio, 166 Conn. 608, 613, 614, 353 A.2d 770, 773, involving a similar claim, this court stated: 'Expert opinion testimony as to the point of impact in a motor vehicle accident is proper provided the witness had been qualified and an adequate foundation for his testimony has been laid. . . . The trial judge has a broad discretion to determine the qualifications of an expert. . . . ' (I)f any reasonable qualifications can be established, the objection goes to the weight rather than to the admissibility of the evidence.' . . . 'Some facts must be shown as the foundation of . . . an (expert's) opinion, but there is no rule of law declaring the precise facts which must be proved before such an opinion may be received in evidence. It is largely a matter of judicial discretion whether a witness has been shown to have sufficient experience and opportunity of observation to render his opinion of value."

There was evidence which clearly supported the court's finding that Trooper Arcari was qualified to state an expert opinion. He had served twenty-six months as a member of the Connecticut state police department and had investigated 130 to 140 accidents. He arrived on the accident scene within minutes of the collision, made a visual examination of the scene and took measurements which he charted. The opinion he gave at the trial was based on his experience and his own pertinent, first-hand observation. It was well within the trial court's discretion to admit the trooper's testimony based on his investigation. 'The trial court's decision is not to be disturbed on appeal 'unless that discretion has been abused, or the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law." Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 513, 325 A.2d 277, 279. We find no error in the ruling of the court admitting the trooper's testimony and his diagrams to illustrate and explain it.

The plaintiffs next contend that the trial court erred in excluding testimony offered by Robert M. Cromwell, the plaintiffs' expert witness, and in excluding exhibits offered to illustrate his testimony. The record indicates no challenge to Cromwell's qualifications as an automotive and mechanical safety engineer with expertise in the reconstruction of accidents. In making its ruling excluding Cromwell's testimony, the trial court stated its conclusion that there were 'so many factors that are so far from certain on which this expert bases his opinion, I feel the uncertainties as to the essential facts are such as to make an opinion based on them without substantial probative value in this case.' In its memorandum of decision denying the motion to set aside the verdict, the court further specified the basis of its ruling: 'This opinion was not permitted since the court found (that) it was based on such conjecture and factual uncertainty as to lack any substantial probative value for the jury. Sears v. Curtis, 147 Conn. 311, 315, 160 A.2d 742; Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 666, 136 A.2d 918. Cromwell did not examine the accident scene until January 19, 1975, some three years and two months after the accident. The road in question had been resurfaced in the interim. As to the point of impact, the jury heard testimony from the operators of the vehicles involved and from police officers who arrived at the scene shortly after the accident and observed the location of the vehicles and the debris on the roadway. The testimony admitted was, by far, the better evidence and there was no need in this case to resort to evidence which could only serve to confuse and possibly mislead the jury. The plaintiffs' expert was permitted to give his opinion on several points to the jury. Other questions were excluded either because they lacked essential facts or were based on facts not in evidence.'

The record discloses that Cromwell began his investigation of this accident...